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This project focuses on how news coverage of climate change structures policy 
debates to examine its role in slowing down the momentum for large-scale policy change, 
such as cap-and-trade legislation. I present a theory of media signaling in what I call the 
“muddled space” of policy debates on complex problems, and apply it to the issue 
climate change. I argue that there is a dual role for media influence in the muddled space: 
it prioritizes attention to policy problems, but also limits the comprehensiveness of 
solutions used to fix them. On problem expansion, findings suggest that two aspects of 
news coverage – attribute diversity and volume – amplify problem uncertainty in policy 
debates and heighten disputes over its severity and are thus important factors in 
prioritizing the climate problem. Causal uncertainty in news coverage – doubt about the 
linkages among human actions, global warming, and climate impacts – makes it less 
likely that the climate problem will be on the policy agenda. But once it is on the agenda, 
causal uncertainty seems to mobilize policy brokers around strategies to define the 
climate problem and delineate its solutions. On solution containment, findings suggest 
that high levels of causal uncertainty is a limiting factor for the generation of large-scale 
climate solutions, such as cap-and-trade. I also find that attribute diversity and causal 
uncertainty in news coverage play an important role in increasing the likelihood that 
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policy debates on climate solutions will converge around incremental approaches to 
fixing it, such as energy efficiency measures. This study is important because it 
demonstrates that the influence of news coverage on public affairs is quite large in its 
ability to moderate attention to policy problems and their attendant solutions. The 
“muddled space” helps explain why complex problems get “stuck” in cycles of policy 
debates over problem definitions, which leads to less effective solutions employed to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
We need to look at the science and be honest about the uncertainties associated 
with climate change… In order to impact global emissions, we must shift from 
costly subsidies and regulations to research and technological solutions that will 
be used not only here but around the world. In other words, let’s set aside the 
fiction and focus on a real solution.1 
 
Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX), Chairman of the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology, penned this op-ed for the Texas Tribune in 2013 to 
mobilize opposition against the Obama Administration’s Climate Action Plan to set 
limits on carbon pollution from power plants. In this piece, Rep. Smith highlights the 
uncertainty in the science that links extreme weather events to climate change, insisting 
this this connection is more due to “exaggerated claims” by politicians. In light of the 
“uncertainties associated with climate change,” he argues that research and technological 
solutions, such as carbon capture, are the “real solutions” – not subsidies and costly 
regulations. A version of this op-ed was also published in The Hill and the Washington 
Post.2   
This is a common tactic used by opponents of comprehensive solutions such as 
cap-and-trade – emphasize uncertainties in the climate problem to steer debate towards 
less costly, incremental approaches to addressing it. In the midst of debating cap-and-
trade legislation in 2007, Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) admitted that climate change was 
a serious problem, but that legislation for greater fuel economy standards was a more 
appropriate solution given that “we need to look at other possible causes of climate 
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change,” such as solar radiation.3 His colleague, Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond (R-
MO), echoed this reasoning in arguing for biofuels and energy efficiency measures until 
both the scientific and policy communities better understood climate impacts.4    
Climate change has been a fixture of elite policy debates since 1988, but as of 
2016 Congress has yet to pass comprehensive climate legislation. We have however 
passed many bills to fund research on climate science, clean energy technologies, and to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions through less costly, incremental solutions. Our 
counterpart, the European Union, has had a cap-and-trade system in place since 2005. 
Why is the United States such a laggard in terms of large-scale solutions to fixing the 
climate problem? One of the oft-cited culprits for policy stagnation is climate news 
coverage (Boycoff and Boycoff 2004, 2007; Schmid-Petri et al 2015; Painter 2011; 
Painter and Ashe 2012). In fact, the House in 2007 held a hearing to examine how media 
organizations distort science in climate news.5 Despite this, questions of if and how news 
coverage influences climate policy remain largely untested in the academic literature.6  
Climate change is one of the most heavily politicized, diabolically complex policy 
problems of our time (Steffen 2011; Boykoff and Yulman 2013). In this dissertation, I 
focus on how news coverage has structured climate policy debates to examine its role in 
slowing down the momentum for large-scale policy change. I present a theory of media 
signaling in what I call the “muddled space” of policy debates on complex policy 
problems, and apply it to the issue of climate change. I argue that the role of the media 
here is one of problem expansion and also solution containment. What does this mean? It 
                                                 
3
 Climate Change Research and Scientific Integrity, Senate, 110th Cong., 2007. 
4
 Vice President Al Gore’s Perspective on Global Warming, Senate, 110th Cong., 2007. 
5
 Shaping the Message, Distorting the Science: Media Strategies to Influence Science Policy, House, 100th 
Cong., 2007. 
6
 For an exception, see Liu et al (2011). 
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means that news coverage induces competition and conflict among policy communities 
over how to understand the climate problem. This expands its scope and makes it a 
priority issue on the policy agenda. Put simply, climate change is a problem considered 
worth solving in some fashion in large part because the media covers it. Then how do we 
arrive at solution containment? We arrive here because the way the media covers climate 
change matters – it induces problem expansion, but at the same time, limits the set of 
politically feasible policy alternatives that will be seriously considered to solve it. 
How does this happen? I focus on how three aspects of news coverage – attribute 
diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – structure policy debates that encourage 
prioritizing the climate problem, but also steer debate towards limiting its scope of 
solutions. The first aspect of news coverage, attribute diversity, leads to amplifying 
problem uncertainty in policy debates – how is the climate problem best understood? 
This is contestation among policy communities over how to define the climate problem 
and delineate its solutions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Kingdon 2003). The second aspect, causal uncertainty, increases the tenuousness of 
the linkages between the causes and the consequences of climate change. This intensifies 
disputes in policy debates about problem severity – what is causing global warming and 
is global warming a serious threat? This is contestation among policy communities over 
causal stories that (dis)connect activities with unwanted outcomes that warrant 
government intervention. These are fundamental as precursors to problem prioritization 
and policy change (Stone 1988, 1989; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Cobb and Elder 1972; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  The third aspect, volume, elevates the salience of climate 
change in policy debates – how important is it that we pay attention to and solve the 
climate problem? The role of the media in driving issue salience is a well-known 
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component of policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; McCombs 2008; Van Aelst 
and Walgrave 2006). 
Chapter 2: Media Signaling in the Muddled Problem Space 
This dissertation is organized into five substantive chapters. Chapter 2 provides the 
theoretical foundations of media signaling. It introduces the contributor and conduit 
approaches to understanding media influence that inform the theory of media signaling. 
These were bore out of the policy processes and communications literatures, respectively 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Bennett 1990, 1996, 2002). 
The theory of media signaling offered in this project is grounded in the information-
processing perspective of information flows in policy debates (Simon 1983; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005; Workman 2015). Chapter 2 thus provides an overview of the 
information-processing framework, focusing on the relationship between attention limits 
and problem prioritization, disproportionate information-processing, positive and 
negative feedback, and the attribute diversity and causal uncertainty attached to complex 
policy problems. Chapter 2 introduces the “muddled problem space” in which policy 
debates over complex problems take place. It also includes a discussion of how the media 
operate in subsystem policymaking, which are the loci of competition and conflict over 
policy problems (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Thurber 1991).  
Chapter 3: Problem Expansion and Solution Containment 
Chapter 3 explicates the problem expansion and solution containment argument 
based on the theory of media signaling, and as applied to climate change. News coverage 
elevates the climate problem. It organizes and prioritizes policy attention. It activates 
competition and conflict over which attributes define climate change in policy debates. It 
also moderates disputes over causal relationships that are used by policy communities to 
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advocate for either limited or comprehensive solutions. The nature of news coverage – 
the three aspects attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – heighten already 
intense debates over the climate problem. The nature of news coverage also increases 
existing uncertainties about climate change. In light of so much unsettled uncertainty, 
news coverage limits climate solutions to those that do not have as many consequences 
for resource allocation, government intervention, and complicated regulatory regimes.  
This dissertation looks at how news coverage influences problem prioritization 
and solution generation in policy debates. This maps back onto problem expansion and 
solution containment, respectively. The theory of media signaling suggests that policy 
communities as a whole will prioritize the climate problem as attribute diversity and 
volume of news coverage grows. This is because these are media signals that focus policy 
attention and mobilize competition over problem definition in light of problem 
uncertainty and the importance of climate change. Policy communities will be less likely 
to prioritize the climate problem as a whole, however, as causal uncertainty in news 
coverage increases because its severity and need of government redress will be called 
into question. High-profile policy brokers are crucial players in the problem definition 
process (Kingdon 2003; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Mintrom and Norman 2009). The theory of media signaling also implies that policy 
brokers acting on behalf of policy communities will respond to all three media signals 
once the climate problem is on the policy agenda – an arena in which conflict and 
competition are already at elevated levels. 
Regarding the generation of solutions and their containment, the theory of media 
signaling suggests that large-scale climate solutions in policy debates will decrease with 
attribute diversity and causal uncertainty in news coverage because these signals amplify 
problem uncertainty and highlight disputes over how severe are the climate impacts. 
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Volume of coverage should have the opposite effect – it should increase large-scale 
solutions because its signals the growing importance of fixing the climate problem. We 
should see completely different dynamics for the relationship between news coverage and 
incremental solutions. The theory of media signaling implies that limited approaches to 
fixing the climate problem should become more prominent in policy debates with 
attribute diversity and causal uncertainty in climate news coverage. This is because these 
media signals increase the political feasibility and policy tool appropriateness of less 
costly, smaller-scale alternatives in light of high levels of problem and causal uncertainty. 
Again, we should see volume have an opposite effect because the signal of importance 
will shift debates away from less effective solutions toward either comprehensive 
approaches or efforts to better understand how the climate problem should be 
characterized. 
To test the expectations that are laid out in Chapter 3, this dissertation uses four 
dependent variables that are derived from a dataset based on over 400 congressional 
hearings on climate change from 1987 to 2012. The three independent variables for 
climate news coverage of attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume are from a 
dataset of almost 5,000 newspaper stories from the New York Times and the Washington 
Post. Both of these datasets are coded for climate policy content using an innovative two-
step machine-human hybrid approach to analyzing political texts. The result is an 
expansive dataset that includes information on the number of large-scale and incremental 
climate solutions in policy debates based on a set of nine possible types of solutions 
mentioned in opening statements and witness testimonies at congressional hearings. The 
dataset on the media is coded for over 30 unique attributes of climate change found in 
news coverage, as well as a thorough accounting of reporting on climate science to 
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capture causal uncertainty. These datasets on solutions and climate attributes in the news 
are the most extensive of their kind.    
Chapter 4: News Coverage of Climate Change, 1987-2012 
Chapter 4 takes the media signals attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and 
volume and ties them explicitly to a detailed history of how climate change has been 
covered in the news from 1987 to 2012. This chapter is organized into three sections, one 
for each of the three media signals. These sections contain a discussion of the relationship 
between the signal and subsystem (i.e. policy community) responsiveness, an overview of 
the journalistic practices behind them, and an accounting of how each signal appears in 
the content of climate news. This chapter incorporates the contributor and conduit 
traditions introduced in Chapter 2 and shows how increases in news volume index to 
events, elite conflict over climate policy, and scientific controversies. It lays out what 
attribute diversity in climate coverage looks like, where it comes from, and how it has 
been covered. This chapter also explains how news coverage of climate science produces 
an overemphasis on causal uncertainty, and how this important dimension has ebbed and 
flowed over time as one of the dominant news frames. 
Chapter 5: Prioritizing the Climate Problem 
Chapters 5 and 6 address the problem expansion and solution containment 
argument by modeling how news coverage structures policy debates on climate change, 
focusing on problem prioritization and solution generation, respecitvely. Chapter 5 on 
problem expansion examines how attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume 
influence how policy communities prioritize the climate problem. Prioritizing policy 
attention is a necessary precursor to coming up with its solutions (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005). Does news coverage influence problem prioritization, and if so, how? This chapter 
uses two indicators of prioritization – congressional hearings for policy communities as a 
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group and the number of opening statements made at these hearings as a proxy for policy 
brokers prioritizing climate change. Findings from this chapter suggest that attribute 
diversity and volume of news coverage moderate problem uncertainty and disputes over 
severity and are thus important factors in prioritizing the climate problem. The number of 
congressional hearings and opening statements increase alongside growth in these media 
signals. Causal uncertainty in climate news lowers the priority of the problem among 
policy communities as a group, making it less likely to be up for debate on the policy 
agenda.  But once it is the subject of formal debates, causal uncertainty seems to 
prioritize the climate problem among policy brokers. Chapter 5 also demonstrates support 
for disproportionate information-processing of signals coming from news coverage. 
Findings suggest that only clear and strong signals of causal uncertainty influence 
problem prioritization by way of congressional hearings. Policy brokers seem only to 
respond when volume of news coverage is a clear and strong media signal as well. 
Chapter 6: Limiting Climate Solutions 
Chapter 6 on solution containment examines how the three aspects of news 
coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – structure the scope of 
climate solutions considered in policy debates. Does news coverage encourage limited 
approaches to solving the climate problem, as implied by the logic of media signaling in 
the muddled space? This chapter develops a typology of climate solutions to address this 
question – which are large-scale and incremental solutions that map on to the 
effectiveness of policy alternatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Findings suggest 
that high levels of causal uncertainty in news coverage is a limiting factor for the 
generation of large-scale climate solutions, such as cap-and-trade measures. The results 
for both attribute diversity and volume’s influence on large-scale solutions are in the 
expected direction, but their estimates do not reach statistical significance. This chapter 
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also looks at how media signals structure the generation of smaller-scale, less costly 
solutions to the climate problem, such as efficiency increases and enhancing green 
technologies. Findings imply that attribute diversity and causal uncertainty in news 
coverage play an important role in increasing the likelihood that policy debates on 
climate solutions will converge around incremental approaches to fixing it. Volume of 
coverage has the opposite effect, as expected – signals that amplify the importance of the 
climate problem seem to steer policy debates away from incremental solutions and 
perhaps toward further deliberating the problem in order to fix it. Results from this 
chapter also support disproportionate information-processing of some media signals 
flowing from news coverage, in that signals of causal uncertainty seem to need to be clear 













Chapter 2: Media Signaling in the Muddled Problem Space 
This dissertation presents a theory of media signaling from the information-
processing approach to studying policy change. Media influence is the result of how news 
coverage interacts with what I call the muddled problem space that characterizes complex 
policy problems, such as climate change. This dynamic produces information signals 
about policy problems to which policy communities respond. This chapter is organized 
into four sections. The first provides an overview of the contributor and conduit 
approaches to understanding media influence – the two literatures on which the theory of 
media signaling is based. The second section addresses crucial aspects of the 
information-processing framework to understanding media influence on policy change. 
The third section introduces the muddled problem space that characterizes complex 
policy problems. The fourth section is a discussion of how the media fits in with 
subsystem policymaking – the forum in which the problem definition process occurs.  
MEDIA SIGNALING: COMBINING THE CONTRIBUTOR AND CONDUIT PERSPECTIVES 
As Bryan D. Jones and I have argued elsewhere (2010), media influence from the 
information-processing perspective in the policy process is best understood in terms of 
interinstitutional signaling (see Workman 2015 for a comprehensive application to the 
bureaucracy).  Expanding on Jones and Wolfe 2010 (and Wolfe et al 2013; Wolfe 2012), 
this project investigates how policy communities (also known as subsystems) in 
governing institutions respond to media signals about heavily politicized complex policy 
problems. This project uses two frameworks (see Table 2.1) to develop a theory of media 
influence based on signaling. To be sure, it expands notions of influence based on 
information processing from the contributor approach and incorporates the journalistic 
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norms and practices used by news organizations to cover political and public affairs from 
the conduit approach.   
Table 2.1: The Characteristics of the Contributor and Conduit Approaches to Media 
Influence 
 
The most important commonality bridging these two approaches is that they both 
focus on elite debate, or in other words, on conflict. From the conduit perspective, news 
coverage is indexed to conflict, but it does not cause conflict. The parameters of elite 
debate are reflected in the news on public affairs, but such coverage does not help shape 
such debate. One implication of the conduit approach is that policy does not change in 
any sort of meaningful fashion absent a departure from official elite sources (Bennett, 
1996, 2003; Lawrence 2000; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007; see also Sparrow 
1999 from an institutions perspective). This is one of the most important ways in which 
these two frameworks diverge. According to the contributor literature, referencing elites 
from outside the dominant policy coalition or more peripheral subsystem participants has 
direct implications for policy change. In this camp, news coverage is a mechanism for 
positive feedback and conflict expansion, which are precursors for policy punctuations.    
There are a couple of additional important points of departure between the 
contributor and conduit approaches that lead to opposing conclusions of media influence 
on policy change. First, each emphasizes different agendas and information flows. The 
Contributor Conduit
Field Policy Process Political Communication
Behavioral Explanation Information-processing Journalistic norms and practices
Literature Punctuated Equilibrium Theory Indexing
Agenda Policy Media 
Information Flow Media → Government Government → Media
 Influence on Policy Change Punctuations Status quo 
Mechanism Positive feedback Index to elite conflict
 12 
contributor tradition focuses on the flow of information from the media to the 
government agenda to explain policy change. Conversely, the conduit framework centers 
on information flows from elites to the media to explain source selection. Second, the two 
approaches generally differ in the duration of the time period under investigation. From 
the contributor perspective, long periods of time (10-20, and even 50+ years) are a 
prerequisite for examining policy change. The conduit subfield generally produces 
relatively shorter case studies (of the qualitative and quantitative variety). The conduit 
approach is not incompatible with the contributor’s view (and findings) that news 
coverage driven by elite conflict can foment policy change; rather, its approach to 
studying the government-media relationship biases findings toward the status quo.   
In the parlance of the contributor framework, bias toward the status quo is 
attributed to negative feedback processes – forces that induce stability in policymaking. 
However until very recently (Wolfe 2012; Jones and Wolfe 2010; Wolfe et al 2013), the 
contributor literature had not engaged in studies that looked at the negative feedback 
effects brought on by news coverage. To be sure, negative feedback from this perspective 
does not mean policy stasis, but instead processes that dampen momentum for punctuated 
changes in policy. This project extends the work bore out of the contributor approach by 
including an examination of how the nature of news coverage can contribute to negative 
feedback. Situated in PET’s information processing framework, news coverage is 
conceptualized as signals that character the state of policy problems. Under the right 
conditions, these signals are detected, prioritized, and used as opportunities by those 
involved in policymaking to better understand the problem at hand and to further their 
own goals. Depending on the nature of news coverage, information signals from the 
media aid in expanding problems (positive feedback) and containing the scope of the 
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solutions that would help solve them.  These approaches are combined to explain climate 
news coverage in detail in Chapter 4.      
INFORMATION-PROCESSING: AN OVERVIEW 
Is the influence of news coverage better understood as either conduit or 
contributor, or can it be both? This project presents compelling reasons why media 
attention to public affairs facilitates both stability and change, both negative and positive 
feedback effects. One reason is because the notion of influence is supplanted by the 
fundamental importance of signaling. An additional reason is because this project focuses 
on how the media influences complex policy problems, using climate change as a theory-
building case study. This chapter is devoted to explaining media influence on complex 
problems from the information-processing perspective.  
The information-processing approach is rooted in the fundamental question of 
how political institutions respond to incoming information (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
2015). This perspective puts a premium on information as inputs into the system directing 
the allocation of attention. Key here is the notion that this involves a process of weighting 
and reweighting issue importance and the reorganization of problem prioritization. Work 
in this vein grew from the tradition of Simon (1947), was extended by Jones (1994; 
2001), and by Jones and Baumgartner (2005; 2015).  The role of the media from this 
perspective is understood as one of several important inputs into the policymaking 
process that directs the allocation of attention (Wolfe et al 2013). 
Baumgartner and Jones’ seminal work Agendas and Instability in 1993 
encouraged a punctuated approach to understanding media influence in terms of attention 
dynamics. The contributor camp has subsequently generated a multitude of studies 
confirming and providing nuance to the positive feedback role of the media (Jones and 
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Baumgartner, 2005; Boydstun 2013; Walgrave 2011; Wolfe et al 2013), buttressing the 
notion that there is a role for news coverage in the information-processing approach to 
policymaking (Jones and Wolfe, 2010).   
The contributor tradition of agenda setting focuses on problem recognition and 
(re)definition, necessarily putting much research at the front-end of policymaking (Cobb 
and Elder 1972; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Stone 1988, 1989; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Kingdon 2003). This perspective thus centers itself on the problem space in 
decision contexts at the systems-level, which is characterized by an oversupply of 
information and an undersupply of attention (Newell and Simon 1972; Jones 1994; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Workman 2015). What follows from examining media 
influence from an information-processing perspective is an emphasis on how attention 
limits, disproportionate information processing, negative and positive feedback, and the 
dynamics between complexity and uncertainty shape government agendas and policy 
outcomes (Wolfe et al 2013). These concepts are crucial to understanding the role of the 
media as information signaler and to linking problem expansion and solution containment 
to news coverage. 
The Relationship Between Attention Limits and Prioritization   
Governing institutions are at heart about problem-solving (Workman 2015; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Following the logic of attention limits, a primary task of 
political institutions is prioritizing policy problems. This prioritization process is at its 
core about detecting and categorizing information in an effort to define the problem at 
hand. As such, policymakers spend a great amount of time operating within a pluralistic 
problem space (Jones and Baumgartner 2015; Workman 2015). This space is 
characterized by an oversupply of information about public policy provided by a 
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multitude of diverse sources, including interest groups, think tanks, political parties, 
bureaucracies, congressional committees, state and local governments, researchers, and 
media organizations. These are inputs into the system – signals -- about policy problems. 
In order to attend to problems, understand their magnitude, and extract their 
relevant dimensions in the pluralistic problem space, policymakers and the institutions 
they embody are tasked with detecting and prioritizing multiple information streams. 
Instead of searching for information, policymaking in the problem space is about 
weighting the bombarding supply of information (Jones 2001; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005). When Congress is prioritizing, it is deciding which issues, and what dimensions, 
are relevant – and which are not. This problem prioritization process is how the 
information-rich environment is winnowed to set – and change -- the policy agenda. 
Disproportionate Information-Processing   
Political institutions, because they are hampered by human and organizational 
limitations that cause “friction” or “stickiness” in the system, are disproportionate 
information-processors (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Jones 2001; Baumgartner and 
Jones 2009; Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009). Disproportionate information processing 
causes both negative and positive feedback. It leads to overreacting to some vague or 
relatively subtle signals and underreacting to other signals that are clear and strong. In a 
pluralistic policymaking environment, it is virtually impossible to react proportionately to 
the “objective reality” of incoming information. Since policymaking institutions have 
limited capacities, agenda space is finite. Attending to issue X, Y, Z or honing in on one 
of these issues attendant attributes X1, X2, X3 necessarily means that they are not 
attending to issues A, B, C or attributes X4, X5, X6.  
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Though “not the whole story” (see Jones and Baumgartner 2005, p 51), 
disproportionate information-processing implies room for threshold effects for the theory 
of media influence based on signaling. Small changes in the volume or content of news 
coverage occurring in a sea of competing information signals will not always trigger 
(re)action from policy communities. Disproportionate information-processing suggests 
that in some contexts, especially if the information environment is saturated, shifts in 
attention will only come about as a response to higher-than-normal changes in media 
coverage. For example, Wolfe (2012) finds that the speed of lawmaking slows down 
much more drastically with high levels of news coverage.  This is a fruitful avenue for 
research, as signal strength based on news coverage and its effects on policymaking is 
under-investigated.  
Positive and Negative Feedback 
Policy agendas and outcomes are characterized by periods of relative stability 
interspersed with dramatic change by scholars in the contributor tradition of punctuated 
equilibrium theory (PET). The same aforementioned constraints and points of friction – 
attention limits and institutional structures – produce both equilibrium by dampening the 
flow of information (negative feedback) and considerable movement away from the 
status quo by amplifying information flows (positive feedback). The policy processes 
perspective emphasizes both positive and negative feedback in policymaking (Kingdon 
1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Workman 2015). 
Though since the overriding goal is to explain agenda and policy change, we see a lot of 
scholarship in this vein focusing on positive feedback processes operating in the context 
of a bias toward equilibrium states. This is especially the case when analyzing the role of 
the media (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
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Put succinctly by Baumgartner and Jones (2002, p 13), positive feedback is “a 
self-reinforcing process that accentuates rather than counterbalances a trend.”  By 
amplifying information signals, positive feedback can be an explosive, destabilizing force 
that produces large adjustments in policy outcomes. Some positive feedback mechanisms 
in economics and politics include social mimicking (Schelling 1978; Bartels 1988), cue-
taking in political institutions and the policymaking process (Mathews and Stimson 1975; 
Kingdon 1973; Baumgartner et al 2009), and issue bandwagons and contagion effects 
(Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Halpin 2011; Boushey 2010; Thomas 2015).  
Positive Feedback and the Media: Focusing Events   
Oftentimes focusing events or “triggering devices” can carve out agenda space 
(Cobb and Elder 1972; Downs 1972; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Birkland 1997, 1998; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) by shifting attention, thereby 
introducing new and elevating newly-redefined policy problems. This happens especially 
when the media latches onto them. Events and policy problems are often linked in news 
coverage due to the journalistic need for contextualization and the imperative for 
interpretation -- called the routinization of reporting (Bennett 2002; Tuchman 1978). 
Environmental disasters, such as Three Mile Island, or natural disasters and extreme 
conditions such as hurricanes and heat waves linked to global warming, receive such 
treatment from the media. When this happens, harm and risk become an amplified 
attribute of the policy image, creating a window of opportunity for problem redefinition.   
For example, environmental (and fishing) policy advocates seized a window of 
opportunity provided by media coverage of the oil spill from the Exxon Valdez to shift 
attention to alternative attributes of the problem definition and policy solutions, which led 
to a revision of existing laws (Birkland 1997).  With the policy monopoly for nuclear 
power already in decline, media and congressional attention to the negative aspects of 
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nuclear energy dramatically increased following the meltdown at Three Mile Island on 
March 28, 1979 (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, pp 65, 75), leading to a massive 
regulatory overhaul of this sector. The attribute-issue linkage provided by the media and 
driven by “dramatic real-world events” is especially important for increasing attention to 
and the legitimacy of complex, organizationally fragmented environmental issues such as 
climate change (Unger 1992). In this policy arena, we often see news coverage indexed to 
legislative events, climate summits, the release of high-profile scientific reports, and 
scientific controversies (Trumbo 1996; Liu et al 2008, 2013; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 
2007; Shehata and Hopmann 2012)  
Positive Feedback and the Media: Venue-Shopping  
Venue-shopping is integral to understanding policy change from the policy 
processes perspective (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Wilson 2000). The media can also be a positive feedback force by acting as an alternative 
venue for policy advocates to increase the salience of their issue (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Cobb and Elder 1972; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988), which expands the scope of 
conflict. This strategy is undertaken in order to redefine the issue with the ultimate goal 
of changing policy in a desired direction. Issue advocates often use news coverage as a 
tool for mobilizing interests – public and elite -- outside of closed policymaking 
subsystem. This is a particularly well-known strategy in environmental politics (Pralle 
2003, 2006), especially in the United States with its political system characterized by 
multiple venues (Green-Pederson and Wolfe 2009). It is a well-established tactic used by 
climate change skeptics (Oreskes and Conway 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2003). 
Pesticides policy is a classic example. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) link changes in 
pesticides policy to shifts in how it was covered in the news – from positive frames of 
scientific progress and productivity to negative frames associated with health and 
 19 
environmental risks (pp. 103-125).  Part of what drove coverage was elite conflict. It can 
be seen that shifting to the mass media as a venue for issue attention can lead to positive 
feedback, and hence act as an avenue for problem expansion.7 
Negative Feedback and the Media 
Oftentimes in the contributor tradition, media attention is conceptualized as a 
mechanism for positive feedback – as a venue for advocacy groups to disrupt policy 
monopolies. But the logic of PET combined with the journalistic standards and practices 
from the conduit approach suggests that news coverage can also an equilibrium-inducing 
forum. Some research demonstrates support for this. Wolfe (2012) finds that the speed of 
lawmaking slows down as media attention to the policy process grows. Boydstun (2013) 
argues that the media acts as a negative feedback force when covering public affairs in 
“patrol mode.” Indexing to elite debate, prizing conflict, and being duty-bound to present 
“fair and balanced” coverage (Bennett 1990, 1996, and 2002), the media is also a venue 
for dominant coalitions – policy monopolies – to counter-mobilize claims and policy 
frames. By doing this, these coalitions are aiming to reinforce the status quo, effectively 
pressing the brakes on the momentum for policy change.8 
We see this in the coverage of policy areas with significant scientific and/or 
technological components, from second hand smoking, ozone and acid rain, to global 
                                                 
7
 This project focuses on the mass media (New York Times and Washington Post). Though sometimes 
specialized media can mobilize policy communities, resulting in direct access or as a platform for 
galvanizing attention from the mass media (see for instance Nelson 1986 and Liu et al 2011). 
8
 We see explanations for negative feedback mechanisms in distributional studies (Fiorina 1977; Shepsle 
and Weingast 1987) and informational models (Krehbiel 1991) of Congress, in the principle-agent 
literature focusing on the bureaucracy (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), incremental decisionmaking in 
public administration (Lindblom 1960; Wildavsky 1964; Simon 1997), adjustments in public opinion in 
response to government activity (liberalism/conservatism) (MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson 2001; 
Wlezien 1995), and pluralist models of American politics and public policy focusing on counter-mobilizing 
forces such as interest groups and policy monopolies, i.e. closed subsystems (Lowi 1969; Schattschneider 
1960; Truman 1951; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
 
 20 
warming. For example, Rothman and Lichter (1982) found far greater consensus 
surrounding the safety of nuclear reactors among experts in the policy community than 
what was portrayed in the media. In climate change, another heavily politicized scientific 
issue, there is a vast literature documenting the overemphasis of uncertainty in climate 
science cause and effect relationships related to global warming in news coverage 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Antilla 2005; Zehr 2000, 2009; Schmid-Petri et al 
2015; Painter and Ashe 2012). Besides being a product of journalist norms and practices, 
we also see this as a strategy. These skeptics use the media to alter the perception of 
either a growing consensus or agreement that is already widespread (Oreskes and 
Conway 2010). 
In fact, the media was blamed for misrepresenting climate change by both 
proponents and opponents of large-scale solutions, such as cap-and-trade. On March 28, 
2007, the U.S. Congress’s House Committee on Science and Technology’s 
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight held a hearing entitled Shaping the 
Message, Distorting the Science: Media Strategies to Influence Science Policy. In his 
opening statement, then-Chairman Brad Miller (D-NC) said before the panel and 
audience: 
Ronald Reagan said that facts were stubborn things. … . The topic of today’s 
hearing is a consorted effort by opponents of measures to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, to bully scientific facts into submission, and, under intense pressure, 
the facts about global swarming caved in and proved much more elastic, much 
less stubborn than Ronald Regan had us believe. 
Just a year prior to this, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works held a 
hearing entitled Examining Climate Change and the Media (2006) that claimed the 
opposite – that the media did not give enough space to skeptics and was partly 
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responsible for creating “alarmist” rhetoric surrounding the global warming political 
debate. In his opening statement, Chairman Inhofe (R-OK) warned that: 
Poorly conceived policy decisions may result from the media’s over-hyped 
reporting. Much of the mainstream media has subverted its role as an objective 
source of information on climate change into a role of an advocate. 
Attribute Diversity and Causal Uncertainty 
The theory of media signaling emphasizes attribute diversity and causal 
uncertainty in news coverage of complex policy problems. Complex policy problems 
such as climate change are characterized by multiple attributes and several causal 
relationships that connect actions – either unguided or purposeful (Stone 1989) – with 
consequences (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). These characteristics are crucial 
components of a problem definition, which is a set of cause and effect relationships that 
is solvable and worth solving (Dery 1984). Problem definitions elevate conditions to 
problems in need of government redress (Kingdon 2003) and structure the sets of 
solutions considered by policy communities to fix them (Newell and Simon 1972). The 
information-processing approach to policy change emphasizes the dynamics of 
complexity in the problem definition process (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2015; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005; Jones 1994a,b, 2001).   
Climate change is by its very nature a complex process that involves multiple 
inputs, outputs, and feedback loops – both positive and negative – long time lags, and 
abrupt changes, called “climate disruptions” (Steffen 2011). It is also complex as a public 
policy problem for a host of other reasons as well. First, the scope of its potential impacts 
is far reaching, potentially debilitating, and costly – food shortages, population 
displacement, infrastructure damage to name a few. Its comprehensive solutions cap-and-
trade or a carbon tax are also quite complex – they involve multiple industrial sectors, 
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economic rearrangements and income redistribution, and complicated regulatory regimes. 
The combination of its scientific nature and the politics of climate policy debates means 
that its problem definition is often unstable, ill-understood, and subject to jurisdictional 
challenges (Rabe 2007; Liu et al 2015).  
Attribute Diversity 
Most policy problems are inherently complex in that they are structured by 
multiple attributes, which means there are potentially several ways to understand and 
characterize them – and a myriad of ways in which to solve them (Jones 1996, 2001, 
1994; Baumgartner and Jones 2005, 2015). The problem space is the arena for the 
problem definition process. In policy debates, the problem space is characterized by 
multiple attributes that are reshuffling in the importance attached to them (Kingdon 2003; 
Jones 1994a,b). Policy change can be explained by this attribute reshuffling, which is 
often the result of new information – i.e. signals – entering into the system.  
 In an individual choice context of a single policymaker, what may appear as a 
change in mind may actually be a change in focus – attention shifting to previously 
underweighted attributes that characterize the policy problem (Jones 1996, 1994a). This 
attribute intrusion also occurs at the institutional level, the U.S. Congress for example, 
when new attributes of a problem definition enter into policy debates. This expands 
disrupts status quo policymaking in closed subsystems, elevating debate to larger policy 
arenas where a greater number of policy participants compete over the problem 
definition. Disruptions such as these can lead to agenda and policy change (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993, 2015; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Worsham 1997). 
Attribute diversity introduces uncertainty into the problem space when the variety 
and concentration of attributes tied to a problem definition change. Uncertainty here 
means that those operating in the policy community are not clear as to the veracity of 
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which attributes best characterize a policy problem – both in terms of its objective nature 
and political receptivity. This uncertainty increases competition and conflict among 
subsystems over defining the problem. Thus it also provides opportunities to change the 
course of policymaking. As previously discussed, the media plays a large role in the 
problem definition process by directing policy attention. It can foment attribute intrusion 
by covering some attributes at the expense of others, amplifying the already existing 
uncertainty surrounding the problem definition. In a theory of media signaling, news 
coverage of policy problems should have a role in structuring uncertainty in the problem 
space via attribute diversity in reporting the news on public affairs (Wolfe et al 2013). 
Causal Uncertainty 
The lack of clarity in causal connections that link actions with consequences is a 
second form of uncertainty that is particularly potent for complex policy problems 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Causal mechanisms and their effects are often ill-
understood with such issues as climate change, economic growth, national security, 
poverty and healthcare. These policy problems are actually composed of multiple cause 
and effect relationships where causal linkages (mechanisms) are fuzzy, in dispute – and 
sometimes – unaccepted. Why is causal uncertainty important in the problem definition 
process? Clarity in causal stories – connecting an activity with an unwanted outcome that 
warrants government intervention – has been shown to be a precursor for problem 
prioritization and policy change (Stone 1988, 1989; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Cobb and 
Elder 1972; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
The causal clarity of a policy problem directly impacts its perceived severity, 
mediating debate over the seriousness of the problem and its consequences. Elite conflict 
over causality relating to the severity of a problem is often picked up by the media 
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994). For example, wide disagreement on the facts surrounding the 
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“extent, timing, and impact” of global warming among policy communities was – and 
still is – a storyline that can be found in climate change news coverage (Stevens 1991 
B12 and Samuelson 1992 in Rochefort and Cobb 1994, p. 17). When news organizations 
cover “causal politics” (Stone 1989), they send signals regarding the uncertainty of cause 
and effect relationships, which in turn amplifies this already-disputed nature of the policy 
problem. This then feeds back into debates surrounding the severity of the problem. 
POLICY DEBATES IN THE MUDDLED PROBLEM SPACE  
The previous section introduced the contributor and conduit perspectives to 
understanding media influence that inform how news coverage structures policy debates. 
It provided an overview of the key aspects from the information-processing approach to 
studying policy change that undergird the theory of media signaling. This includes the 
relationship between attention limits and problem prioritization; disproportionate 
information-processing and signaling threshold effects; how the media fits in with 
positive and negative feedback, highlighting events, venue-shopping, and indexing news 
coverage to elite debate; and it concluded with a discussion of attribute diversity and 
causal uncertainty. 
This section introduces what I call the muddled problem space. It is the typical 
problem space from the information-processing approach – on steroids. Media influence 
is the result of how news coverage interacts with policy debates taking place in the 
muddled problem space that characterizes complex policy problems, such as climate 
change. Table 2.2 compares the characteristics of the muddled space with the problem 
and solution spaces of typical issues and the potential for media influence in each space. 
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Table 2.2: The Muddled Space of Complex versus Typical Policy Problems 
Typical policy problems for the purposes of this project include “legacy” issues, 
which are problems that have a long history on the government agenda, such as 
education, veterans and older Americans issues, and agriculture (May et al 2006).  While 
some of these may be structurally complex, they are not imbued with the same persistent 
degrees of uncertainty. In contrast, complex issues are relatively new; and, they can be 
heavily politicized. Policy problems that fall under this category include climate change, 
air pollution, homeland security, and global pandemics.  Because of this distinction, the 
policy processes tradition knows a lot less about complex issues, especially in the realm 
of media influence.  
Context and Information Supply  
An important distinction between complex and typical issues is their contexts. I 
argue that complex issues operate in a third, muddled context that mostly revolves around 
problem recognition and (re)definition; they get “stuck” there. Typical issues operate in 
two contexts: the problem and solution spaces. While on the ground in policy debates 
problems and solutions often coexist, with solutions sometimes used to define problems, 
they are analytically distinct and can be thought of as practically distinct as well. The 
Characteristic Complex
Context Muddled space Problem-space Solution-space
Information Vast oversupply Oversupply Preferences
Issue Attributes Multiple, ill-defined Multiple, under-defined Few, well-defined
Causal Relationships Multiple, uncertain and disputed Range, in flux Known, accepted
Severity Contention, wide-range Contention, narrow-range Consensus
Competition Open, boundary-spanning Open, bounded Closed, policy monopolies
Conflict Protracted In flux Limited
Goal of Actors Steer debate, negative and positive 
agenda-setting
Steer debate, positive 
agenda setting
Control, negative agenda 
setting
Media Influence Large, frequent Medium, occasional/during 
crises




ratio of policy debate on problems versus solutions is much higher during the recognition, 
definition, and agenda setting stages and inverse in the choice contexts and during policy 
implementation. For example, of the over 95,000 hearings Congress has held from 1946-
2012, approximately 36,000 (37.8%) were called to debate policy solutions.9 Of the 400- 
plus hearings on climate change, only 10% have centered on solutions. Typical issues 
cycle through this stylized policy process, and to be sure spend more time in the solution 
than the problem space (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Complex issues can be different: 
the bulk of activity occurs in a muddled problem space. 
As previously explained, the problem space is the loci of interest in the policy 
processes approach to studying information processing and agenda setting. The 
characteristics of complex policy problems that create the muddled space are explained 
from this perspective as well. What separates the muddled and “typical” problem space 
from the solution space are two notions of information: what it is and its availability. In 
the solution space, preferences and outcomes constitute information; and, its availability 
is limited and often withheld. This tradition is born out of economic theories of 
information (see Workman 2015 and Shafran 2015 for extensive overviews). In 
contradistinction, changes or “disturbances” in conditions and existing policies 
constitutes information in the muddled and typical problem space. Here, there is an 
oversupply of information in the policy environment. A wide range of sources send 
messages that contain varied and sometimes contradicting content.  
The remainder of this section will focus on comparing the muddled and typical 
problem spaces, making reference to the solution space only in order to add clarification 
or nuance. This section will provide an overview of the table as it pertains to issue 
                                                 
9
 Data from http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#congressional_hearings (Accessed 
March 31, 2016). 
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attributes and causal relationships in the muddled space – and how they relate to 
competition and conflict among subsystems (i.e. policy communities). Subsequent 
sections in this dissertation go into detail regarding these characteristics, how they 
specifically relate to climate change policy debates in the muddled spaces, and how 
media signals structure these debates in terms of problem prioritization and solution 
generation (see Chapter 5 on prioritization and Chapter 6 on solutions).  
Problem Uncertainty and Questioning Problem Severity 
Here we focus on the characteristics that generate uncertainty in the problem 
definition process: multiple issue attributes and causal relationships. These characteristics 
create problem uncertainty – which attributes best define the policy problem? – and 
disputes over problem severity – what really are its impacts? In both the muddled and 
typical problem spaces, problems are characterized by multiple attributes. In the muddled 
problem space, the attributes that characterize a policy problem are many, often ill-
defined, and subject to persistent reshuffling.  
For example, Table 2.3 shows the 12 dimensions under which multiple attributes 
fall in policy debates about climate change.10 Climate change is characterized by a wide-
range of diverse attributes such as agricultural productivity, temperature trends, 
un/employment, disease, coastal erosion, alternative energy, mass transit, social welfare, 
conflict involving the U.S. military, technology R&D, international affairs, and extreme 
weather events such as hurricanes. And this is a limited list. Climate change has been a 
                                                 
10
 These were obtained by content coding opening statements and witness testimonies as part of the data 
collection and policy content coding effort for Chapter 6 on climate solutions in policy debates. See the 
section on research design for a thorough explanation of how the data were obtained and assigned attribute 
codes.  
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fixture of congressional policy debates since 1988. In that time, the dimensionality of 
debates has ranged from as little as one to as many as nine.11 
Table 2.3: The Multiple Attributes of Climate Change in Policy Debates 
But because typical issues have a legacy in political institutions and policy 
communities, they generally have fewer attributes, and the weights on the attributes 
experience less fluctuation (May et al 2006).  This is directly related to the openness of 
competition in the muddles versus typical problem spaces. Subsystems are relatively 
open in the typical problem space, but they are less porous than in the muddled space of 
complex policy problems. This means that there is more stability for the typical problem 
definition; it is harder for attributes to intrude and destabilize current governing 
                                                 
11
 The number of unique dimensions in the sum of opening statement and witness testimonies for each 
hearing on climate change was used to calculate these dimensions of climate change. See Chapter 6 for a 
more detailed explanation and Table A.1 in Appendix A, Table B.1 in Appendix B for content coding.  
Dimension Examples of Attributes
Agriculture Production, productivity, crop insurance
Climate Science
Carbon dioxide and global warming, human 
contribution, natural variation, temperature trends, 
computer modeling and simulations, climate impacts
Economics Competitiveness, costs/benefits, employment ("green jobs"), program funding
Public Health Disease, heat stroke/deaths
Environment greenhouse gas pollution, air quality, coastal erosion, 
endangered species, resource conservation
Energy Alternatives and renewables, efficiency and 
conservation, fossil fuels, nuclear, electric power
Transportation Mass and alternative modes
Social Welfare Low-income families
National Security Role of US military in conflict, climate resilience
Technology R&D Carbon capture, capacity building, technology 
International Treaties, cooperation, conferences, developing and 
industrializing nations
Weather & Natural Disaster Hurricanes, heat/cold waves, droughts
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arrangements. However, once a new dimension does take hold in policy debates 
surrounding typical issues, it is more likely to be incorporated and hence solutions 
formulated to account for it. This should not be the case for policy problems in the 
muddled problem space.  The characteristics of attributes in the muddled space –multiple, 
ill-defined – encourages subsystem competition over problem definition, and hence 
conflict expansion.  We can see how new attributes enter more easily in the muddled 
problem space. But at the same time, the high degree of problem uncertainty discourages 
comprehensive solution formulation (see Cobb and Elder 1972, pp. 111-115 for a 
discussion of the relationship between ambiguity and conflict expansion).  
Turning to causal relationships in the muddled space of complex problems, there 
is a great deal of uncertainty about the mechanisms that link actions – either manmade or 
natural – with consequences. Multiple causal relationships define problems in the 
muddled space and they are often in dispute. For example, Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX), 
Chairman of the House Committee on Space, Technology, and Science, highlights the 
causal uncertainties in climate change in an op-ed published by The Hill in 2013:  
Climate change is due to a combination of factors, including natural cycles and 
human activity. But scientists still disagree about how much each of these factors 
contributes to the overall climate change the Earth is experiencing. But 
understanding the causes of climate change is critical to developing a serious and 
effective solution.12 
In the muddled space, even basic causal relationships go unaccepted, such as humans 
contributing to global warming (McCright and Dunlap 2003, 2010; Oreskes and Conway 
2010).  In the typical problem space, the clarity of causal relationships does fluctuate, but 
there is there is widespread agreement among subsystem participants about basic causes 
of the problem (Sabatier 1998, p. 113; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, p. 133). For 
                                                 
12
 . Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) in The Hill, October 1, 2013. http://the hill.com/opinion/op-ed/325971-
extreme-weather-isnt-linked-to-climate-change. (Accessed November 2013). 
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example, there is stable and subsystem-wide agreement that one of the basic causes of 
poverty – a typical issue – is under/ unemployment. The dispute is rather placed in 
arguments over antecedent aspects, like what causes under/unemployment. 
(AEI/Brookings 2015). 
A tenant of causal stories is that they need to be accepted and made rather clearly 
in order for a condition to become a problem in consideration of government attention 
and deliberation. But what if causal stories was a major and persistent storyline, as they 
can be in news coverage of heavily politicized complex issues like global 
warming/climate change? The media covers causal conflict. In doing so, it sends signals 
back into the system that thwart convergence toward a path of consensus. This doesn’t 
constrict debate over problem definition; rather, it amplifies conflict and thus political 
debate surrounding it. This occurs in one of several ways that involves both politics and 
good (i.e., thorough, data-driven) public policy. Scientists and other types of policy 
experts will seize upon causal conflict and use it as an argument to conduct more research 
that will refine causal understandings. Some will use it to as an opportunity to counter 
one causal story with another, or further defend it to opposing coalitions. 
Uncertainty generated by attribute diversity and complex causal relationships 
helps shape the perception of problem severity. Both the muddled and typical problem 
spaces are characterized by contention over the overall seriousness of the problem. 
However the range of contention within the complex space is greater. Severity is 
mediated by how clear are the causes and consequences of a policy problem. Generally 
speaking, how important is it? The seriousness of disruptive extreme weather events and 
conditions, such as hurricanes and droughts – which can subsequently cause death, 
displacement, conflict, and famine for example – is discounted if there is a nontrivial 
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(i.e., politically salient) degree of uncertainty about and disagreement over what causes 
them and/or the ability to forecast them.  
Elite conflict over the severity of a problem is fuel for the media pyre, especially 
when they can be dire. Many of the potential and real consequences of climate change are 
dramatic in their own right, like natural disasters. Some impacts brought on by global 
warming and climate change are somewhat slow to materialize, but cause great harm and 
broad suffering when they do. Conflict due to famine brought on by drought or a global 
infectious disease pandemics like malaria or Zika virus brought on by changing climates 
that produce more ecosystems hospitable to mosquitoes (Harvey 2016).  
THE MEDIA AND SUBSYSTEM POLICYMAKING 
The last section introduced the muddled problem space that characterizes complex 
policy problems like climate change. It focused on two important contributors of 
uncertainty in problem definitions: attribute diversity and causal uncertainty. This section 
addresses the characteristics of subsystems in the muddled spaced as compared to typical 
issues (please refer back to Table 2.2). These subsystem components are competition, 
conflict, and goals of the participants. Media influence in the muddled space will be 
addressed by discussing the behavioral logic that underlies interinstitutional signaling. 
Why do subsystems respond to media signals about policy problems? What drives news 
organizations’ coverage of subsystem activity?  In doing so, this section will further 
explicate how news coverage of subsystem conflict in the muddled space can lead to 
problem expansion, but also to the containment of their attendant solutions.   
Defining the problem is the sine qua non for subsystems. Public policy is a 
function of who participates and how problems are defined. Subsystems compete over 
problem definitions – cause and effect relationships that are solvable and worth solving 
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(Dery 1984; Stone 1989) – to advance policy goals.  Subsystems are organized around 
issues and are composed of coalitions of interest who engage in a non-trivial amount of 
coordination (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Pluralist theories of the 
policy process emphasizing the dynamics of group competition and information flows 
view the potential for subsystem participation more broadly than their counterparts who 
underscore stable power systems. Instead of closed iron triangles (Lowi; Dodd and Schott 
1979; Redford 1979), subsystems in pluralist theories of policy change allow for a 
broader scope of participation (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
Figure 2.X provides examples of an iron triangle and an expanded policy 
subsystem.13 The iron triangle depicts agriculture, the makeup of which is smaller in 
scope, and composed of a single dominant subsystem, compared to many other issues. 
Policymaking in an agriculture iron triangle is a result of the coordination among a 
congressional committee, a federal agency, and interest groups. This structure doesn’t 
change much and hence policymaking here is relatively stable. In contrast, the 
composition of the expanded subsystem is much larger in scope and breadth. This 
depiction fits many complex policy problems, such as air pollution and climate change. 
For example, it includes research institutes and think tanks, multiple congressional 
committees, and regulatory and scientific agencies.  
Most notably, national elite news organizations, such as the New York Times and 
Washington Post, are part of an expanded policy subsystem. Why are publications such 
as these included as if they are operating within policy subsystems? It is because they are 
                                                 
13
 Other terms that fit this depiction are policy communities (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), advocacy 
coalitions plus policy brokers (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), and issue networks (Heclo 1978). 
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part of the flow of information that steers and structures policy debates.14  The 
information they produce through news coverage of policy problems affects subsystem 
competition and the scope of conflict. They also are policy experts.  News organizations 
such as the Times and Post employ “beat” journalists who specialize in particular policy 
areas, such as science and the environment. They also employ journalists whose 
specialties intersect science and politics, such as Washington Post’s Joel Achenbach.15  
Andrew Revkin, who left the New York Times in 2009 after nearly 15 years, covered the 
relationship between climate science and politics.16 
There are many boxes in the figure that depicts expanded policy subsystems. This 
is because the scope of participation is quite large. Given this, it is easy to see how 
coalitions competing over problem definitions are doing so in an environment with an 
oversupply of information. This is the case for both the muddled and typical problem 
spaces. However, some characteristics of subsystems in the muddled space increase the 
potential for greater media influence. First, while in both problem spaces, subsystems are 
relatively open – especially compared to the nearly impenetrable solution space – there is 
more competition in the muddled space compared to that of the typical. In the normal 
(i.e., typical) problem space, competition generally involves 2 or 3 subsystems (Thurber 
1991, 332; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). It is open; but it is also bounded. Complex 
policy problems, especially those with such wide-ranging effects as in the case of climate 
change, can span a greater number of subsystems. For example, May, Sapotichne, and  
                                                 
14
 Specialized media, such as professional journals and newsletters, have a place in shaping the information 
flows in subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Thurber 1991). The influence of specialized media 
in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and Thurber’s (1991) notion 
of competitive subsystems comes from it facilitating adaptation and learning. Thus it is viewed as more a 
source of stability and subsystem maintenance than subsystem disruption. See Nelson (1984), Liu et al 
(2008) for the ability of specialized media to alter policy agendas.  
15
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/joel-achenbach. (Accessed February, 2016). 
16
 He continues to write the Times’ Dot Earth blog 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/andrew_c_revkin/index.html.  
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Figure 2.1: Iron Triangles and the Media in Expanded Policy Subsystems 
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Workman (2009) identified eight subsystems involved in homeland security, a complex 
and heavily politicized policy issue.17 Climate change – a complex and heavily 
politicized policy problem where debate take place in the muddled problem space – has 
13.18   
Competition and Conflict 
Why is there an imperative for subsystem competition in policymaking? 
Subsystems compete over problem definitions to maintain or gain jurisdictional authority 
over an issue (Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Thurber 1991; Worsham 1997; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: King 1997). The more 
complex the issue -- in terms of both causes and effects -- the more opportunities are 
afforded to outside players to steer debate away from one attribute toward another. These 
opportunities are increased in the muddled problem space that is also characterized by ill-
defined attributes and hazy causal linkages, as they are by their nature susceptible to 
change. Jurisdictional battles, aka “turf wars”, are subject to widespread publicity from 
the media (Thurber 1991, p. 332; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 1997).  
News organizations have an incentive to report on this type of conflict among 
political elites. It hits the newsmaking imperatives for dramatization, novelty, and expert 
and elite sources, and routinized reporting (Bennett 2002, 1990, 1996; Gans 1979). For 
example, in 2007 the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate held a hearing on 
national security threats related to climate change.19 This was the committee’s first 
                                                 
17
 Homeland security fits many of the characteristics of a “muddled” problem space. However, there is far 
greater consensus on the seriousness of the problem among subsystems here than in for example, climate 
change. 
18
 This is based on the number of committees that have held hearings on global warming/climate change 
since 1987.  House and Senate committees were coded into policy domains, such as agriculture and energy, 
to avoid double-counting. Liu et al (2015) do not code committee for policy area and find 21 unique House 
and Senate committees have held hearings on climate change. 
19
 Climate Change: National Security Threats, Senate, 110th Cong., 2007. 
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hearing on the climate problem in six years. Attaching national security threats to climate 
change makes it newsworthy is being linked to a policy area already institutionalized as 
such by news organizations (Tuchman 1979). The theory of media signaling suggests that 
uncertainty in the policy environment increases when the media cover attributes outside 
the scope of what “normally” defines a policy problem. If that signal is detected, 
subsystems responds with by flooding the environment with more information in an 
effort to compete over the problem definition.  
We now turn to the second comparison of subsystem characteristics between the 
muddled and typical problem spaces: conflict. Greater competition and more uncertainty 
regarding the nature of the problem means that there is more capacity and likelihood for 
conflict expansion in the muddled versus the typical problem space. Policy change – or at 
least problem expansion – is more likely when conflict expands beyond the tight bounds 
of a dominant subsystem (Schattschneider 1960; Cobb and Elder 1983; Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993).  Cobb and Elder linked ambiguity with problem expansion (1972, pp. 111-
115). Using the terminology of the characteristics of the muddled space in Table 2.2, the 
greater the number of issue attributes associated with a problem, the greater the 
likelihood it attracts a broader range of subsystems.  Cobb and Elder also note an 
important tradeoff regarding problem expansion of complex (i.e., ambiguous) issues: A 
high degree of ambiguity (attribute diversity) may prevent specific solutions from being 
seriously considered (1972, p. 115). Put another way, even when the definition of a 
policy problem more accurately reflects the “true” nature of its cause and effect 
relationships, its solution sets may be far from comprehensive.  
We know that news organizations index coverage to elite conflict (Bennett 1990; 
1996, 2003; Lawrence 2000; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007). Subsystem 
conflict in the muddled space is more protracted than in the typical problem space. The 
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theory of media signaling on complex policy problems suggests that news coverage of 
conflict over issue attributes and causal relationships will facilitate problem expansion, as 
it presents opportunities to and pressure on subsystems to better clarify and understand 
the problem. Or in the case of climate change, opportunities to argue that there is no 
problem. But because of its complexity and because the certainty of its causal linkages is 
a fixed feature of debate, news coverage that amplifies this uncertainty will steer debate 
away from comprehensive solutions sets to a more narrow, contained set.  
Summary 
This chapter provides a theory of media signaling in muddled problem spaces that 
characterizes complex policy problems. The contributor and conduit traditions of media 
influence are combined to understand how coverage that indexes to elite debate over 
public affairs is meaningful in terms of policy agenda dynamics. News coverage shapes 
policy debates over problem uncertainty and severity by sending signals that structure 
subsystem competition and conflict in the muddled problem space. This approach to 
media influence emphasizing the importance of signaling is undergirded by core 
components from the information-processing perspective of policy change. These 
components are attention limits and prioritization, disproportionate information-
processing, positive and negative feedback cycles, and the attribute diversity and causal 
uncertainty inherent in complex policy problems. The theory of media signaling is tested 
on one of the most complex, diabolical problems of our time – climate change (Stephen 
2011). The next chapter on research design introduces three aspects of news coverage 
that shape policy debates about climate change in the muddled problem space – attribute 
diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume. The theory of media signaling is tested using 
two aspects of the problem definition process – problem prioritization and solution 
generation. The chapter on research design discusses the indicators used for 
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prioritization, solutions, and the three aspects of climate news coverage. It provides 
information on data collection and policy content coding, as well as expectations for 
media signaling on prioritization and climate alternatives that lead to problem expansion 
and solution containment.  
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Chapter 3: Problem Expansion and Solution Containment 
[T]his greenhouse effect is now a major concern of Members of the Congress and 
of the people everywhere in this country. The question is what do you do about it. 
Well, the first thing you do about it is learn about it, what is happening, why is it 
happening, how serious is the problem. Then we must begin to address this very 
serious problem.20 
Sen. J. Bennett Johnston, June 23, 1988 
 
This statement by Senator Johnson in 1988 was made on the same day – at the 
same hearing – when NASA climate scientist James Hansen told Congress with “ninety-
nine percent confidence” that “the greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing 
our climate now”.21 This statement, which was widely covered by the media, “ignited a 
firestorm of public debate, and elevated the carbon-dioxide problem to pre-eminence on 
the environmental agenda ever since” (Sarewitz and Pielke 2000).  Fast forward nearly 
twenty years to 2007 and Sen. Johnson’s question of “what do you do about it” was still a 
matter of contentious debate. This is because the “what is happening”, the “why is it 
happening”, and “how serious is the problem” became major sticking points in defining 
the climate problem for over two decades. Remarks from Members of Congress at 
hearings in 2007 provide a glimpse at the opposing viewpoints of how climate change 
was understood, how it should be addressed, and how prepared policymakers were – and 
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We know what we have to do in order to avoid the worst effects of climate 
change.  ….  [W]e need to cap and eventually significantly reduce our greenhouse 
gas emissions. … Now, we must face the challenge of global warming. I believe it 
is one of the greatest challenges of our generation.22 
 Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), January 30, 2007  
Your Inconvenient Truth spends a lot of time discussing the problem, but little 
time detailing solutions… .23 
Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-MO), March 21, 2007 
Even the mainstream media … are now noticing that global warming science is 
uneven and evolving. We need to be deliberative and careful when we talk about 
so-called scientific facts.24 
Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX), March 21, 2007 
 
Climate change has been on the congressional agenda for nearly three decades. 
Not for lack of trying, they have been unable to pass comprehensive climate legislation, 
such as cap-and-trade or a carbon tax. Bypassing Congress, President Obama in 2013 
directed the EPA to work with states to develop a plan to reduce carbon emissions from 
new and existing power plants.25 However, the climate change debate is far from settled. 
In 2016, more than two dozen states and multiple industry groups were able to stave off 
implementing the EPA’s Clean Power Plan while it undergoes judicial review (Adler 
2016). Arguably one of the Republican’s more moderate candidates for the presidential 
nomination, Ohio Gov. John Kasich, believes of climate change that “[w]e don’t know 
how much humans actually contribute, but it is important that we develop renewables” 
(Sheppard 2016).  
                                                 
22
 Senators’ Perspectives on Global Warming, Senate, 110th Cong., 2007. 
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 Vice President Al Gore’s Perspective on Global Warming, House, 110th Cong., 2007. 
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Why has the U.S. government been so slow to respond to climate change with 
comprehensive solutions? Why do we see so much congressional debate on the climate 
problem, but only mostly incremental movement toward solutions? How it is that high-
profile public figures can question basic scientific tenets of global warming and climate 
change on which 97% of climate scientists agree (Cook et al 2013; Cook et al 2016)? One 
explanation rests on how it has been covered in the news. As shown in previous sections, 
there is a proverbial cottage industry of studies that connect climate news coverage to 
elite debate and scientific controversies, suggesting it as a source for policy stagnation. 
Despite this wealth of scholarship, the media-government connection remains largely 
untested (for an exception, see Lui et al 2011). 
This dissertation project presents a theory of media signaling about complex 
problems to policy communities and applies it to the case of climate change. News 
coverage helps shape the climate debate. We see mostly protracted deliberation around 
the problem definition and limited solutions applied to it due to three characteristics of 
climate news coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume. These 
aspects of climate coverage helped create and perpetuate the muddled problem space in 
which most policymaking activity on climate change takes place most of the time. News 
coverage mediates the muddled space by amplifying uncertainty surrounding its 
attributes, causal relationships, and its impacts. This triggers competition and conflict 
among those in the policy community – and those trying to become part of the policy 
subsystem – over how to steer the climate debate.    
What news coverage does is it helps elevate the importance of the problem. It 
organizes attention, induces subsystem competition and conflict over which set of 
attributes define climate change, and it moderates disputes over its causal relationships. It 
is in this sense that media signals are forces for positive feedback; which is to say, they 
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facilitate problem expansion. Focusing attention and devoting resources to better 
understand how to characterize it is part and parcel of problem expansion. But this 
growth is also a delimiter for which set of solutions are considered to solve the problem. 
The nature in which attributes and causal relationships are covered in the news leads to 
heightening already intense climate change debates about problem uncertainty – its 
scope, why it happens, and its impacts. In light of so much unsettled uncertainty, the 
solutions are limited to those that do not have as much consequences for resource 
allocation, government intervention, and regulation. It is in this sense that news coverage 
of climate change contains – limits – solutions, and is a negative feedback force slowing 
down momentum for large-scale policy change.       
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The three aspects of news 
coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – and the dependent 
variables used to gauge policy debates in the muddled space – problem prioritization and 
climate solutions – are introduced and described. The expectations for the relationship 
between news coverage and these policymaking activities are presented, along with the 
expected influence of disproportionate information-processing and party influence on 
climate debates.  Following this, I provide a detailed accounting of the measures, data 
collection, and policy content coding methodology used to test the theory of media 
signaling. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Problem expansion and solution containment: This is how news coverage shapes 
the complex and highly politicized scientific problem, climate change. It grows the 
problem, but limits its solutions. Because of climate news, the problem is attended to, 
better understood, and grows more complex in the attributes used to define it. But 
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characteristics of coverage also mean its attributes, causal relationships, and arguments 
about problem severity are imbued with uncertainty and in near-constant dispute. This 
limits the scope – in terms of comprehensiveness – of solutions deemed necessary and 
politically feasible used to solve it. To test the theory of media signaling presented in 
chapter 2 and explicated subsequently, this dissertation focuses on two aspects of 
subsystem activities around the problem definition process: prioritization and solution 
generation. Support for problem expansion and solution containment is derived by 
examining the relationship between characteristics of climate news – attribute diversity, 
causal uncertainty, and volume – for each of these aspects of the problem definition 
process. 
Media Signals on Climate: Attribute Diversity, Causal Uncertainty and Volume 
We now turn to a brief review of the characteristics of climate coverage that steer 
subsystem competition and conflict over problem definitions in the muddled space. Table 
3.1 provides descriptions of the main independent variables of interest – attribute 
diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume. Attribute diversity is ambiguity in the variety 
and concentration of the dimensions found in climate change news coverage. These are 
media signals that – when interacting with the muddled problem space – amplify problem 
uncertainty in climate policy debates. Problem uncertainty is understood as doubt over 
the veracity of which attributes characterize the climate problem definition. Attribute 
diversity in climate coverage can lead to competition among policy communities in light 





Table 3.1: Three Media Signals of Climate Change News Coverage 
The second media signal is causal uncertainty. Causal uncertainty is reporting on 
the uncertainties in causal relationships that link human behavior with global warming 
and global warming with unwanted climate change consequences, such as population 
displacement from sea-level rise. This media signal interacts with the muddled problem 
space to intensify existing disputes over causal stories and problem severity. To borrow 
from Sen. Johnson’s quote at the beginning of the chapter, it delineates arguments over 
“what is happening” and “why is it happening” and “what are its effects.” Recall what 
Rep. Smith’s (R-TX) said about causal uncertainty in his op-ed in The Hill: 
Climate change is due to a combination of factors, including natural cycles and 
human activity. But scientists still disagree about how much each of these factors 
contributes to the overall climate change the Earth is experiencing. But 
understanding the causes of climate change is critical to developing a serious and 
effective solution.26 
The third media signal is volume. Volume in news coverage is the amount of 
attention the media devotes to climate change. When this signal interacts with the 
muddled space, the climate problem increases in salience, and hence importance. We see 
this quite often in studies of media influence on policy agenda setting (Baumgartner and 
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 Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) in The Hill, October 1, 2013. http://the hill.com/opinion/op-ed/325971-
extreme-weather-isnt-linked-to-climate-change. (Accessed November 2013). 
Media Signal Description
Attribute Diversity
Ambiguity in the variety and concentration of the dimensions found in 
climate change news coverage. This leads to amplifying problem 
uncertainty. 
Causal Uncertainty
Reporting on the uncertainty in the causal relationships that link human 
behavior with global warming, global warming with climate change, and 
climate change with its impacts. This leads to intensifying disputes over 
causal stories and problem severity.
Volume The amount of attention the media devotes to climate change. This increases the salience and importance of the climate problem. 
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Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; McCombs 2008; Van Alest and Walgrave 
2006). Policy communities may react to this signal with an increased sense of urgency in 
terms of defining the climate problem – to better understand it and to come up with a set 
of feasible solutions to address it. 
Problem Prioritization and Solution Generation in Climate Policy Debates 
The climate problem must be prioritized in order to begin to understand it and to 
start considering which set of solutions is best-suited to solve it. The theory of media 
signaling in the muddled space suggests that news coverage will influence problem 
prioritization and solution generation. Table 3.2 shows how problem expansion and 
solution containment are linked to integral parts of the policy process, prioritization and 
solution generation, which lead to policy change. The indicators for prioritization and 
climate solutions are listed in the right-hand column of the table.  
Table 3.2: Media Influence and Indicators of the Policy Process 
The indicators of prioritization and solution generation are all measured using 
congressional hearings, which are a forum for generating information on policy problems 
and solutions. They are the locus of subsystem competition and conflict over defining 
problems and delineating their solutions (King 1997; Worsham 1997; Baumgartner, 
Jones and MacLeod 2000; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Prioritization of climate 
change in policy debates is linked to media signals playing an integral role in problem 
expansion. Congressional hearings and opening statements made by Members of 
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Congress at these hearings are both indicators of policy communities prioritizing the 
climate problem. Solution generation – as a precursor to policy change – in climate 
debates is linked to media signals influencing solution containment. As a reminder, 
solution containment occurs when incremental approaches to fixing the climate problem 
are preferred over more costly comprehensive solutions. Large-scale solutions (such as 
cap-and-trade) and incremental solutions (such as energy efficiency) to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions are used as indicators of climate solution generation. 
Expectations 
This section provides the expectations for how news coverage influences climate 
problem prioritization and solution generation. It also provides expectations for the 
expected effects of disproportionate information-processing and party differences in the 
climate change debate. Each set of expectations is accompanied by a discussion of the 
mechanisms and theoretical reasoning that underpins them. The theory of media signaling 
is about how aspects of climate news coverage sometimes encourages debates, and at 
other times, discourages them. Since this is the case, the expectations provide the 
predicted direction of news effects on prioritization and solution generation.  
Prioritizing the Climate Problem: Hearings 
As Sen. Johnson noted in the above statement, in order to solve problems, you 
must learn about them – you must first define the problem at hand. This requires the 
prioritization of attention and other resources, including political capital. Chapter X looks 
at two indicators of problem prioritization – prioritization via congressional agenda 
setting and competition among policy brokers. In order for a problem to be recognized, it 
must be prioritized. Efforts to define a problem also require it to be prioritized.  From the 
information-processing perspective, prioritization is the result of detecting and 
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categorizing information about a condition or an existing policy problem (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). 
The muddled problem space in which climate change resides is characterized by 
an oversupply of information from diverse sources, such as scientists, industry groups, 
think tanks, advocacy groups, federal agencies, and even multiple congressional 
committees. The theory of media signaling argues that news coverage steers the 
allocation of attention in such a messy information-rich environment. In terms of agenda 
setting, or institutional prioritization related to problem recognition, the below 
expectations about climate news coverage should hold. As a reminder, hearings are used 
as an indicator of institutional prioritization. 
1: The number of hearings will increase with attribute diversity and volume of 
news coverage because they are media signals that focus subsystem attention and 
mobilize competition over problem definition in light of problem uncertainty and 
importance. 
1a: The number of hearings will decrease with causal uncertainty because it 
heightens disputes over causal stories, making it less likely that the policy 
community will recognize the climate problem as one that warrants debate.  
Congressional problem prioritization – holding hearings in this study – is the 
frontline of attention allocation to the problem definitions process. Committees will call 
hearings in response to changes in climate coverage of attribute diversity because it sends 
signals to subsystems that the attributes that define the problem are unstable. This 
increases the likelihood of conflict expansion. Regarding the climate science signal, as 
discussed previously, causal stories are integral to agenda setting (Stone 1988, 1989; 
Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Strong signals from the media that causal relationships are 
uncertain will dampen agenda setting effects of news coverage. Finally, media attention 
has been shown time and again to be positively associated with congressional problem 
prioritization (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1972; for a review see Van 
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Aelst and Walgrave 2006) because it elevates the visibility of the problem outside the 
confines of closed subsystem policymaking. 
Prioritizing the Climate Problem: Opening Statements 
Competition to define the climate problem via opening statements made by 
Members of Congress at hearings is the second form of prioritization examined in this 
dissertation. Whereas congressional prioritization captures how political institutions (and 
policy communities as collectives) respond to news coverage, this looks at how 
individuals within policy communities respond. This is also prioritization of the problem 
after it is on the agenda. As discussed, subsystems compete over the definition of 
problems in order to pursue their policy goals. Members of Congress are considered high-
profile policy brokers for competing subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Kingdon 2003). Opening statements are a vehicle for casting an image over and making 
claims about a policy problem27; it is used to steer debate. Chapter 4 provides several 
examples of opening statements where Members used news stories of climate change to 
support or oppose allocating resources to the problem.  The theory of media signaling 
suggests that: 
2: The number of opening statements will increase with all three aspects of news 
coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – because they will 
induce policy brokers to compete over defining climate change in light of problem 
uncertainty, heightened scrutiny of problem seriousness, and increases in 
importance. 
News coverage of attribute diversity provides an opportunity to compete over 
which attributes define the climate problem. Because the agenda is already set – there is a 
degree of consensus that the problem warrants attention – causal uncertainty in news 
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 Sherrod Brown, in his book Congress from the Inside writes that opening statements are used to “bring 
out a point or clarify an issue.” (2004, p. 38) 
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coverage is expected to have a positive effect on the number of opening statements. 
There are several ways this can happen. Proponents will react to the overemphasis on 
scientific uncertainty by stating as such, arguing that there is far more clarity regarding 
the seriousness of the problem than what is reported in the news; or, they may cite it in a 
call for further research funding. Opponents will seize climate science in the news as a 
means to steer debate away from large-scale, resource-intensive solutions or toward 
nonproblemicity (McCright and Dunlap 2003). The volume of coverage should have a 
large effect because it increases the salience of the problem to the wider issue public. As 
it is submitted to the record, it is a statement of policy position.  
Climate Solution: Large-Scale and Incremental Policy Change 
The generation of solutions is the second feature of the policy process examined 
in this project. As you may recall, a problem definition is a set of causal relationships that 
structures its solution sets, is solvable, and is worth solving (Newell and Simon 1972; 
Dery 1984). Chapter 6 is devoted to looking at how news coverage structures the 
generation of solutions in climate debates. The argument is that climate news can be 
understood as a mechanisms for solution containment by shifting debate away from 
comprehensive solutions and toward incremental approaches to fixing it. Incremental and 
large-scale solutions for tackling climate change have been part of the congressional 
agenda for nearly three decades. Even so, the House and Senate have only seriously 
considered a handful of comprehensive cap-and-trade climate bills, and not one has 
passed both chambers. Instead, climate legislation has been contained to incremental 
approaches, such as funding research, technology R&D, energy efficiency, conservation, 
alternatives, and renewables. Often, these types of solutions become provisions of major 
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energy bills, as opposed to being touted as climate legislation (e.g. Energy Policy Act of 
1992 and 2005).   
Many have pointed to climate news coverage as one of the reasons why the U.S. 
(and other countries) has been slow to move toward comprehensive solutions, such as 
Obama’s 2015 Clean Power Plan (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Painter and Ashe 
2012; Antilla 2005; Zehr 2000, 2009; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Pielke 2010; McCright 
and Dunlap 2003). However, the literature does not directly test this relationship. What is 
it about news coverage that often prohibits the feasibility of large-scale solutions, yet 
encourages debate of incremental approaches to solving the climate problem? The theory 
of media signaling presented in this dissertation implies that in regards to large-scale 
solutions: 
Large-Scale Solutions 
3: Large-scale solutions in policy debates will decrease with attribute diversity 
and causal uncertainty in climate news coverage because these media signals 
amplify problem uncertainty and highlight disputes over the seriousness of the 
problem, respectively. This reduces the political feasibility of comprehensive 
approaches to fixing the climate problem. 
3a: Large-scale solutions will increase with the volume of coverage because it 
signals growing importance of the climate problem, which encourages policy 
debates on fixing it. 
Incremental Solutions 
4: Incremental solutions will increase with attribute diversity and causal 
uncertainty in climate coverage because media signals that amplify problem 
uncertainty and disputes over severity will increase the political feasibility and 
policy tool appropriateness of smaller-scale solutions. 
4a: Incremental solutions will decrease with volume of news coverage because 
the signal of importance will shift debates to considering solutions far greater in 
scope and potential effectiveness. 
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Boydstun (2013) demonstrates that attribute diversity in news coverage begets 
increases in attribute diversity in subsequent news cycles in the cases of terrorism and the 
death penalty. Liu et al (2013) show that news coverage of climate solutions increase 
when coverage is linked to outside issues such as the economy and especially energy. In 
their study, climate solutions decrease when coverage is linked to climate science (which 
they found in 50% of their cases). Both of these studies are media-centric – they do not 
test whether attribute diversity or issue dimensions in coverage affect policy debates, nor 
do Liu et al parse incremental from large-scale solutions.    
When attribute diversity grows in news coverage it sends a signal to policy 
communities that the climate problem definition is losing its integrity and potentially 
changing. Large-scale solutions to climate change such as cap-and-trade require massive 
shifts in resource allocation, government intervention, and regulation. It requires support 
from a broad coalition of interests – agriculture, defense, energy industry, manufacturers, 
business, environmental groups, and so on – herculean coordination and bargaining. If 
the problem definition is not stable, support breaks down and pressure to come around 
fades. This is why coverage of attribute diversity – because it heightens problem 
uncertainty – should be negatively related to large-scale, punctuated changes.  
Attribute diversity in the news should be positively associated with incremental 
solutions because it limits the scope of politically-feasible solutions. This relationship 
should hold also because these signals of problem uncertainty can open up windows of 
opportunities for existing solutions to be attached to climate problems, a la the garbage-
can approach to problem-solving (Kingdon 2003; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). We 
see this anecdotally in Sen. Wirth’s suggestion that advocates of energy conservation 
“ride the global warming wave” (Stanfeld 1988) and in news coverage and elite debate 
 52 
that frames incremental solutions such as energy efficiency as “business opportunities”  
(Zehr 2009).    
Causal uncertainty in news coverage should have a dampening effect on 
comprehensive solutions in policy debates about climate change, as Liu et al (2013) 
found with solutions in the media in general. However, it should have the opposite effect 
on incremental solutions. Remember that this dissertation captures solution generation 
during hearings debate – when the issue is already on the agenda. Causal uncertainty in 
the news will have a positive impact here because media signals heighten uncertainty in 
how actions are linked with consequences – thus calling into question problem severity. 
This provides opponents of comprehensive solutions the opportunity to argue that an 
incremental approach to policymaking is more justified, given the uncertainty in why 
climate change happens and what its impacts are. We see this in the example at the 
beginning of the chapter with Gov. Kasich in 2016 calling for renewables in light of 
uncertainty in the human contribution (Sheppard 2016).  
Disproportionate Information-Processing 
Humans and organizations – and especially political institutions – are 
disproportionate information-processors (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jones 2001). 
Restrictions on cognitive and capacities, coupled with institutional design, leads to over- 
and under-reacting to information signals. That is, information may not be processed and 
reacted to at the same speed in which it is produced. The logic of media signaling 
suggests that there could be threshold effects associated with how policy debate shifts as 
a response to news coverage, leading to: 
5: Threshold effects for climate news signals will vary by coverage type and stage 




One of the reasons given for the lack of a national climate policy for so many 
years is that it quickly become a partisan issue, opposed by conservative lawmakers, 
think tanks, and corporations (McCright and Dunlap 2000, 2003; Fisher et al 2013; 
Jatkoswi and Nowlin 2014; Park et al 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010). This leads to: 
6: Republicans should be less active in the problem definition process save for  
giving opening statements at hearings to highlight its uncertainties and/or steer 
debate towards “nonproblemicity.” 
Summary 
This chapter explicates the problem expansion and solution containment argument 
based on the theory of media signaling, and specifically, to climate change. News 
coverage elevates the climate problem. It organizes and prioritizes policy attention. It 
activates competition and conflict over which attributes define climate change in policy 
debates. It also moderates disputes over causal relationships that are used by policy 
communities to advocate for either limited or comprehensive solutions. The nature of 
news coverage – the three aspects attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – 
heighten already intense debates over the climate problem. The nature of news coverage 
also increases existing uncertainties about climate change. In light of so much unsettled 
uncertainty, news coverage limits climate solutions to those that do not have as many 
consequences for resource allocation, government intervention, and complicated 
regulatory regimes.  
This dissertation looks at how news coverage influences problem prioritization 
and solution generation in policy debates. This maps back onto problem expansion and 
solution containment, respectively. The theory of media signaling suggests that policy 
communities as a whole will prioritize the climate problem as attribute diversity and 
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volume of news coverage grows. Policy communities will be less likely to prioritize the 
climate problem as a whole, however, as causal uncertainty in news coverage increases 
because its severity and need of government redress will be called into question. The 
theory of media signaling also implies that policy brokers acting on behalf of policy 
communities will respond to all three media signals once the climate problem is on the 
policy agenda – an arena in which conflict and competition are already at elevated levels. 
On climate solutions and their containment, the theory of media signaling 
suggests that large-scale climate solutions in policy debates will decrease with attribute 
diversity and causal uncertainty in news coverage because these signals amplify problem 
uncertainty and highlight disputes over how severe are the climate impacts. But volume 
of coverage should have the opposite effect – it should increase large-scale solutions 
because its signals the growing importance of fixing the climate problem.  
We should see completely different dynamics for the relationship between news 
coverage and smaller-scale solutions to fixing the climate problem. The theory of media 
signaling implies that more limited, less costly approaches should become more 
prominent in policy debates with increases in attribute diversity and causal uncertainty in 
climate news coverage. This is because these media signals increase the political 
feasibility and policy tool appropriateness of these smaller-scale alternatives in light of 
high levels of problem and causal uncertainty. However, as with large-scale climate fixes, 
volume should have an opposite effect because the signal of importance will shift debates 
away from less effective solutions toward either comprehensive approaches or efforts to 
better understand which set of attributes best defines climate change. 
These questions are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 with four dependent variables 
that capture problem prioritization and climate solutions in policy debates. The next part 
of the dissertation, Chapter 4, provides a thorough accounting of how the three media 
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signals under investigation – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – should 
elicit a reaction from policy communities. It addresses how they are manifested through 
journalistic practices that shape reporting on public affairs. And it provides a detailed 
discussion of how these media signals are indexed to climate events, elite conflict and 




Chapter 4: News Coverage of Climate Change, 1987-2012 
This chapter provides a detailed examination of the three aspects of climate 
change news coverage that produce media signals in the muddled problem space where 
policy debates take place. Here, volume will be addressed first, attribute diversity second, 
and causal uncertainty third. This chapter is organized into three sections, one for each 
media signal. Each section is made up of three components: (1) the relationship between 
the media signal and subsystem responsiveness; (2) the journalistic practices behind the 
media signal; and (3) an exploration of how that signal appears in the content of climate 
news.   
The first section asks, what drives news coverage of climate change? Engaging in 
this question necessarily requires an understanding of the journalistic standards and 
practices and the economic constraints of media organizations that feed into covering 
complex, scientific policy problems. This section incorporates the conduit tradition in 
political communications to explain how increases in the volume of news coverage are 
triggered by – and indexed to – events, elite conflict, and scientific controversies (see 
Table 2.1). The second section on attribute diversity lays out what attribute diversity in 
climate news looks like, where it comes from, and how it structures policy debates. The 
third section explains how news coverage of climate science produces an overemphasis 
on causal uncertainty that heightens disputes over what causes climate change and what 
are its impacts.  
VOLUME OF CLIMATE NEWS 
One of the three media signals under investigation, volume of climate news is the 
amount of attention the media devotes to climate change. Growing climate coverage is a 
 57 
signal to policy communities that the salience and importance of the climate problem is 
increasing. 
Media Attention and Subsystem Responsiveness 
Chapter 2 introduced a theory of media signaling based on the information-
processing perspective to understanding the policy process. This theory approaches 
media influence in terms of attention dynamics, in line with the contributor literature 
outlined in Table 2.1. As previously identified in Table 2.2, climate change in the 
muddled problem space is characterized by an oversupply of information, multiple ill-
defined attributes, causal relationships that are uncertain and disputed, contention 
surrounding severity of the problem, boundary-spanning competition, and protracted 
conflict. This creates a messy policy environment in which subsystems involved in the 
climate problem operate. Media attention is one of a several important inputs into the 
system that directs the allocation of attention and organizes subsystem activity in the 
muddled problem space.  
Changes in the volume of climate news coverage are signals to the policy 
community that the existing problem definition is unstable and marked with uncertainty. 
The theory of media signaling predicts that subsystem participants should respond to 
these signals by increasing activities that are related to the problem definition process.  
News coverage should facilitate competition and conflict over the attributes and causal 
relationships that structure the boundaries of the problem. Advocates and opponents of 
government action on climate change can utilize media attention as windows of 
opportunities to pursue their goals by steering debate in their desired direction.  
How has climate change been covered in the news and attended to by subsystems 
in the United States? Figure 4.1 displays a quarterly time series of combined climate 
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coverage by The New York Times and The Washington Post and congressional hearings 
from 1987-2012.  
Figure 4.1: Climate Change News Coverage and Congressional Hearings (Quarterly) 
1987-2012 
In line with previous scholarship, we see climate change emerge on the media’s 
agenda as an uptick in coverage in the latter months of 1988. After that, we also see 
increases in coverage in 1992, 1997, 2001-2002, and two large increases in 2007 and late 
2009 through early 2010. This is also consistent with studies of how news organizations 
have covered climate change over the years (Ungar 1992, 1995; McComas and Shanahan 
1999; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Liu et al 2011, 2013; Zehr 2000, 2009; Painter 
and Ashe 2012). The number of congressional hearings increased those years as well, 
save a slight 10% decrease in 1992 and no changes in 2001 and 2002. The theory of 
media signaling expects a lag between media attention and subsystem responsiveness. 
Hearing activity increased the year following the upticks in news coverage for all years 
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except 2007 and 2009.28 Of note, climate coverage is a consistent feature of the media’s 
agenda. This is not the case for the congressional hearing agenda. There are 18 null time 
points in the hearings data series, but none for news coverage.      
Journalistic Practices and Climate Coverage 
This section provides an overview of the journalistic norms, standards, and 
newsroom imperatives that explain what drives climate news coverage. The following 
factors explain what makes climate change newsworthy: events, novelty, dramatization, 
routinized reporting of complex scientific issues, elite conflict, and scientific controversy.  
In accordance with the conduit literature, elite conflict and scientific controversy -- which 
are not mutually exclusive -- are the fundamental drivers of media attention to climate 
change. The lengthier proceeding section that focuses on periods characterized by large 
increases in media attention provides further detail of and context to how journalistic 
practices, elite conflict, and scientific controversies interact to carve out agenda space for 
climate news.  
The nascence of climate coverage as a mainstay of the media agenda is at around 
the mid-to-late 1980s (McComas and Shanahan 1999; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; 
Wilkins 1993; Trumbo 1996; Unger 1992, 1995; Mazur 1998). In a context of increasing 
attention to similar environmental problems such as acid rain, ozone depletion, and 
species extinction (Mazur 1998; Dunlap 1991), the confluence of a few events propelled 
global warming onto the media agenda in the Summer of 1988 (Boykoff and Boykoff 
2004; Mazur 1999; McComas and Shanahan 1999). On June 23, 1988 the Senate held a 
hearing on climate change during a heat wave on the same day that also happened to be 
the hottest temperature yet on record.  In his testimony at this hearing, NASA scientist 
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 The correlation coefficient for the quarterly series is 0.75. Annual data correlate at 0.87. 
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James Hansen told members of the committee that his agency was “99% certain global 
warming had begun” (Shabecoff 1988, A1). Just a few days later, the fires in 
Yellowstone that raged in drought conditions were covered as an example of one of many 
consequences of the greenhouse effect (New York Times 1988, 4.1). On the other side of 
the equator, massive plumes of smoke from burning rain forest in the Amazon were 
linked to global warming, its destruction “may account for at least one-tenth of the global 
man-made output of carbon dioxide” (Simons 1988, A6).  
What are the journalistic practices that drive news coverage of climate change? 
First, we turn to how triggering events attract media attention. As the saying goes, if it 
bleeds, it leads. There is a large role for events in the newsmaking process (Dearing and 
Rogers 1996; McCombs 2004). The harmful and sometimes very visible consequences of 
global warming and climate change trigger news coverage (Unger 1992, 1995; Liu et al 
2008, 2011, 2013).  Real-world events such as these fires, and hurricanes and other 
natural disasters, are newsworthy also for their timeliness (i.e., newness) and impact 
(Gans 1980; Tuchman 1978). But events need not be dramatic on their face like natural 
disasters in order to gain news coverage. Novelty can be extended to changes in the 
indicators used to track a policy problem, often in the form of international conferences 
and the release of scientific reports. For instance, McComas and Shanahan (1999) found 
that approximately 80% of the articles in their study presented new evidence or research 
from scientific and government reports. 
  One of the challenges facing science and environmental reporters is that the 
causes of global warming and climate change are complex and often invisible (Wilson 
1993; Wyss 1991). Journalists overcome this problem with routinized reporting 
(Tuchman 1978). They link a complex, somewhat amorphous subject to concrete events 
and to policy areas with built-in audiences, such as economics and energy (Fitts 2014). In 
 61 
fact, Liu et al (2008, 2013) find that the majority of news coverage on global warming 
and climate change is thematic and linked to many policy issues – it is presented in a 
broader context than the triggering event from whence it came (but see Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004, 2007). 
The news value of an event highlighting a policy problem such as global warming 
grows if it can be tied to elite conflict and controversy (Bennett 1990, 1996, 2002; 
Boykoff and Boykoff 2003, 2007; Boykoff 2011). In fact, instances of elite conflict and 
controversy for all intents and purposes are events in covering public affairs. News 
coverage of global warming and climate change increases “when climate science meets 
politics” (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007). Indeed, using elites as sources and indexing to 
political and scientific conflict is a hallmark of climate change news coverage (Shesheta 
and Hopmann 2012; Zehr 2000, 2009; Mazur and Lee 1993; Trumbo 1996; McComas 
and Shanahan 1999; Boykoff and Boykoff 2003; Liu et al 2008, 2011). Indexing to elite 
debate is also a linchpin in the theory of media signaling presented in this dissertation 
project.  
The uptick in coverage beginning in 1988 is in part attributed to real-world 
events. But journalists need to contextualize events. Climate coverage is first and 
foremost a product of elite sources and debates over of the scientific uncertainties related 
to climate change. The first IPCC assessment report was published in 1990 for the UN 
Framework on Climate Convention. In the Executive Summary to this report, which is 
written for journalists and policymakers, the IPCC stated they were certain that 
“emissions resulting from human activities … [will] enhance the greenhouse effect,” 
resulting in an increase in the average warming of the Earth’s surface. The summary also 
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went on to emphasize the many uncertainties related to predicting the “timing and 
magnitude” of climate change.29  
At the same time, the US Congress in 1989 and 1990 held a series of hearings 
debating various provisions to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in proposed legislation 
related to the Clean Air Act amendments. However, none of these provisions were in the 
final bill, which passed November 14, 1990 and was signed into law shortly thereafter. 
Citing the many scientific uncertainties related to climate change, the policy community 
compromised to create the Global Change Research Program. This program was put in 
place in lieu of the more controversial proposals to reduce global warming, including 
limiting deforestation, developing alternative fuels, and fuel taxes (CQ Almanac 1990 
1991).  
Climate News Increases: Elite Conflict and Scientific Controversies 
Elite conflict and debate underpinned by climate science controversies drive the 
increases in coverage we see in 1992, 1997, 2001-2002, and the two large increases in 
2007 and late 2009 through early 2010. This section ties together subsystem activity and 
news coverage of climate change for each of these periods. Part of the theory of media 
signals presented in this dissertation project rests upon the conduit approach to the 
behavior and output of newsrooms. Climate coverage is by and large indexed to the 
parameters of elite debate, as we would expect regarding coverage of public affairs. 
However, as will be discussed in the subsequent section on climate science, the news 
does not mirror reality (Lippman 1922). The journalistic norms, practices, and economic 
imperatives that explain what drives media attention are also responsible for the 
production of news that is skewed from reality. Certain dimensions are covered more 
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 https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_spm.pdf. (Accessed February 2016). 
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than others and uncertainty in the policy community becomes amplified. Even though 
indexed to elite debate, media attention does not usually accurately reflect elite debate. It 
can downweight it, or it can overweight it. The theory of media influence based on 
signaling suggests that subsystems respond shifts in news coverage, as it helps them 
organize their priorities and elicits competition in problem definition. 
1992: Earth Summit and Scientific Uncertainties 
News coverage of climate change increased in 1992 by 27% from the previous 
year. This explanation for this uptick is rooted in novelty, conflict, and debate over 
scientific uncertainties (Boykoff and Boykof 2004, 2007).  In order, the dominant 
dimensions of coverage that year were climate science with 28%, international affairs and 
cooperation at 25%, and energy and environment nearly tied with 15% and 14% 
respectively. Media attention steadily rose leading up to the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janerio, Brazil (Earth Summit) in June.  
President Bush, who had called for the United States to participate in international 
conferences to address global warming on the campaign trail in 1988 (Los Angeles Times 
1988), was reluctant to attend as his Administration had evolved to focus on the “vast 
economic consequences” of policy based on “rudimentary” science (New York Times 
1989). In the end, Bush did attend; but, only after Congress passed resolutions urging him 
to do so (CQ Almanac 1992 1993). This high-level political conflict is fodder for news 
organizations. 
The House and Senate held 10 hearings on climate change in 1992, focusing on 
the upcoming Earth Summit, strategies to control and the impact of greenhouse gas 
emissions, and several oversight hearings on the Global Change Research Program. 
Debate (i.e., statements) in these hearings centered on the status of climate science and 
the economic consequences of action versus inaction. For example, in his opening 
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statement, Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) argued that the US could stabilize its 
carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels “at little or no cost” after noting that debate in 
the scientific community had moved on from whether warming will occur to debate over 
by how much and how quickly. In contrast, his counterpart on the committee, Rep. Ritter, 
warned against committing to major action, citing two university scientists’ explanations 
for the shortcomings of predictive computer modeling. [92-H361-86, Waxman 1-2. Ritter 
17-19].30 In a hearing on Earth Summit negotiations, while an official from the DOE 
testified that regulations or a carbon tax were the only ways to efficiently and reliability 
reduce emissions, officials from the EPA and Commerce advocated for voluntary 
programs and technology transfers, emphasizing threats to competitiveness and 
opportunities for US businesses respectively, given “the current state of scientific 
knowledge.” [92-H361-90, Volcansek].   
Policy brokers such as Waxman see news coverage as opportunities to pursue 
their policy goals. In his statement he cites the urging from 10 top-tier newspapers’ 
editorial pages – including the Washington Post and the New York Times – for US 
participation and leadership at the Earth Summit (Ibid). While this clear signal of support 
is used by policymakers such as Waxman to steer debate, opponents of mandatory and 
large-scale greenhouse gas emission reductions counter-mobilized by citing the lack of 
scientific certainty as one of the major obstacles to moving passed at most an incremental 
adjustment to the status quo. In this stance, the signal from the editorial pages was 
counterbalanced by the high volume of coverage that emphasized climate science 
uncertainty and the need for more research (Boykcoff and Boykoff 2007). For example, 
even though the editorial staff of the Post wrote in support of the summit, its reporters 
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also framed climate change in terms of a relatively new and still “fickle” science 
throughout the year (Weisskopf 1992, A1).  
1997: The Kyoto Summit and the Science behind Global Warming Trends 
In 1997, news coverage went up by more than three-fold from the previous year. 
As in the case before, media attention in 1997 was driven by events, elite conflict, and by 
debate over climate science. Activity relating to climate change by news organizations 
and policymakers increased leading up to the Kyoto Climate Summit. The Kyoto 
Protocol, signed by President Clinton but never ratified by the Senate, called for the US 
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2012. Months before the 
summit, the Senate approved a bi-partisan resolution opposing the treaty, citing the 
absence of provisions to legally bind developing countries, including India and China, to 
similar emission reductions (CQ Almanac 1997 1998).   
In terms of news coverage, 37% was devoted to aspects of international 
cooperation and developing nations’ participation. Climate science, another point of 
conflict and controversy, accounted for 28% of reporting on the problem of global 
warming that year. Energy and the environment were at 17% and 8% respectively. The 
number of hearings on climate change in 1997 more than doubled from the previous year, 
with the Kyoto treaty the subject of over half of those hearings. One hearing was devoted 
to questioning the scientific basis for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, focusing on the 
state of predictive modelling and the ability to account for the human contribution versus 
natural variations of climate change.  Other hearing topics included the use of biofuels 
and water management in light of an El Nino. 
News coverage of climate science and international cooperation reflects several 
developments in the policy community as well as high-profile debates emanating from 
within it.  A coalition of automobile manufacturers, business interests from the fossil fuel 
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industry, and unions formed in opposition to the treaty (CQ Almanac 1997 1998). This 
group spent over $13 million in a media campaign warning that the treaty would cause 
job losses, slow economic growth, and was based on premature -- if not incorrect -- 
scientific findings (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Oreskes and Conway 2010).  Debates in 
the Kyoto and climate science hearings reflected this message with many members of 
Congress and expert witnesses drawing from news coverage to support their claims. 
In House hearings on the Kyoto treaty, a representative from the Farm Bureau 
warned that emission reductions would result in higher fuel and hence food costs, arguing 
that both the scientific and policy communities were unsure that a climate change 
problem even existed.31 Representatives from both the AFL-CIO and the National 
Association of Manufacturers cited the couched scientific language from the 1995 IPCC 
Second Assessment linking industrial activity and climate change as a reason to oppose 
the treaty on the basis of its threat to jobs, productivity, and competition.32  Gilman (R-
NY) did not question climate science in his opening statement to the Committee on 
International Relations. Rather, his support for reductions to 1990 levels hinged on the 
participation of developing countries, especially China. However, his colleague 
Rohrabacher (R-CA) was not circumspect on the state of climate science. In warning of a 
debilitating gas tax, he stated that “this idea of global warming, after keeping an open 
mind and trying to listen to the debate, is a lot of nonsense” because in previous hearings 
“scientists…on both sides of this, they ended up debating whether or not it was going to 
be global warming or global cooling over the next 20 years.”33 
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In the Senate hearing questioning the scientific basis for greenhouse gas 
reductions, three of the four climate scientists invited to testify stressed that they – the 
scientific community – lacked sufficient evidence to confidently link human activities 
with climate change.34 Dr. Barron, a Professor in the Department of Geosciences at 
Pennsylvania State at the time, called for further research on climate change, pointing out 
that the uncertainties surrounding climate model predictions were still “very large”. He 
went on to state that this was probably going to be the case for a while, predicting that 10 
years in the future newspapers would continue to give a “balanced view,” even if there 
still remains “substantial disagreement and controversy” among scientists.35 News 
coverage of climate change was brought up again, this time by a Member of Congress. In 
his opening statement, Senator Bond (R-MO) quoted a Washington Post op-ed piece that 
“[t]he problem with global warming is that we don't yet know whether it represents a 
genuine national threat, and if so, how large,” or whether a supposedly serious problem 
should be taken seriously at all (Samuelson 1997, A23).  
2000 and 2001:  Climate Science Events and the Kyoto Protocol Backlash 
News coverage increased in 2000 and 2001 to nearly twice as much as the 
previous year. Media attention was driven by events, elite conflict, debates over climate 
science, and novelty. The agenda for 2000 and 2001 was dominated by two dimensions. 
For both years, climate science took up 36% and 24% of the media’s agenda in reporting 
on climate change. Topics related to international cooperation came to 26% in 2000 and 
41% in 2001. Two events directly related to climate science produced highly visible 
conflict in both the scientific and policymaking communities – and were covered 
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extensively by news organizations. As for the other dimension, the Kyoto Protocol 
organized elite conflict and news coverage around international cooperation. 
First, in August esteemed NASA climate scientist James Hansen, who testified in 
the 1988 hearings mentioned earlier, and some colleagues published a paper in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, the conclusions of which stirred 
controversy (Hansen et al 2000). As a New York Times reporter explained, Hansen et al 
wrote that the “emphasis on carbon dioxide may have been misplaced” and suggested 
that it would be more politically feasible to reduce global warming by focusing on other 
greenhouse gases (Revkin 2000, A1). This conclusion by Hansen and his coauthors was 
used by Republicans in subsequent hearings to question the need for the Kyoto treaty. 
The second event related to climate science was that a draft of the IPCC’s Third 
Assessment was released in mid-October ahead of the Kyoto talks. In it, the panel of 
scientists said that there was a substantial role for human activity in global warming and 
that temperatures projections were higher than in the 1995 report (Revkin 2000, A22). 
The Kyoto Protocol, as it is otherwise known, was the subject of several congressional 
hearings.  
As discussed earlier, novelty in a policy area can garner the interest of journalists 
and may increase the likelihood that it will be covered in a new dimension. This is what 
happened when in mid-October several large energy and manufacturing corporations – 
Dupont, Ford, Enron, BP, Weyerhaeuser to name a few – and the Environmental Defense 
Fund announced that they had teamed up to form the Partnership for Climate Action 
(Revkin 2000, C5). This group got ahead of Kyoto by pledging to voluntarily reduce their 
emissions of carbon dioxide, establishing a carbon trading regime among themselves, and 
by advocating for market-based and “green power” solutions to climate change (Drozdiak 
2000, A18). The Kyoto treaty itself was the subject of “contentious high-stakes 
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negotiations” at the Convention on Climate Change in The Hague in December that year 
(Revkin 2000, A1). The biggest sticking point for the US was the carbon credits allotted 
for protecting existing forests and farmlands, and the negotiations “went down in flames” 
(Hammitt 2000, E01). 
The events that triggered news coverage in 2000 are represented in political 
debate among members of the policymaking community that year as well. Congress held 
nine hearings36 examining the Kyoto treaty (2), technologically-driven and market-based 
solutions (4), the science and complexities of climate change (3), and the carbon 
emissions associated with the increasingly popular Internet (1). Participants in these 
hearings link the remaining scientific uncertainties, especially in regards to its impact, to 
the need for solutions that were already being implemented by industry, such as carbon 
sequestration, CAFE standards, energy efficiency in buildings and appliances, and 
renewables such as wind and solar.  This is of course in contrast to mandatory reduction 
limits, whether through cap-and-trade, regulations, or a carbon tax. 
For example, in his opening statement in the hearing examining these solutions, 
Chairman McCain (R-AZ) said that they were “approaches to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, the suspected cause of global temperature increases” and reminded the 
audience about the uncertainties in and the complexities of climate science.37 In line with 
the corporations that formed the Partnership for Climate Action, these “green energy” 
solutions were touted as business opportunities by witnesses and Members of Congress in 
this hearing and elsewhere.38 The Senate also held a hearing on two legislative initiatives 
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(S. 882 and S. 1776) that would create an Office of Climate Change in the DOE to cost-
share developing new green technologies with the private sector.39      
In examining the science of climate change, a common message conveyed by 
both the elected officials and the researchers invited to testify was a call for more 
research to reduce significant uncertainties in climate science. Raymond Schmitt, Senior 
Scientist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institutions, remarked on the challenges of 
modeling the role of the oceans in global warming and climate change: “…we are not 
doing a very good job at either modeling or predicting the role of the oceans…[we] do 
not yet have enough data.40  In commenting on the draft IPCC report, Chairman McCain 
noted that some scientific evidence contradicts that climate change is real and due to 
human activity and that the report’s findings highlight the need “for a more firm 
understanding and scientific consensus on global warming.”41  In a nod to the discord 
created by the reports, Chairman McCain proposed the creation of an alternative 
international commission of scientists to provide “unbiased sound scientific analysis to 
anyone in search of the facts on climate change.”42 His colleague on the committee, 
Senator John Kerry (D-MA), warned against “inserting politics into a scientific matter.”43  
The dynamics that triggered news coverage in 2000 carry over to explain a 39% 
increase in 2001. Events, novelty, dramatization, and elite conflict, and debate over 
climate science undergirded media attention to climate change. In 2001 there were 
multiple contentious international meetings on Kyoto, three high-profile scientific reports 
released, and President Bush reneged on a campaign pledge for mandatory carbon 
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dioxide reductions.  News coverage of climate science decreased by a third to 30%, while 
international cooperation increased by nearly two-thirds to take up 47% of the media’s 
agenda space on climate change.  
  Responding to pressure from conservative lawmakers, the coal industry, and 
right-wing think tanks, President Bush announced in March that carbon dioxide would 
not be included in his proposal to regulate greenhouse gases (Adams 2001a). Bush also 
repudiated the Kyoto protocol, though he did say climate change was a “serious issue” 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2007).  Bush called for more research funding and further 
investment in green technologies instead, citing that a recently-released National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) had found some scientific uncertainty on the causes and 
consequences of global warming (New York Times 2001, A12). Bush’s announcement 
was met with strong condemnation by international leaders and by both liberal and 
moderate policymakers in the United States. News coverage steadily picked up 
momentum beginning in March and peaked in the summer months leading up to the 
World Conference on Climate Change in Germany and the G8 Summit in Italy in July.  
During this window from March to July, the House and Senate held nine hearings 
on climate change, focusing on debates over climate science (5) and technology-driven 
solutions to reduce carbon emissions by increasing energy efficiency (4). Even with the 
change in Senate party control in early June when Jim Jeffords (I-VT) chose to caucus 
with the Democrats, debate centered on continued research and technological 
improvements as a policy responses in light of the uncertainty and variability that 
remained about the impacts of global warming.  
Several of the hearings on climate science examined the findings from two NAS 
reports and the final version of the Third Assessment by the IPCC. In his opening 
statement, Senator Murkowski (R-AK) said of an NAS report, it is “not a call for action 
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but a call for improved climate monitoring and climate modeling.”44  When Senator 
Kerry (D-MA) remarked that they were moving from science to opportunities via policy 
solutions in a hearing on energy efficiency technologies, his Republican colleague 
countered with findings from an NAS report. Senator McCain (R-AZ) noted that there is 
still “considerable uncertainty in current understanding of how the climate system varies 
naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols.”45  
   News coverage during this period reflects the debate over climate science in the 
hearings. For example, in reporting on the IPCC’s Third Assessment, the New York Times 
gave lengthy room to its opponents who argued that the IPCC “ignored the views of 
scientists who discount evidence of global warming as part of normal climate 
punctuations or cast doubt on the effects of carbon dioxide” (Smith 2001, A7).  The 
Washington Post gave considerable space to the position held by S. Fred Singer, 
professor emeritus and frequently invited hearing witness, that the IPCC “grossly 
exaggerated the problem” and based it on “faulty models that don’t conform to existing 
scientific data” (Pianin 2001, A16). In covering the release of an NAS report on abrupt 
climate change, both newspapers emphasized the variability and uncertainty in predicting 
such change and whether or not it should be considered threatening, because for example, 
“societies have demonstrated they are good at adapting to serious climate change” (Pianin 
2001, A19).  
2007: Policy Debates Intensify – Climate Science and Large-Scale Solutions 
In 2007, news coverage nearly tripled in volume from the previous year, which is 
a more than fourfold increase in the amount as compared to 2001. As in the case of 
previous notable surges in media attention, the jump this year is attributable to novelty, 
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events, dramatization, debates over climate science, and elevated political conflict among 
subsystem participants. The media’s issue agenda was more evenly spread than prior 
periods with climate science at 27%, energy at 26%, and international cooperation at 
20%. The total volume of news coverage peaked twice in 2007: once from February to 
late April and then again in September. These upticks in attention track with scientific 
and political events, debate over policy developments, and international conferences. 
The period from February to late April was dominated by political conflict, 
climate science, energy sector policy solutions, and jurisdictional issues.  After many 
years of Republican control, Democrats took over majority status of the House and 
Senate beginning in January, 2007. The Democratic leaders of both chambers, House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi (CA) and Senate Majority Leader Barbara Boxer (CA), pledged to 
take on the issue of global warming (CQ Weekly 2007, January 22). We see congressional 
hearings on climate change increase over sevenfold from the previous year. Pelosi 
created the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming to organize 
the effort to prepare climate change legislation for the House (CQ Weekly 2007, January 
27).46 This raised the ire of not only many Republican House members, but also of fellow 
Democrats such as John D. Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, who opposed sweeping legislation that would hurt his state’s automobile 
industry (Eilperin and Grunwald 2007, A22; CQ Weekly 2007, January 22; Davenport 
2007a). 
Several events in the first quarter of the year related to the climate science debate 
heightened its visibility in news coverage and in the policy community. On January 30th 
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 The simple creation of this committee does not account for the marked increase in hearings from the 
previous year; rather, it is the product of changes in existing political, policy, and scientific forces. The 
House held 57% of hearings on climate change in 2007 and the Select Committee on Energy Independence 
and Global Warming held approximately 20% of the two chambers’ total for that year. 
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the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Government Accountability Project issued a 
report alleging that the Bush Administration was interfering with the ability of Federal 
scientists to convey their findings (Dean 2007, A17).  In early February, the IPCC 
released a draft of its Fourth Assessment Report’s Summary to Policymakers and 
followed with portions of the report in subsequent months leading up to its adoption in 
May, 2007. The report concluded that, with 90% certainty, greenhouse gas emissions 
attributed to human activities accounted for most of the recent trends in global warming, 
as opposed to natural variations (Selin and VanDeveer 2007, p. 281). Writing that the 
earth was warming at an “alarming rate,” a Washington Post article with the headline 
“Humans Faulted for Global Warming,” highlighted warming’s global effects: massive 
species extinctions,” destructive rises in sea levels, and increased intensity and duration 
of hurricanes (Eilperin 2007, A23). 
The House and Senate held several hearings on the allegations against the Bush 
Administration and many more to examine IPCC’s findings from February through late 
April. They also held many hearings on several alternative cap-and-trade proposals, 
within which many participants tied the latest IPCC findings to call for strengthening 
climate change solutions.47 At the same time, a proportion of news coverage and political 
debate contained language that casted doubt on the certainty of science and on the need 
for such large-scale policy solutions. For example, in their study on how the New York 
Times and Washington Post reported on the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment during this time 
period, Painter and Ashe (2012) found that 18% of coverage contained the views of those 
who were skeptical of its findings. In a House hearing examining the IPCC findings, 
Representative Rohrbacher (R-CA) submitted to the record a list of scientists “who are 
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 Opening statements by Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) in Global Warming 
and Wildlife, Senate, 110th Cong., 2007. 
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not part of this ‘so-called’ consensus that any climate change is being caused by human 
activity” [2008-H701-65 2007, p 68] and proceeded to call a climate scientist “dishonest” 
multiple times as he was providing testimony on greenhouse gas emissions [ibid p .71].   
Several additional dramatic and novel events related to debates about climate 
science and policy solutions explain the uptick in climate coverage at the front-end of the 
year. Former Vice President Al Gore and his documentary An Inconvenient Truth were 
the subject of contentious House and Senate hearings in March following its win of two 
Oscars in late February. Gore, who helped “reshaped public perception of what was once 
a wonkish scientific debate,” was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in early February 
(Eilperin 2007, A1). It was awarded to him, along with the IPCC, later that year in 
October. In early April, the New York Times led with the story of the Supreme Court’s 5-
4 ruling on Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, “one of its most 
important environmental decisions in years” (Greenhouse 2007, A1).  The Court ruled 
that the EPA not only had the authority to regulate greenhouse gas automobile emissions, 
it could not sidestep its authority to do so “unless it could provide a scientific basis for its 
refusal” (Ibid).  
The House and Senate hearings featuring Gore in March were held to examine 
“disagreements over findings regarding responsibility of human activity for global 
warming and the extent of global climate change effects on the environment.”48 Gore and 
former Chairman Senator Inhofe (R-OK), who is often used as a news source because of 
his high profile (Painter and Ashe 2012; Shesheta and Hopmann 2012), engaged in a 
particularly heated debate on climate science.  Inhofe asserted that “skeptics say science 
is not settled and alarmists say it is.”49  
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In his question-and-answer period with Gore, Inhofe pointed to a New York Times 
article on a growing backlash against the former VP among supporters, which included 
NASA scientist Hansen criticizing his claims linking hurricanes to global warming 
(Broad 2007, F7).  The article also included a quote from Roger Pielke, Jr. saying that 
Gore is a “very polarizing figure in the science community.”   Pielke, who is a professor 
and Director of the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, University of 
Colorado, has testified numerous times in congressional hearings. The House hearing 
also featured Danish political scientist Bjorn Lomborg, a high-profile sceptic of climate 
change impacts. Dr. Lomborg, who has a column in the Wall Street Journal, appears 
often as a counterpoint voice in climate coverage (Painter 2011).       
The second spike in 2007 news coverage started in September and lasted through 
to the end of the year. Several events, policy developments, and political debates during 
this time period exemplify news coverage that highlights energy and international 
cooperation dimensions of climate change, which took up 26% and 20% of the media’s 
agenda that year respectively. In regards to international cooperation, several meetings 
took place leading up to the UN Conference on Climate Change in Bali in December. 
International climate conferences are routinely covered by news organizations. This 
year’s had the added element of dramatization, similar to 2001. One schism that received 
a good deal of news coverage was the Bush Administration’s decision to hold a climate 
summit at the White House in lieu of participating in talks that were held just a few days 
earlier at the UN (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007). A Washington Post editorial said that 
other countries’ skepticism of the US was understandable, given that “Bush has 
temporized and dithered” (2007, A16). Another Post article highlighted the presence of 
Al Gore and California Governor Schwarzenegger in the stead of a delegation from the 
White House (Lynch 2007, A1).  
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In Bali, the Bush Administration attended again as an observer, declining to 
participate in anything other than open-ended talks due to its opposition over mandatory 
greenhouse gas emission reductions (Davenport 2007c).  The Senate formed a bi-partisan 
albeit unofficial delegation to attend Bali. Though in the end, only Senator Kerry (D-MA) 
ended up making the trip. The rest stayed in Washington to debate the details of 
America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191), a cap-and-trade bill co-sponsored by 
Senators Lieberman (I-CT) and Warner (R-VA) that was making its way through the 
chamber. Media outlets highlighted the tension between the parties showcased in Bali. 
For example, a Washington Post article quotes Senator Inhofe, who put out a statement 
that “Democratic attempts to influence the U.N. Climate Conference, much like the entire 
conference itself, are more theatrics than substance” (Eilperin 2007, B01).  
The end of the year also culminated in several high-profile debates surrounding 
energy sector policy solutions, including the Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade proposal. 
With Warner casting the sole Republican ‘yay’ vote, the bill barely made it out of the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works. As evidenced by hearing and floor debate, 
opposition arguments focused on potential job losses and increases in energy costs for the 
low-income (Palmer 2007b).50 The New York Times and Washington Post also covered 
House cap-and-trade legislation (e.g. Eilperin 2007, A8), energy efficiency and fuel 
economy initiatives (e.g. Healy 2007, A22), and climate technology R&D (e.g. Wald 
2007, H1) (see also Zehr 2009). Finally, a federal judge’s ruling in favor of California’s 
request to the EPA for a waiver to regulate greenhouse gas emissions received heavy 
media attention. An article in the Post led with a finding from a House Committee on 
Oversight and Government reform hearing on the matter that “[t]he Bush administration 
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Almanac 2008 2009).  
 78 
has conducted a concerted, behind-the-scenes lobbying campaign to try to generate 
opposition to California's request to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and 
trucks” (Eilperin 2007, A5).  
Late 2009 to Early 2010: Large-Scale Solutions and Climate Science Scandals 
The next period in the time series with a significant increase in climate news 
coverage occurred from September 2009 through February 2010, with a bump in media 
attention preceding it in late June and July. The total volume of coverage increased by 
48% compared to the previous period, which is late 2008 through the first half of 2009. 
Some of the major issue attributes that define climate change shifted as well. Climate 
science increased by nearly a third to take up 30% of the media’s agenda; energy 
decreased by a little under a fifth to 24%; and international attributes increased by a fifth 
to 20%. News coverage, as in previous years, was driven by elite debate, climate science 
controversy, novelty, events, and dramatization. Hearing activity decreased during this 
time period by 24%, which is mostly due to the drop in hearings from 23 to two in the 
first quarter of 2010 compared to the same time in 2009.51 This is largely because 
comprehensive climate legislation had moved out of committee in both the House and 
Senate.  
The first uptick in news coverage that occurred in June and July was driven by 
elite debate over climate legislation and international cooperation and trade. On June 26, 
the House narrowly passed comprehensive climate legislation for the first time, the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (HR 2454). The bill, a cap-and-trade measure, 
limited greenhouse gas emissions to 17% of 2005 levels by 2050 using a system of 
buying and selling free and previously purchased allowances. It also included 
                                                 
51
 In fact, if we compare annual differences, hearings increased by 35% in 2009 compared to 2008.  
 79 
requirements for the use of renewable resources by electric utilities and incentives for 
energy efficiency, and technology R&D (CQ Almanac 2009 2010). Debate leading up to 
the bill’s passage centered on its potential effects on multiple business sectors and the 
economy in general, especially in light of uncertainty surrounding China’s own emissions 
policies [2012-H361-91; Lewis June 8, 2008; Schatz June 15, 2009]. For example, 
seizing on an opportunity provided by news coverage, Representative Walden (R-OR) in 
an opening statement called attention to a Washington Post article that included a quote 
from a Peking University professor that "[b]oth sides are worried that the other side will 
take advantage of them on the climate change issue" (Eunjung Cha 2009, A27). 
The Washington Post and New York Times indexed their coverage to elite debate 
throughout the legislative process, highlighting especially dramatic moments and points 
of conflict. For instance, in reporting on the final legislation, the Washington Post 
described Speaker John Boehner’s (R-OH) attempt to filibuster a floor vote, which is a 
most unusual tactic in the House (Mufson, Fahrenthold, and Kane 2009, A1). In reporting 
on its passage, an opinion piece in the New York Times focused on climate science 
conflict, stating that of the “212 representatives who voted no…most rejected the bill 
because they rejected the whole notion that we have to do something about greenhouse 
gases” (Krugman 2009, A21). News coverage continued its increase through July as the 
Senate started to debate the House measure as they were formulating their own 
comprehensive climate bill (Davenport 2007b). Both newspapers ran pieces on it being 
an uphill battle, with the New York Times in an editorial noting that “only 45 Senators 
mostly Democrats, can be counted as yes or probably yes,” with Republican Senate 
leadership making arguments focusing on its “unacceptable rise in energy prices” (2009, 
A32). 
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The second increase in news coverage began in the middle of Fall 2009 and lasted 
until around February 2010. This period is marked by political conflict over legislative 
proposals, climate science controversies, international meetings, and a finding issued by 
the EPA that greenhouse gases are dangerous pollutants. In early November the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works approved S. 1733, a comprehensive 
climate change bill. It set the same goal of 17% of 2005’s levels by 2050 as the House, 
but also included a 20% reduction target of 2020 (CQ Almanac 2009 2010). The bill, 
however, never made it out of markup and died at the end of the session.  
The Senate legislation was plagued with intense opposition from industry, think 
tanks, Republicans and some moderate Democrats making arguments that it was too 
costly and too soon, given the state of computer modeling and prediction by climate 
scientists. News coverage was indexed to these heightened debates and to some novel, 
dramatic political maneuvering by Republicans. For example, capitalizing on the media 
attention it was receiving, Senator Voinovich (R-OH) submitted to the record a 
Washington Post front-page article that led with the observation that the “potential 
economic impact of climate change” was at the forefront of debate during a hearing in 
late October (Eilperin 2009, A1).  Both the New York Times and Washington Post 
covered a Republican boycott of a vote to move the legislation out of committee. It was 
reported out despite the boycott, but as the president of the National Petrochemical and 
Refiners Association, Charles T. Drevna, expressed in a Washington Post article, “it’s 
frustrating to see…[the committee] pass something that all realizes has no chance of 
passage” (Eilperin 2009, A6). 
The uptick in news in late 2009 and early 2010 is also attributable to two events 
that brought climate science controversies to the forefront. First, at the end of the year, 
email messages and documents owned by climate scientists at the University of East 
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Anglia’s Climate Research Unit in the United Kingdom were hacked and posted to the 
Internet. Climate skeptics picked over these files in an attempt to “show that climate 
scientists conspire to overstate the case for a human influence on climate change,” as 
described in a New York Times article (Revkin 2009, A1). A story in the Post noted that 
“climategate,” as the scandal was dubbed by the media, ranked as one of the most 
popular on its website (Eilperin 2009, A4). The article went on to quote Stanford 
University climate scientist Stephen H. Schneider, who argued that, while the scandal 
will not stop the debate, it will help “slow down the nation’s public policy response.”  
The second climate science controversy took place in early 2010 when errors in 
the IPCC’s 2007 Third Assessment went public, were picked up by the media, and seized 
by those in the policy community who opposed comprehensive climate legislation. For 
example, the Washington Post noted in an article that a coalition of conservative groups 
and lawmakers led by Senators Inhofe (R-OK) and Barrasso (R-WY) were “citing the 
errors as further reasons to block mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions” 
(Eilperin and Fahrenthold 2009, A1).  Citing climategate and the IPCC errors as reasons, 
researchers Painter and Ashe (2012) found that 34% of climate change coverage in two 
prestige newspapers, The New York Times and Wall Street Journal, during this time 
period included sources skeptical of climate science, with little discernable difference 
between the two publications. 
In addition to the climate controversies, two other events help explain the surge in 
media attention in late 2009 through early 2010 as well. The first, December’s two-week 
long UN Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen, fed into prolonged debates 
surrounding climate legislation in Congress at the beginning of 2010. Ending in 
“disarray,” negotiations were deadlocked by developing countries’ assertions, led by 
China, that the US and other developed countries put up as much as $200 billion a year to 
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help them mitigate and adapt to climate change (Davenport 2010a). In the end, President 
Obama, whose attendance was widely covered in light of his predecessor Bush’s 
illustrious leadership role, helped negotiate the Copenhagen Accord among major 
polluters – China, the US, India, Brazil, and South Africa. This was a “loose” nonbinding 
agreement that was best described, as a New York Times article reported, as a “general 
commitment to the idea that ''climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time'' 
and asserts that ''deep cuts'' in global emissions were required” (Rosenthal and 
MacFarquhar 2009, A10).  
The second event tied to increased news coverage beginning in late 2009 was 
timed with the Copenhagen climate conference. On the summit’s opening day, December 
7, the EPA issued its finding that greenhouse gases were a dangerous pollutant and thus 
could be regulated by the agency according to provisions in the Clean Air Act (CQ 
Almanac 2009 2010). As a New York Times article noted, this strengthened the US 
delegation’s bargaining power going in to the conference (Broder 2009, A18). The same 
article noted that EPA’s administer, Lisa Jackson, broached the subject of the East Anglia 
email scandal in her prepared statement, stating that even though scientists would 
continue to debate the impacts of climate change, “the overwhelming amounts of 
scientific study show that the threat is real” (Ibid). The declaration by the EPA was the 
subject of “wide criticism” months after the rule was issued. In the background of stalling 
negotiations on climate legislation in the Senate, the EPA finding was condemned by a 
group of high-profile Democrats led by Senator Rockefeller (D-WV), who was quoted in 
a New York Times article saying that “E.P.A. actions in this area would have enormous 
implications, and these issues need to be handled carefully and appropriately dealt with 
by the Congress, not in isolation by a federal environmental agency” (Broder 2009, A19). 
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ATTRIBUTE DIVERSITY IN CLIMATE NEWS COVERAGE 
The second variable for media signals, attribute diversity is ambiguity in the 
variety and concentration of the dimensions that frame climate news coverage. Increasing 
attribute diversity in the news is a signal that amplifies problem uncertainty in the policy 
community. This leads to growing competition and conflict over which attributes best 
characterize the climate problem definition.  
Attribute Diversity and Subsystem Responsiveness 
Chapter 2 on the theory of media signaling introduced the term attribute diversity 
as a key component to understanding the role of the media from an information-
processing perspective. Policy problems such as climate change are inherently complex. 
They span multiple subsystems and policy domains. As a result, they are defined along 
multiple dimensions, which can shift when new information enters the policy 
environment (Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). When this happens – when 
attributes intrude into the problem space – subsystems often respond by shifting their 
attention to focus on the newly updated problem definition. In the policy processes 
literature, this is a precursor to problem redefinition and policy change.  This dissertation 
argues that attribute intrusion can also keep policy debate “locked in” in the problem 
space, inhibiting its solution set. For example, in 2008, a year before the Senate debated 
cap-and-trade proposals, the economic dimensions of climate change news coverage 
increased by 34%. Juliet Eilperin (2009, A1) of the Washington Post noted the shift in 
describing the 2009 debates:  
For a decade or more, the political battle over climate change has been fought 
largely over the validity of the science of global warming. But Tuesday, as the 
Environment and Public Works Committee opened its first hearing on a Senate 
climate change bill, those concerns took a rear seat to a different issue: the 
potential economic impact of climate change. 
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Attribute intrusion can happen in one of two ways. A problem can inherit an 
entirely new dimension, such as when climate change was linked to increases in violent 
conflict in Africa (Reuveny 2007) or when the death penalty was redefined in terms of 
“fairness” (DeBoef, Baumgartner, and Boydstun 2008). More commonly, attribute 
intrusion occurs when the dimensions underlying a policy problem are reweighted so that 
once dormant dimensions gain greater prominence. For example, agricultural offsets 
grew to become a dominant dimension in the failed 2000 Kyoto climate negotiations and 
again in debating cap-and-trade 2009 legislation in the Senate (Revkin 2000, A21; 
Davenport July 6, 2009).  In these examples, climate deliberations were structured by 
how the problem was characterized.   
Regardless of its form, reshuffling of attributes increases uncertainty in the 
problem space (Jones 1994b, 1996, 2001). A couple of recent studies examining how 
subsystems respond to this phenomenon coined the attribute diversity that underlies 
policy problems attribute uncertainty and problem uncertainty (Shaffer et al 2015; 
Shafran 2015 respectively). In the Shaffer et al (2015) piece, the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 opened up a window for alternative attributes to restructure how policymakers 
understood financial regulation. This exogenous shock – the financial crisis – was a 
signal that the working definition coming from the existing regulatory regime was no 
longer an adequate characterization of the problem. The crisis created an opportunity for 
several previously underweighted attributes, such as consumer protection and small 
business loans, to restructure ensuing policy debates on the matter.  
In a similar vein, this dissertation argues that the diversity of attributes in climate 
change news coverage sends a signal to subsystems about how the problem – global 
warming and its impacts – is characterized. More than that, attribute diversity in climate 
news facilitates subsystem competition over defining the problem. It increases 
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uncertainty about how the problem is characterized, which creates windows of 
opportunity for subsystem participants to advance the attributes that best help them 
achieve their policy goals. As a result, policy activity increases as advocates from various 
subsystems mobilize and counter mobilize their resources to gain control over the 
problem definition. We can see now how attribute diversity is related to conflict 
expansion as described by Schattschneider (1960) and expanded by Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993). New attributes or changes in old ones attract the involvement of 
subsystems beyond the current scope of conflict. 
Journalistic Practices and Attribute Diversity in News Coverage 
Why do we see attribute diversity in news coverage of climate change? The 
answer rests upon the dynamics between the issue, the people who report on it, and 
subsystem players. First, the nature of the issue interacts with journalistic standards and 
practices to create the dimensions we see in climate news. Journalists must reduce 
complex scientific problems like global warming into their component parts to produce 
pieces that are newsworthy and relatively easy to digest (Wilson 19XX; Wyss 19XX). 
This is one of the reasons why we see a good deal of thematic reporting on climate 
change (Liu et al 2008, 2013).  
Second, the causes of global warming are for the most part invisible; and climate 
change impacts are often long-term and far-reaching, save extreme weather events such 
as hurricanes.52 Since this is the case, journalists will have an incentive to frame them in 
terms of existing policy domains that are historically newsworthy (Fitts 2014; Boydstun 
2013), such as energy, economics, or international affairs. Once this happens, the 
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 The IPCC Third Assessment in 2001 was one of the first times scientists – and policymakers – made 
public linkages from climate change to extreme weather events. It was hotly contested in subsequent 
debates in the policy and scientific communities due to the variability and uncertainty that underlies its 
modeling. Most of the time most scientists qualify the relationship by emphasizing its uncertainty. 
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economics of the newsroom and informational efficiencies encourage routinized 
reporting around these dimensions (Tuchman 1978). For example, Boydstun (2013) finds 
that diversity in news coverage begets increases in diversity in subsequent coverage in 
the New York Times and Wall Street Journal in the cases of the war on terror and the 
death penalty. 
Two additional journalistic practices and imperatives help to understand the 
diversity of dimensions in climate coverage: novelty and news sources. The third reason 
is that novelty is newsworthy (Bennett 1996, 2002; Gans 1980; Sigal 1973). As 
previously discussed, events such as the release of scientific reports, climate conferences, 
legislative hearings, and flashy technological breakthroughs, such as advances 
geoengineering, tend to capture the attention of journalists. Oftentimes the event will 
shed light upon a recent development, such as the first seriously considered cap-and-trade 
bill for instance. When this happens, it is more likely to receive coverage; and, coverage 
will emphasize the new angle.  For example, the formation in 2000 of the Partnership for 
Climate Action, a voluntary carbon trading regime by several large energy and 
manufacturing corporations and the Environmental Defense Fund, was a surprising new 
development – an about-face in terms of the corporations’ previously publically-stated 
policy position (Revkin 2000, C5). News coverage of their announcement highlighted 
dimensions associated with climate science (carbon and global warming), technology 
R&D (the partnership lobbied heavily for “green” R&D), and international cooperation 
(the partnership was formed to set the agenda ahead of Kyoto treaty climate talks).53     
Fourth, elites are the sources of climate change attributes. We know from the 
conduit approach to media influence that journalists rely on elite sources as information-
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 These were the three most prominent dimensions in the cited newspaper article on the Partnership for 
Climate Action, as determined by automated text and human content coding, a methodology described in 
more in Chapter 3. 
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providers for reporting on public affairs (Gandy 1982; Bennett 1990, 1996). These 
sources – the people operating within subsystems – are constantly competing over how to 
define “climate change” in the muddled problem space. Furthermore, we know from the 
contributor literature that policy communities often turn to the media as a venue to 
promote the attributes that go alongside their definition of what is the problem. Because 
of its scientific nature, the language of a climate change is ladened with uncertainties and 
probabilities. This poses a challenge to journalists in terms of translating the issue for 
their news consumers (Wilkins and Patterson 1991). This encourages a relationship 
between journalists and political elites that provides many opportunities for subsystem 
participants to insert their dimensions into the news. As official sources, subsystem elites 
provide journalists legitimacy (Bennett 1990, 1996). As information-providers, 
journalists will rely on subsystem participants to anchor how they write the climate story.  
The Pathways to Attribute Diversity and Problem Uncertainty 
How does attribute diversity come together as news organizations cover climate 
change? Figure 4.2 is a stylized depiction of the pathway to uncertainty caused by 
attribute diversity.54 On the leftmost side of the diagram are several high-level attributes 
that characterize climate change: economics, weather, climate science, environment, and 
energy.55 To the right are arrows that vary in their thickness, which represents the weights 
associated with each attribute. Notice that no two arrows are the same weight. In this 
rather simplified depiction (see Table 4.1 for the full list of climate news attributes), 
climate change is characterized along five distinct dimensions, all of which are attached 
to unique weights. The combination of dimensions and weights produces the attribute 
diversity that structures the climate change problem definition. Moving to the very last 
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 Diagram adapted from Baumgartner and Jones (2015). 
55
 The ‘international’ dimension is excluded only for reasons of space.  
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box on the right of the diagram, we see that attribute diversity produces uncertainty. As in 
the case of Shaffer et al (2015), ambivalence underlies problem uncertainty.     
 
Figure 4.2: The Pathways to Attribute Diversity and Problem Uncertainty  
Here ambivalence means uncertainty due to fluctuations in the concentration and 
number of attributes in climate news. If climate change is covered by the media in terms 
of only a few dimensions, with one attribute receiving far more attention than the other, 
then attribute diversity in news coverage is low. Attribute diversity is high when the news 
contains multiple dimensions that vary in their prominence in relation to each other. Thus 
increases in attribute diversity in climate news are signals to policy communities that its 
problem definition is in a state of flux. This in turn should mobilize subsystem activity.  
This dynamic is on display in Figure 4.3, which shows time series of climate 
change attribute diversity. We can point to upticks in hearing activity in periods that 
follow increases in the attribute diversity in climate news. For example, in 1988 attribute 
diversity increased by almost 69% and the number of hearings the following year more 
than doubled. In 2005, almost two decades later, climate news attribute diversity 
increased by 28% and hearings the next year again more than doubled. A converse 
relationship is also on display. For instance, in 1991 and 2001, news attribute diversity 
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decreased by approximately 27% and 16% respectively. Hearing activity in 1992 and 
2002 also decreased, by approximately 10% and 33%. 
 
Figure 4.3: Attribute Diversity in Climate News Coverage, 1987-2012 
Of course the above examples are simply illustrative.56  They do however imply 
that there may be a nonlinear association between media signals of attribute diversity and 
subsystem responsiveness. This falls in line with what we know about the limits of 
attention – that individuals and institutions are disproportionate information processors. 
Media signals of attribute diversity may need to be above a certain threshold in order for 
subsystem participants to detect and process them (i.e., respond to them). This is 
especially likely in climate change’s muddled problem space, which is characterized by 
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 The two series at the annual level are correlated at 0.49. 
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conflicting information about attributes, causal relationships, and the seriousness of the 
problem.  
The messages contained in news coverage of climate change’s attributes, once 
detected, are opportunities -- and perhaps even mandates at times – for policy 
communities to define the climate problem in line with what advances their goals.  These 
goals vary: some seek to steer debate towards nonproblemicity (McCright and Dunlap 
2003, 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Hopmann 2011); fund more research to better 
understand the problem (Zehr 2000); deploy peripheral solutions such as conservation 
and efficiency measures in light of problem uncertainty; or, pass comprehensive 
legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because the cost of not doing so is greater 
than the cost of maintaining the status quo (Zehr 2009). Management of the news by 
journalists and elites with stakes in climate policy allows the latter a certain amount of 
latitude in reshaping the boundaries of the problem definition for particular purposes (see 
Zehr 2000, p. 98).  
Attribute Diversity in Climate Change News Coverage 
This section provides an overview of the attributes of climate in two elite news 
publications, The New York Times and the Washington Post, from 1987 to 2012. Table 
4.1 displays climate attributes and their corresponding prominence with counts and 
percentages aggregated across all years.57 There are 32 unique climate attributes in news 
coverage, ranging from the relationship between carbon dioxide and global warming, 
energy conservation and efficiency, through to technology R&D (e.g., geoengineering). 
The 32 unique attributes are nested under umbrella categories that comport to similar 
studies showing that climate news conveys its complex, myriad policy dimensions (see 
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 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of how the table’s content was derived and measured. 
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especially Liu 2008, 2013; Zehr 2009).  In descending order, the prominence of these 
major categories is climate science (25%), energy (22%), international (18%), economics 
(9%), weather and the environment (7% each), national security and technology R&D 























Table 4.1: Attributes of Climate Change in News Coverage, 1987-2012 
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A handful (6) of the unique attributes stand out in terms of how much media 
attention they garnered over the years.  The top two fall under the energy category, which 
is consistent with other studies (see Liu et al 2008, 2013; Zehr 2009). The two attributes -
- alternative and renewable energy and energy conservation and efficiency -- garnered 
9% and 7% of the media’s climate agenda respectively. These energy-based solutions 
have been under the auspices of climate policy since Congress passed the 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments (CQ Almanac 1990 1991). Previously, however, they were tools used in 
response to the energy crisis in the late 1970s. As oil prices plunged in the 1980s, these 
solutions were more and more likely to be attached to climate change. For example, 
Senator Wirth (D-CO) in 1988 from the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, was 
quoted in the National Journal as saying “[w]hat we’ve got to do in energy conservation 
is try to ride the global warming issue” (Stanfield 1988).  These attributes appear in 
articles with titles such as: “The Problem With Biofuels; More proof that there are no 
easy solutions to climate change”; “Debate on Clean Energy Leads to a Regional Battle 
Over Jobs”; “Studies Call Biofuels a Greenhouse Threat”; “The Sun Also Braises; 
Renewable Energy Advocates Offer Invention That Can Harness and Ease Global 
Warming”; “Eat Locally, Ease Climate Change Globally”; and “Gas and the Greenhouse 
Effect”.58 
The third unique attribute to stand out is from the climate science dimension. 
“Temperature trends” garnered 6% of news coverage. The prevalence of climate science 
is consistent with similar studies documenting the range of climate news dimensionality 
(Liu et al 2008, 2013; Zehr 2009; Hulme 2009; Hopmann 2011). Furthermore, many 
studies focusing solely on climate science and uncertainty have documented its 
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 In order: Washington Post (2008, A14); Wald (2009, A13); Rosenthal (2008, A9); Weiss (1996, A15); 
Washington Post (2008, B6); and Mathews (1988, A10) 
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pervasiveness in structuring news coverage (Mazur and Lee 1993; Zehr 2000; Antilla 
2005; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Painter and Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 
2015). This attribute is not to be confused with news stories about weather or natural 
disasters. Rather “temperature trends” refers to coverage emphasizing the uncertainty in 
historic temperature trends as well as the variability in the temperature range of future 
global warming (see also Zehr 2000, p. 94). This attribute appears in articles such as: 
“1988 Set Warmth Record, British Meteorologists Report; Scientists Differ on Signs of 
Long-Term Global Trend”; “'Greenhouse Effect' Seems Benign So Far; Warming Most 
Evident At Night, in Winter”; “Ice Age Evidence Suggests a Mercurial Tropical 
Climate”; and “2007 Among Hottest Years On Record; Scientists Blame Trend On 
Greenhouse Gases.”59 
The fourth highest-ranking attribute is “international treaties” at 5%. Its rank is 
consistent with other studies (Liu et al 2008, 2013; Smith 2005; Shehata and Hopmann 
2012). There a couple of reasons why this attribute garners as much coverage as it does. 
First, the scope of climate change – i.e. global warming – is by its nature a collective 
action problem on an international scale.  Sovereign nations look to enter into pacts with 
others on greenhouse gas emissions reductions in order to stave off the competitive 
advantage of polluting countries. As shown in the preceding section, international 
treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol, are highly conflictual matters. This attracts the 
attention of journalists, whose news organizations already carve out space for 
international affairs. This is even more the case for elite news publications, especially the 
New York Times.60  The “international treaties” attribute appears in articles such as:  
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 In order: Weisskopf (1989, A20); Rensberger (1993, A19); Stevens (1995, C4); Eilperin (2007, A13). 
60
 See Boydstun (2013, pp. 90 and 97) for the prominence of front-page attention to international affairs by 
the New York Times, 1996-2006. 
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“Crying Wolf About Kyoto”; “Amid a Hopeful Mood, U.N. Talks Set Countries on Path 
Toward a Global Climate Treaty”; “14 Nations to Participate in Plan to Reduce Methane; 
Gas to Be Used as Energy Source in an Effort to Slow Global Warming”; and “14 
Nations to Participate in Plan to Reduce Methane; Gas to Be Used as Energy Source in an 
Effort to Slow Global Warming.”61 
The attribute “climate program costs” also garnered 5% of the news agenda across 
the years. This attribute is housed in the larger economics category, which consistently 
ranks high in many studies (Liu et al 2008; 2013; Zehr 2009; McComas and Shanahan 
1999; Hulme 2009; Hopmann 2011).  This attribute captures debates that center on the 
budget, spending proposals, and program cost estimates on a diverse set of topics such as 
a carbon tax, cap-and-trade, research funding, and energy bill tax credits for the low-
income. By its very nature, this attribute tends to generate a great deal of elite conflict, 
which in turn attracts media attention. The “climate program costs” attribute appears in 
articles such as: “Senate Clears Spending After Fractious Debate”; “Science gets a boost 
in budget”; “Talk of Raising Gas Tax Is Just That; Analysts Cite Advantages but 
Concede Its Political Improbability”; and “Energy Boost; Solar and Wind Businesses 
Powered by Tax Breaks.”62 
Finally, the sixth unique attribute to receive considerable news coverage is 
greenhouse gas pollution, which falls under the “environment” category.  Many studies 
have documented the prevalence of the environmental aspects of climate change, 
especially in its nascent years as an issue (Trumbo 1996; Mazur and Lee 1993; Mazur 
1998; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Zehr 2009). It is not as dominant as one might 
expect given that climate change (and global warming) is fundamentally an 
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 In order: Makhiijani, (1997, A29); Rosenthal (2008, A7); Eilperin (2004, A2); Jacobs (2009, A10)  
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 In order: Herszenhorn (2009, A19); Vastag (2011, A2); Mufson (2006, A13); Huslin (2008, A14) 
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environmental dilemma. It is unlikely to receive media attention unless it is the source of 
elite conflict, linked to other issue dimensions or becomes associated with a negative 
policy image, like most environmental problems (Dryzek 1987; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Ungar 1992; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Liu 2008, 2013).  The “greenhouse 
gas pollution” attribute is found in articles such as: “Yellowstone Park Emits Tons of 
Carbon Dioxide, Study Finds”; “CO2 Is Not a 'Pollutant'”; “Trying to Connect the Dinner 
Plate to Climate Change”; and “Less Water Vapor Slows Earth's Warming Trends, 
Researchers Say”.63 
CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY IN CLIMATE NEWS COVERAGE 
As a media signal, causal uncertainty is reporting on the tenuousness of causal 
relationships in climate science that link human behavior with global warming and global 
warming with unwanted outcomes, such as population displacement from sea-level rise. 
Chapter 2 on the theory of media signaling introduced causal uncertainty in the muddled 
problem space as key to understanding the role of the media from an information-
processing perspective. Climate change is a highly politicized, complex scientific issue 
characterized by multiple uncertain, and oftentimes disputed, causal relationships. A 
hallmark of complex problems is that their causal mechanisms and impacts are often ill-
understood (Baumgartner and Jones 2005). Scientific research on climate change plays a 
significant role in mediating the causal stories used by subsystems to define the climate 
problem. News coverage of climate science tends to be framed overwhelmingly in terms 
of uncertainty, either as a product of scientific language or skeptical voices from within 
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 In order: Associated Press (1997, A27); Stevens (1989, C4); Deutsch (2007, C3); Bhanoo (2010, A16) 
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and outside the scientific community (Wilkins 1993; Antilla 2005; Boykoff and Boykoff 
2004, 2007; Boykoff 2011; Painter and Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 2015).64  
Climate science in the news converges around three forms of uncertainty, 
reflecting the sources of uncertainty in scientific studies of climate change: human 
contribution, temperature trends (global warming), and impacts (Painter and Ashe 2012; 
Schmid-Petri et al 2015). These categories are based on collaborative work among media 
scholars and climate scientists (see Rahmstorf 2004). Figure 4.4 shows the causal 
pathways leading to global warming and climate change that dominate news coverage of 
climate science. Each arrow represents the linkage between cause and effect; and, the 
arrows’ gray radial shading represents how each relationship is colored by uncertainty, 
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 The climate science attributes news coverage data series collected and coded for this dissertation 
correlates at .85-.97 with the results of content coding from three well-known sentiment dictionaries that 
capture uncertainty:  Loughran and McDonald (2011); Lexicoder (Young and Soroka 2011); WordStat 
Sentiment Dictionry (2012). Each of these dictionaries was altered slightly to customize it for global 
warming and climate change to remove/add domain-specific words. In addition to these, a domain-specific 
dictionary was created; and, the climate science series correlates with it at .91).  
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Figure 4.4: How Climate Science News Coverage Creates Causal Uncertainty 
The bottom three boxes in the diagram depict uncertainty in the anthropogenic 
attribution to global warming and climate change, or the human contribution. The 
linkages between human activity resulting in greenhouse gas emissions -- especially since 
the industrial revolution – to global warming trends and climate change is one source of 
uncertainty in climate science news. This abated over time, but was particularly prevalent 
in the early stages of covering climate science (Wilkins 1993; Boykoff and Boykoff 
2004). For example, a Washington Post article from 1995 emphasized uncertainty in the 
scientific community regarding the role of humans: “some skeptical meteorologists and 
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analysts assert that global warming reflects a natural cycle of temperature fluctuation and 
cannot be decisively tied to human actions” (Atkinson 1995, A10). 
The second source of uncertainty in climate science news rests squarely on the 
third box from the bottom: global warming or temperature trends and atmospheric 
warming. In this case, scientific findings and predictions confirming an upward trend in 
global warming are countered by arguments that there is insufficient evidence to rule out 
warming that is within the bounds of natural variations. The denial or downplay of global 
warming imbues the linkages between it, climate change, and its impacts with large 
degrees of uncertainty and ushers the causal story down the path toward nonproblemicity 
(Dunlap and McCright 2003). An example of this in the news comes from a Washington 
Post article covering the IPCC’s 2001 report “warning…that Earth’s average temperature 
could rise by as much as 10.4 degrees over the next 100 years” (Pianin 2001, A21). The 
article featured a contrary view from Fred Singer, professor emeritus of environmental 
sciences at the University of Virginia. Professor Singer was (and still is) a frequently-
used source in climate science news (Painter 2011) and has provided testimony in 
congressional hearings on numerous occasions. Of the IPCC’s findings, Singer said: 
…charged that the U.N. study grossly exaggerated the problem. He said it was 
based on faulty models that don't conform to existing scientific data from 
thermometers at weather stations, Earth-circling satellites and high-altitude 
balloons.  "This report is based on shaky science and is designed to present only 
the worst possible cases in order to scare politicians and the population and 
pressure the administration into signing the Kyoto Protocol." 
 The third type of uncertainty in climate science news centers on the causal 
relationships between climate change and its myriad impacts, depicted in the top two 
boxes. This clouds causal stories that highlight the seriousness of the problem. Climate 
change can be linked to extreme weather events (e.g. hurricanes), diseases (e.g. malaria), 
displacement, conflict, property damage (from weather events and rises in sea levels), 
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wildlife extinction (e.g. polar bears), and famine. Impact uncertainty is one of the more 
prevalent frames in climate science news in the latter decade of the data series (2001/02-
2012). This coincides with the strong statements about (and evidence for) climate change 
impacts on human and natural systems in the third IPCC report published in 2001.  
Uncertainty in climate impacts is inherent in the science, statistics, and computer 
modeling that underlies it, as explained by atmospheric scientist and one of the third and 
fourth report’s lead authors, Kevin E. Trenberth, at a congressional hearing (2008-h701-
65, State of Climate Science 2007, published in 2008). An example of this type of 
uncertainty can be found in a New York Times article reporting on an abrupt climate 
change study released by the National Research Council (Chang 2001, A19). In the 
article, it was noted that “[t]he scientists do not foresee any imminent changes, and the 
report advises that the public "not be fatalistic about the threats." The panel recommends 
further research to understand the mechanisms that can cause the sudden changes” and 
that one of the lead scientists, Dr. Alley, emphasized that “other models predict no 
effects.” What this does is downplay the immediacy and concreteness of climate impacts, 
which in turn increases the uncertainty associated with arguments emphasizing the 
severity of the problem. 
Climate science is the number one news dimension in 18 out of the 26 years that 
are included in this dissertation project, with an average of 32% and a range from 15%-
56%. See Figure 4.5 below for a time series area graph comparing the climate science 
dimension with the other prominent dimensions. What is more, news coverage of climate 
science tends to overemphasize its uncertainty. How should we expect subsystems to 
respond to these strong media signals that amplify uncertainty in the causal relationships 
that define the problem of climate change? We should expect increased competition to 
define the problem among both advocates and opponents of government action to 
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mitigate and/or adapt to climate change in response to these signals. Causal stories are 
especially crucial in the problem recognition phase of the policy process (Stone 1988, 
1989; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Because of this, we should see media signals of causal 
uncertainty to influence subsystem activity the most at the earlier stages of the problem 
definition process, such as agenda setting.  
 
Figure 4.5: Climate Science Dominates: Area Graph of the Issue Dimensions of Climate 
News Coverage, 1986-2012 
Both proponents and opponents of climate policy should be responsive to these 
media signals because competitive advantage is pursued by moderating the degrees of 
uncertainty associated with the various causal relationships. Proponents will respond to 
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media signals amplifying causal uncertainties in order to reduce them -- to make it so 
there is sufficient clarity in the causes and consequences to warrant large-scale and 
comprehensive policy solutions. Opponents will respond in order to increase them – to 
call into dispute the seriousness of the problem and steer debate toward smaller-scale 
solutions or no solutions at all. Generally speaking, media signals of climate science 
uncertainty are opportunities for subsystems to pursue their policy goals.     
Journalistic Practices and Causal Uncertainty in the News 
By and large, news coverage of climate science is shrouded in varying layers of 
uncertainty. Two journalistic practices produce news coverage that overemphasizes the 
degree of uncertainty in the causal relationships associated with climate change.65 First, 
fair and balanced reporting is a standard meant to fulfill the ideal of objectivity 
(Cunningham 2003; Stocking 1999). Balanced reporting means presenting views of 
conflicting sides with roughly equal attention (Entman 1989). In covering developments 
in climate science and policy, journalists will include opposing viewpoints of 
authoritative sources – prestigious scientists, powerful lawmakers, and researchers from 
influential think tanks – in an effort to present a fair depiction of the range of debate. In 
reality, these opposing voices are oftentimes outlier viewpoints (Boykoff 2011; Oreskes 
and Conway 2010). This practice produces skewed representations of uncertainty, as the 
consensus about the causes and consequences of climate change is far greater than what 
is depicted in news coverage. This “balance as bias” is a common finding in studies on 
climate news coverage (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Antilla 2005; Zehr 2000; 
Painter and Ashe 2012). 
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  The previous two sections on what drives climate coverage and attribute diversity introduced many of 
the journalistic practices that also feed into the overemphasis of scientific uncertainty in climate news – 
events, dramatization, novelty, elite conflict, and controversies in the science community. Since these were 
previously covered, they are omitted from this section. 
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Second, news coverage overemphasizes scientific uncertainties because 
scientists are commonly used as sources. Scientists are used as authoritative voices 
when journalists cover climate science because their expertise legitimizes news 
content (Gandy 1979; Bennett 1996). They also help journalists sort through the 
complex, often arcane terminology used in scientific studies of climate change. 
Further, the language scientists use to describe and qualify research findings is 
couched in uncertainty, as is their training. This shows up in news coverage in 
reporting on climate science (Bailey, Giangola and Boykoff 2014).  An example 
comes from a Washington Post article with the headline “Degrees of Uncertainty in 
Climate Studies; One Study Says Surge in Global Warming Likely; Another Highlights 
Unknowns” (Pianin 2001, A21): 
Another study published in Science, however, cautions that future emissions of 
greenhouse gases and their resulting environmental and economic consequences 
"are subject to large uncertainties."  The study by scientists specializing in global 
change at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of North 
Carolina challenged the U.N. panel's forecast of rising temperatures over the 
coming century.  "This finding is not accompanied by any quantification of the 
probability of those projections or the probability bounded by this range, and the 
reader is left to guess whether the likelihood of exceeding this range is 1 in 10 or 
1 in 1,000," the report said. 
Causal Uncertainty in the News: An Overview  
As shown in the previous two sections, the science of climate change is a 
prominent dimension of news coverage and a significant driver of media attention. Figure 
4.6 below shows the number of newspaper articles from the Post and Times with climate 
science as a prominent dimension alongside congressional hearings on climate change 
from 1987-2012. Comparing this figure to the area graph in the previous section (Figure 
4.5), we can see that although climate science as a proportion of all news stories has 
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trended downward over time – though with notable variation – the number of stories with 
climate science as a dimension has increased.66 
Figure 4.6: Causal Uncertainty in Climate News Coverage, 1987-2012 
Eight years in the data series fall above the mean annual change score of 32%, 
with a range of 52% in 2004 to 436% in 1988.  The years with substantial growth in 
climate science coverage are 1988, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006-2009. The large 
increase in 1988 holds steady for a couple of years until 1990, where it dips down by 
41% by 1991. Scientists were the most-cited source on climate change until then 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Wilkins 1993; Trumbo 1996). Several high-profile events, 
elite conflict, and policy developments took place during this time period. Hearing 
testimony by NASA scientist James Henson, multiple wildfires, the formation of the 
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 The total volume of climate coverage increased over time as well, though not in the same proportion. 
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IPCC, and deliberation on carbon dioxide proposals for Clean Air Act amendments in 
1988 framed news coverage of what was then mostly considered a scientific issue 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Wilkins 1993; Trumbo 1996).  
Seventy-percent of climate science news coverage during these years centered on 
warming trends and the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming. These climate science attributes appear in articles with titles such as: “Area 
Stays Out Of 'Greenhouse' During Cool Year”; “Don't Make a Villain of the Greenhouse 
Effect”; “Record Hot Readings in 1980s Boost Global-Warming Theory”; “New Peril 
Seen on Earth Warming”; “Global Warming: Experts Ponder Bewildering Feedback 
Effects”; and “I'm Not Being an Alarmist About the Greenhouse Effect.”67 
The next window of heightened media attention to climate science occurred in 
1995, 1997, and 2000. Coverage nearly doubled in 1995, grew by 145% in 1997, and 
intensified again in 2000 with a 92% increase. The news surges are tied to political 
turnover, releases of scientific reports, international climate talks, and elite debate 
regarding the uncertainty of climate change’s causal relationships. In the previous period, 
climate science news was dominated by two attributes. In the latter period, coverage is 
more spread out across attributes, especially in 2000. The “human contribution” attribute 
appears for the first time as a substantial dimension for the first time. “Balancing dueling 
scientists” became a common feature of climate news in the mid-nineties (Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2007; McCright and Dunlap 2003). It marks the beginning of an era 
characterized by an overemphasis of climate science skepticism.  
The IPCC Second Assessment on climate change was released in 1995. The 
report stated that the “balance of evidence suggestions a discernable human influence” 
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 In order: Pianin (2001, A16); New York Times (1988, A14); Specter (1990, A20); Stevens (1990, A18); 
Shabecoff (1989, C1); Washington Post (1989, A10). 
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but “future unexpected, large, and rapid climate system changes are by their nature 
difficult to predict” (Houghton et al 1996). Conservative think tanks and the fossil fuel 
industry intensified their efforts to manufacture doubt about the scientific consensus 
around climate change after the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 (McCright and 
Dunlap 2003; Oreskes and Conway 2010).  The top climate science attributes in 1995 
were temperature trends, human attribution, computer modeling and simulation, and 
scientific findings and methodologies. These attributes appear in article titles such as: "In 
Rain and Temperature Data, New Signs of Global Warming”; "Global Warming Experts 
Call Human Role Likely”; “Global Warming Forecast Is for Slower Rate Than 
Previously Feared”; “Scientists Say Earth's Warming Could Set Off Wide Disruptions.”68 
Two years later in 1997, climate science was the subject of contentious elite 
debate leading to the Kyoto climate summit at the end of the year. The Global Climate 
Information Project, a coalition of industry groups and labor unions, spent over $13 
million in a media campaign against Kyoto’s emissions reductions, attacking climate 
science as “premature” (Boykoff and Boycoff 2007; Oreskes and Conway 2010). The 
Senate invited several known skeptics from the scientific community to testify at hearings 
to cast doubt on the scientific basis for greenhouse gas reductions.  The top climate 
science attributes in 1997 were temperature trends, human contributions, and the 
relationship between greenhouse gases and global warming. These attributes appear in 
article titles such as: “Warming Could Bring Some Cold Surprises”; “Team Challenges 
Theory Linking Climate Change, Evolutionary Surge”; “Holes in the Greenhouse 
Effect?”; and “Complexities of Global Warming; What Scientists Don't Know -- And 
Why They Don't Know It.”69 
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 In order: Stevens (1995, C4); Stevens (1995a, A1); Stevens (1995b, A1); Sawyer and Lee (1995, A12).  
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 In order: Stevens (1997, C2); Suplee (1997, A15); Michaels (1997, H01); Casti (1997, H01). 
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The increase in 2000 can be traced back to scientific studies, Kyoto climate talks 
again, and elite debate on climate science. A draft of the IPCC’s Third Assessment report 
was released ahead of the international summit. It stated that humans had a substantial 
role in global warming and that temperature projections were higher than previously 
identified (Revkin 2000, A22). A group of climate scientists led by James Hansen 
published a study that included a suggestion that it could be more politically expedient 
for policymakers to focus on reducing greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide 
(Revkin 2001, A1).  This was seized by opponents in arguments against large-scale 
government intervention in mitigating global warming and the Kyoto Protocol [2003-
S261-39; 2001-S261-9]. Elite debate also centered on climate modeling, calling for 
further research for a more “firm understanding” (McCain 2000 in 2003-S261-39 p #). 
The attributes for climate science in the 2000 news coverage were temperature 
trends, human contributions, computer modeling and simulations, scientific findings and 
methodologies, greenhouse gases and global warming ,and glacial and sea ice melt. 
These attributes appear in article titles such as: “A Century-Long Warming Trend”; 
“Study Faults Humans for Large Share of Global Warming”; “Ocean Temperature Rise 
May Mean Warmer Times Ahead”; “Get the Easy Greenhouse Gases First “;  “Surface or 
Air? The Great Debate Continues”; and “Antarctic Test Raises Hope On a Global-
Warming Gas.”70 
Media attention to climate science increased again in 2004 and 2006. This reflects 
the growing tension between policy advocates and opponents, with the latter intensifying 
their challenges of the scientific basis for climate action (Jalonick, Kady, and Sharma, 
March 20, 2004). Heated political debate centering on the release of several studies, high-
profile events, and policy developments during these years tracks with the growth in 
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coverage. The following findings from climate science reports appeared in the news: the 
2003 heatwave in Europe that killed thousands was linked to global warming caused by 
human activity (Stott, Stone, and Allen 2004); carbon dioxide emissions were rising at a 
rate faster than previously found (Brahic 2006); and additional support for the much-
debated “hockey stick” graph that shows a rapid rise in temperatures in recent decades 
(Lund, Lynch-Stieglitz, and Curry 2006).  The now-infamous Stern Review, an economic 
analysis of climate change, was released in 2006. Its major finding was that the cost of 
adapting to climate change was greater than the cost of mitigating its effects (i.e., large-
scale measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) (Eizenstat 2006, A19) 
Two high-profile climate science events took place during this period. First, 
NASA scientist James Hansen accused the Bush Administration of trying to stop him 
speaking about global warming (Revkin 2006, A1). Second, former-Vice President 
Gore’s documentary about climate science, An Inconvenient Truth, became one of the 
top-grossing documentaries of all time (Painter and Ashe 2012). Regarding policy 
developments during this period: Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol (Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2007; the US Supreme Court announced it would hear a case on the EPA’s 
resistance to regulating carbon dioxide (Janofsky, 2006); and legislation (S 1164) to fund 
climate research was met with fierce opposition by some lawmakers and industry groups 
(Jalonich, Kady, and Sharma March 20, 2004). 
The distribution of climate science attributes in news coverage is again spread 
relatively evenly over many dimensions, as was the case in 2000. Though there were 
some notable shifts in categories: the “carbon dioxide and global warming” dimension 
decreased, while the sea-level rise attribute increased. In addition to the latter attribute, 
the following climate science dimensions garnered significant news coverage: human 
contribution, computer modeling and prediction, scientific reports, and temperature 
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trends. These attributes appear in article titles such as: “More Denial; Instead of 
concentrating on the changing climate, the House Energy Committee picks on 
climatologists; “Climate Change Will Be Significant but Not Extreme, Study Predicts”; 
“Climate Expert Says NASA Tried To Silence Him”; “Study Links Tropical Ocean 
Warming to Greenhouse Gases”; “Global Warming Is Expected To Raise Hurricane 
Intensity”; and “Computers Add Sophistication, but Don't Resolve Climate Debate”. 
The last two significant increases in climate science coverage took place in 2007 
and 2009. During these years climate science debate centered on the release of several 
studies, a few high-profile events, and policy developments – which were all fueled even 
further by the Democratic takeover of Congress in 2007. Both the House and Senate held 
hearings on allegations that the Bush Administration was interfering with communicating 
findings about global warming (Dean 2007, A17). Both chambers also debated findings 
from the IPCC’s draft Fourth Assessment, which included the statement that human 
activity accounted for most recent trends in global warming with “90% certainty” (Selin 
and VanDeveer 2007, p. 281). Other significant scientific reports released during this 
time focused sea-level rises and warming in the Antarctic (Eilperin 2009, A4), including 
the imminent collapse of a large ice shelf (Revkin 2009, W3). 
A couple high-profile events highlighting climate science occurred during this 
period. Al Gore, along with the IPCC, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His 
documentary An Inconvenient Truth won two Academy Awards and it, along with his 
perspective on global warming, was the subject of two congressional hearings. 
Climategate, the scandal over hacked private email messages and documents of climate 
scientists used by skeptics to cast doubt on the integrity of the scientific community, 
developed in 2009. The Senate held heated debates on cap-and-trade legislation that year 
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as well, with climate science as a point of contention (Mufson, Fahrenhold, and Kane 
2009, A1).   
The climate science news coverage in 2007 and 2009 is fairly evenly spread 
among five attributes. One of these dimensions, scandals, is new and reflects the 
allegations against the Bush Administration and climategate. Along with science-based 
scandals, the prominent attributes during this time period were human contribution, 
scientific reports and findings, temperature trends, and sea-level rises. These attributes 
appear in article titles such as: “Hacked E-Mail Data Prompts Calls for Changes in 
Climate Research”; “Climate Change Testimony Was Edited by White House”; “Agency 
Affirms Human Influence on Climate”; “Climate Change May Help Prevent Some 
Atlantic Hurricanes”; “Ever-Firmer Statements on Global Warming”; and “NOAA 
Scientists Say Arctic Ice Is Melting Faster Than Expected.” 
Summary 
This chapter ties the media signals attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and 
volume explicitly to a detailed history of how climate change has been covered in the 
news from 1987 to 2012. The relationship between each of the three media signals and 
subsystem responsiveness is addressed. An overview of the journalistic practices behind 
each media signal is provided. And further, this chapter gives a thorough accounting of 
how each signal appears in the content of climate news. The contributor and conduit 
traditions introduced in Chapter 2 are woven throughout to show how climate news is 
indexed to events, elite conflict over climate policy, and scientific controversies. We have 
laid out what attribute diversity in climate coverage looks like, where it comes from, and 
how it has been covered. There is now a much greater understanding of how news 
coverage of climate science produces an overemphasis on causal uncertainty, and how 
this important dimension has ebbed and flowed over time as one of the dominant news 
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frames. This rich discussion of attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume feed 
directly into the next two model-based chapters that investigate how these aspects of 
news coverage influence problem prioritization and the generation of policy solutions in 




Chapter 5:  Prioritizing the Climate Problem 
How is climate change reported on and what is the effect? This chapter focuses on 
the relationship between the news and prioritizing the climate problem. News coverage 
plays an important role in prioritizing government attention to policy problems 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Cobb and Elder 1972; 
Rogers and Dearing 1996). It can be a disruptive force, expanding conflict beyond 
relatively closed subsystem policymaking onto larger, more competitive arenas of policy 
debate (Schattschneider 1960; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Prioritizing attention to 
climate change is a necessary precursor to coming up with its solutions.  
The theory of media signaling presented in this dissertation suggests that dual 
dynamics are at play for how news coverage shapes the climate debate – it expands the 
problem, but limits its solutions. News coverage of climate change prioritizes the 
problem, propels it onto the agenda, and keeps it there for prolonged debates over its 
problem definition. It expands conflict and increases subsystem competition because it 
heightens attention and amplifies uncertainty in the problem space. What this does is that 
it expands our understanding of the climate problem, but it also intensifies fissures in the 
structure and integrity of the problem definition. Comprehensive climate solutions 
require broad swaths of consensus from a set of diverse coalitions. Too much uncertainty 
in questions of “is climate change happening”, “why is it happening,” and “when and 
what are its impacts” makes this a tremendous hurdle. This is how news coverage limits 
debate to smaller-scale solutions.  
In examining the prioritization of the climate problem, this chapter is thus 
focusing on the problem expansion role of news coverage. One of the first steps in 
expanding understanding of the climate problem is prioritizing attention to it. Here, we 
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will look at two indicators of prioritization: congressional hearings and opening 
statements made by Members of Congress (MOC) at the beginning of these hearings. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, the first section provides a review of 
media signaling in the muddled problem space that characterizes the climate change 
debate. The second section provides a review of climate coverage and policy debates. 
The third section presents research design and findings on two models that look at how 
news coverage shapes prioritization of the climate problem. 
  MEDIA SIGNALING IN THE MUDDLED PROBLEM SPACE 
News coverage expands the climate problem, but limits the scale of solutions used 
to solve it. One way it expands the problem is prioritizing government attention to it. This 
argument is best understood by reviewing the role the media plays in the muddled 
problem space that characterizes climate change. Three aspects of climate coverage – 
attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – influence the prioritization of 
attention in the muddled space. We will focus on these aspects of coverage after a short 
review of what is the muddled climate change problem space. 
Climate change is a “truly complex and diabolical” heavily politicized, scientific 
policy problem (Steffen 2011; Boykoff and Yulsman 2013). Policy debates about 
defining the climate problem take place in what I call the “muddled problem space” of 
complex policy problems. The muddled space of climate change is the typical problem 
space on steroids. As a reminder, the muddled climate change problem space (see Table 
5.1) is characterized by information oversupply (i.e., multiple and diverse sets of policy 
communities are involved in the climate debate and there are multiple indicators of the 
climate problem); multiple ill-defined issue attributes (i.e., is it a social welfare problem? 
If so, how? Is it best understood as a scientific issue? If so, why?); uncertain and disputed 
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causal relationships (i.e., does stability in temperature trends mean that global warming 
isn’t happening? If it is, how much do humans contribute to warming? What are its 
impacts?); and wide-ranging contention over problem severity (i.e. human populations 
have always adapted to natural climate changes, so why invest resources in mitigating 
carbon emissions? We don’t know how much humans contribute, so let’s invest in less 
costly solutions such as renewables). These four characteristics imbue the climate 
problem with a very large amount of uncertainty. They are at once the result and the 
fomenter of heightened, boundary-spanning competition and protracted conflict among 
subsystems to define the climate problem.     
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the Muddled Problem Space 
How does climate news coverage fit into policy debates in the muddled problem 
space? How does it prioritize attention to the climate problem? The theory of media 
signaling suggests a large role for the media to shape debate and prioritize attention 
because the problem space is uncertain and messy. There are two opposing goals of 
actors operating in the muddled problem space in the climate debate. You have advocates 
who wish to reduce uncertainty in order to best define and solve the problem. And you 
have opponents, who capitalize on climate uncertainties in order to intensify them and 
limit debate, and hence climate solutions (Liftin 2000; Sewell 2005; McCright and 
Characteristic Muddled Climate Change Problem Space
Information Oversupply
Issue Attributes Multiple, ill-defined




Goal of Actors Steer debate, negative and positive agenda-setting
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Dunlap 2003; Oreseks and Conway 2010). Both sets of actors respond to media signals 
on the uncertainty and the salience of the climate problem.  
What is the content of these media signals that produce uncertainty and salience? 
And what are the effects on prioritization? From the information-processing perspective, 
policy communities inside and outside of governing institutions will look to news 
coverage as a source of information that will aid them in detecting, understanding, and 
categorizing the climate problem (see Workman et al 2009; Jones and Wolfe 2010; Wolfe 
et al 2013). As a reminder, the three media signals expected to have a large influence on 
shaping the climate debate are attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume (see 
Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: Three Media Signals of Climate Change 
First, attribute diversity is ambiguity in the variety and concentration of the 
dimensions that define the climate problem that appear in news coverage. As a media 
signal, this leads to amplifying problem uncertainty. It is a signal to subsystems that the 
attributes used to define the climate change problem definition are becoming unstable. 
Subsystems pursue their goals by trying to monopolize problem definitions. Signals of 
problem uncertainty will (re)focus and heighten their attention to compete over the 
Media Signal Description
Attribute Diversity
Ambiguity in the variety and concentration of the dimensions found in 
climate change news coverage. This leads to amplifying problem 
uncertainty. 
Causal Uncertainty
Reporting on the uncertainty in the causal relationships that link human 
behavior with global warming, global warming with climate change, and 
climate change with its impacts. This leads to intensifying disputes over 
causal stories and problem severity.
Volume The amount of attention the media devotes to climate change. This increases the salience and importance of the climate problem. 
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climate problem. Second, causa uncertainty in news coverage is reporting of the 
uncertainty in the causal relationships that link human activity with global warming, 
global warming with climate change, and climate change with its impacts. As a media 
signal, it intensifies disputes over problem severity. It sends a signal that the seriousness 
of the problem is in question. In terms of prioritizing the government agenda, this signal 
is expected to have a dampening effect. Clarity in causal relationships has been shown to 
be a precursor for government problem prioritization (Stone 1988, 1989; Rochefort and 
Cobb 1994; Scheberle 2005; Brunner 1991). Once on the agenda, however, it should 
prioritize competition and increase conflict in policy debates. Finally, the volume of 
coverage is the amount of attention the media devotes to climate change. As a media 
signal, it increases the salience and importance of the climate problem. This is a signal of 
increased urgency to better understand and perhaps to even capitalize on the climate 
problem.  
CLIMATE NEWS: COVERING ELITE DEBATE AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES 
One reason to expect a large role for media influence on problem prioritization is 
because climate news is indexed to elite debate and scientific uncertainties (McComas 
and Shanahan 1999; Zehr 2000; Mazur and Lee 1993; Trumbo 1996). Journalistic 
standards and the economics of the newsroom make it so that climate news coverage 
highlights conflict and competition among elites in the problem definition process. This 
also includes controversies over causal uncertainty in climate science (Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004, 2007). Subsystems respond to climate coverage precisely for these reasons 
– it provides crucial information about their competitive (dis)advantages in defining the 
climate problem. It also provides windows of opportunity for policy communities to 
shape the climate debate. 
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This take on media influence comes out of the information-processing approach 
to studying the policy process – the contributor framework introduced in Chapter 2. As a 
reminder, this perspective puts a premium on understanding how media signals feed back 
into the system, altering long-term policy dynamics (Jones and Wolfe 2010; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). There is a good deal of support for the positive feedback role of the 
media to prioritize problems and set the policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Cobb and Elder 1972; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Soroka 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; for a review see Van Aelst and Walgrave 2006). This dissertation takes the 
contributor perspective, expands notions of media influence beyond salience, and 
incorporates the conduit approach from the communications literature to explain how 
journalistic norms and practices fit into media signaling in the muddled problem space. 
The conduit approach tells us that climate coverage should be indexed to the 
parameters of elite conflict, as we should expect with news on public affairs (Bennett 
1990, 1996).  Indeed, we see this in climate news. Domestic politics and scientific 
controversies drive climate coverage (Trumbo 1996; McComas and Shanahan 1999; 
Mazur and Lee 1993; Zehr 2000; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007). Journalists rely on 
official sources for policy and scientific expertise (Gandy 1982; Bennett 1990, 2002; 
Molotch and Lester 1974).  We see this reflected in climate news coverage as well, where 
sources are often high-profile elected officials, scientists, think tanks, and advocacy 
groups (Shesheta and Hopmann 2012; Painter and Ashe 2012; Boykoff 2011; Liu et al 
2008). This kind of coverage – news that is indexed to elite conflict and scientific 
controversy and relies heavily on official sources – sends signals to policy communities 
about the status of the climate debate. It is a message that contains information about who 
is defining the problem and how it is being defined, i.e., the competitive element of 
subsystem policymaking. 
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We also know from the conduit approach that the journalistic ideal of objectivity 
is pursued through the practice of fair and balanced reporting (Entman 1989; Bennett 
1996, 2002). What this does in terms of climate coverage is create a “balance of bias,” 
where the news overemphasizes climate science uncertainties (Boykoff and Boykoff 
2004, 2007; Zehr 2000; Antilla 2005; Painter and Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 2015). 
Because scientific controversies and elite disputes over climate science are major drivers 
of news coverage, causal uncertainty is often a predominant dimension. We took a look at 
causal uncertainty in climate science coverage in detail in the third section of Chapter 4. 
Climate science as a proportion of the news agenda was as high as 56% in 1987, 35% in 
2000, and 42% in 2004.71 This is a pretty stark signal that goes back in to the muddled 
problem space, intensifying disputes over the severity of the climate problem. In line with 
what many who study scientific uncertainty from the conduit approach assume, the 
theory of media signaling expects that this makes it more difficult for government to 
prioritize the climate problem.  However, media signaling – housed in the contributor 
framework – also suggests that science coverage will prioritize attention to defining the 
climate problem once it is on the agenda. 
Finally, the conduit literature illuminates the importance of novelty, exciting 
developments and dramatic events, and routinized reporting of complex policy problems 
as journalistic imperatives that shape news on public affairs (Gans 1980; Tuchman 1978; 
Bennett 1996, 2002). This has a very significant implication for media signals of attribute 
diversity in the muddled problem space. Recall that subsystem competition over the 
climate problem involves delineating which attribute or set of attributes best defines the 
problem, and thus structures its solutions. For example, Rep. Barton emphasizes the 
                                                 
71
 These figures are consistent with other studies that quantify the amount of climate science coverage over 
extended periods of time (see especially Liu et al 2013; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004).  
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perils of economics and climate science in his opening statement at a congressional 
hearing in 2007, advocating for cautious solutions for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Former Vice President countered with a third dimension – social welfare – in 
his testimony at the same hearing, arguing for a large-scale shift in how we approach 
climate solutions.72 
The novelty and drama associated with Gore’s testimony – he was the sole 
witness at two congressional hearings that day – makes it more likely that social welfare 
dimension will be covered in the news. Journalistic imperatives make it so that 
burgeoning dimensions of climate change will receive coverage, especially if tied to elite 
sources and conflict. The event-driven nature of the news, coupled with journalistic zest 
for novelty, implies that the number of attributes used to frame climate news will be at 
times high, diverse, and in motion. Indeed, a synthesis of mostly conduit literature on 
climate change in the news reveals it is covered using multiple dimensions, including 
climate science, economics, energy, environment, international affairs, weather, national 
security, public health, and climate technologies (e.g., geoengineering) (Liu et al 2008, 
2013; Zehr 2000, 2009; Smith 2005; Shehata and Hopmann 2012). Attribute attribute 
diversity is a signal about increasing problem uncertainty, as it casts doubt over the 
integrity of which attributes structure the climate problem. When this happens, attention 
to the climate problem is prioritized. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS 
How does news coverage prioritize attention to the climate problem? The theory 
of media signaling suggests that three aspects of climate coverage – attribute diversity, 
climate science, and volume – are signals to policy communities operating in the 
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 Vice President Al Gore’s Perspective on Global Warming, House, 110th Cong., 2007. 
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muddled space about problem uncertainty, problem severity, and the salience of the 
climate problem. Once detected, these signals intensify competition and conflict over the 
climate change problem definition. Prioritization is one of the first steps in the problem 
definition process that leads to problem expansion – that is, more attention and resources 
devoted to debating and understanding the problem in order to delineate its solutions. The 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the empirical relationship between news 
coverage and two indicators of problem prioritization – congressional hearings and 
opening statements made by Members of Congress (MOC) at the beginning of these 
hearings. This section is organized as follows: a review of data collection and content 
coding of news coverage, followed by a presentation and discussion of the findings.  
Data: Hearings and Opening Statements 
The two dependent variables in this chapter used to examine problem 
prioritization are the count of congressional hearings per calendar quarter and the number 
of opening statements made by MOCs per hearing from 1987-2012. As a reminder, 
hearings are an indicator of government problem prioritization and considered an arena 
for subsystem competition (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 1997; Worsham 1997; 
Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Opening 
statements made by MOCs are acts of high-profile policy brokers prioritizing attention to 
problem definition after climate change is on the policy agenda. Policy brokers are 
integral players in theories of policy change that focus on the problem definition process 
(Kingdon 1995; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Mintrom and Norman 2009).   
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To explore government problem prioritization, 406 hearings were collected from 
ProQuest,73 Policy Agendas Project,74 and the US Government Publishing Office 
(GPO).75 Hearings on climate change were revealed by conducting a key word search 
using a standard set of terms (“greenhouse gases”, “greenhouse effect”, “global 
warming”, “climate change”).76 After reading ProQuest descriptions and the first few 
pages to eliminate non-relevant hearings, results were cross-referenced with the Policy 
Agendas Project’s data series on congressional hearings in categories 705 (global 
warming and air pollution) and 1902 (international resource agreements).77 The full text 
of opening statements made by MOCs was collected from these hearings, totaling 1,818 
statements between 1987 and 2012.  
Figure 5.1 below shows the number of congressional hearings on global 
warming/climate change per calendar quarter (top) and the number of opening statements 
made by MOCs per hearing (bottom) from 1987-2012.  
 









 This set of terms is standard in media and policy studies of climate change. See for example Liu et al 
2011, Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Park et al 2010; Fisher et al 2013. 
77
 www.policyagendas.org The Policy Agendas Project maintains a data series on congressional hearings 
that is coded for policy content using a consistent and reliable coding scheme that is backwards compatible, 
i.e. it allows for comparisons over time. The full coding system can be accessed here 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook. Data and the coding scheme have been used in 
numerous peer-review studies and in books printed by major publishers (for a select few, see Baumgartner 
and Jones 2015; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jones and Baumgartner (eds) 2009; Baumgartner et al 2011; 






Figure 5.1: The Number of Climate Change Hearings per Quarter and Opening Statement 
per Hearing, 1987-2012 
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The average number of hearings is 3.9, with a standard deviation of 5.8 and a 
range of 0-29 per calendar quarter. Note the gradual rise and decline in congressional 
hearings until the last eight to 10 years of the series. We see spikes in hearings in 1989, 
1992, 1998, and then in 2007, and 2009. In 1989, Congress was debating a “wide range 
of solutions to the global warming threat” as part of draft provisions for the Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1990 (CQ Almanac 1990 1991). Debate over the cost of solutions, such 
as gas taxes to cut emissions, in light of scientific uncertainties stalled carbon reduction 
legislation. Instead, the House and Senate passed the US Global Climate Research 
Program. In 1992, congressional hearings focused on research program oversight and 
global strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ahead of the Rio Summit, which 
was a point of contention between the Democratically-held Congress and Republican 
President Bush (CQ Almanac 1992 1993). 
In 1998, nearly every hearing examined the Kyoto Protocol negotiated in late 
1997 that would have had the US reduce its carbon emissions without binding 
industrializing countries (China, India, and Brazil) to the same agreement. Signed by 
President Clinton, Sen. Murkowski (R-AK), then-chairman of the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee, said “[t]he Kyoto deal is dead on arrival” (CQ Almanac 
1997 1998). And it was. In the first quarter of 2007, congressional hearings more than 
doubled from all held the previous year. The Democrats took over majority status in both 
the House and Senate.78 They held hearings on allegations of interference with scientists 
at federal agencies by the Bush Administration (CQ Weekly Feb. 5, 2007); climate 
science in light of the draft IPCC Fourth Assessment; energy efficiency, renewables, and 
                                                 
78
 The House established the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming at the 
beginning of the 110th Congress. Even so, this is not the source of the increase in congressional hearings. 
The Senate, which did not have such a committee, held 43% of hearings on climate change in 2007, which 
is just below their global average of 45%. Rabe (2007) cites a large increase in jurisdictional competition 
over climate change in the Senate in particular starting in the 110th Congress. 
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fuel standards (Davenport 2007); and proposals on several comprehensive solutions to 
climate change, including carbon tax and cap-and-trade (Palmer 2007). 
Looking back to Figure X.X, the bottom graph displays the number of MOC 
opening statements per hearing from 1987-2012. The bars on the X-axis are shaded to 
present these numbers in time periods with clusters of hearings. As you can see, there is 
quite a lot of variation in the number of statements made by MOCs over the years, with 
new highs reached in 2001 and 2007, with 22 and 25 statements respectively.79 The 
average number of statements is 4.4, with a standard deviation of 4.2 and a range of 0-25 
per hearing. The average number of statements made by Democrats and Republicans is 
virtually the same, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. The following excerpts are examples of what 
is being said about the climate problem in opening statements:  
Ronald Reagan said that facts were stubborn things. … . The topic of today’s 
hearing is a consorted effort by opponents of measures to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, to bully scientific facts into submission, and, under intense pressure, 
the facts about global swarming caved in and proved much more elastic, much 
less stubborn than Ronald Regan had us believe.80 
…[t]he problem with global warming is that we don't yet know whether it 
represents a genuine national threat, and if so, how large.81 
Table 5.3 provides examples of hearing topics for a range of statements made per 
hearing, with the title of the hearing displayed. The topics in this  
table cover climate science, clean energy, political scandal and scientific controversies, 
developing countries, treaties, economics, and agriculture. The number of statements 
range from 4 in 1989 (agriculture) to 22 in 2001 (climate science).  
                                                 
79
 The most opening statements in the original data series is 41 over a three-day period in 2007. This 
Senate hearing (American’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S2191) was removed as an outlier. It was held to 
debate S 2191, a cap-and-trade bill. 
80
 Chairman Brad Miller (D-NC) in Shaping the Message, Distorting the Science: Media Strategies to 
Influence Science Policy, 2007. 
81
 Sen. Bond (R-MO) at 98-S321-8 
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Table 5.3: Hearings for a Range in the Number of Opening Statements  
 
Data: Collecting and Content Coding News Coverage 
The independent variables for news coverage are attribute diversity, causal 
uncertainty, and volume. For news coverage, 4,765 full-text newspaper articles were 
collected from The New York Times and The Washington Post from a LexisNexis82  
keyword search limited to the headline and the leading paragraphs. The keywords used 
were the same as those used to collect hearing data: “greenhouse gases”, “greenhouse 
effect”, “global warming”, “climate change.” Irrelevant articles – those only mentioning 
climate change in passing – and duplicates were removed to make up the final data series.  
The Times and the Post are two of the most commonly-used elite news organization in 
studies of policy attention (see Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Boydstun 2013; Liu et al 2011; Baumgartner et al 2008) and of climate change (see 
Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Liu et al 2011, 2013).  
                                                 
82
 http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/ 
Hearing Title Statements Year
Clean Air Act Oversight Issues: Science of Global Climate Change and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 22 2001
Clean Energy Policies to Reduce Oil Dependencies and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 21 2010
Allegations of Political Interference With the Work of Government Climate 
Change Scientists 16 2007
Joint Hearing on the Potential Impact of Global Warming on the Third World 14 1989
EPA's Proposed Renewable Oxygenate Standard 11 1994
Countdown to Kyoto, Parts I-III 10 1997
Climate Science: Empowering Our Response to Climate Change 10 2009
Climate Treaty: The Impacts of a New Climate Treaty on US Labor, Electric 
Supply, Manufacturing and the General Economy 8 1997
National Imperatives for Earch and Climate Science Research and 
Applications Investments Over the Next Decade 6 2007
Climate Change and Agriculture 4 1989
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Volume of Coverage 
We now turn to volume of coverage. Volume is the amount of media attention 
devoted to climate change. As a media signal to policy communities, volume moderates 
the importance and salience of the climate problem. Volume as media attention has long 
been linked to policy agenda dynamics (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005; McCombs 2008; Boydstun 2013; see Van Aelst and Walgrave 2006 
for a review). There are 4,765 newspaper articles in the data series that spans 1987-2012. 
Volume is measured as the number of newspaper articles per unit time. At the monthly 
rate, the volume of climate change coverage averaged 15.4, with a standard deviation of 
17.8 and a range of 0-114.  
Figure 5.2 below displays the volume of news coverage from 1987-2012, 
aggregated at the quarterly level. The first section of Chapter 4 discusses volume of 
coverage for climate news rather extensively. As a reminder, there are peaks and valleys 
in volume, with some notable increases in 1988, 1992, 1997, 2000-2001, followed by a 
steady increase starting in late 2004, with a surge in 2007 and again in late 2009-2010.   
This movement in volume is consistent with other studies of climate change in the news 
(Ungar 1992, 1995; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; 






Figure 5.2: Volume of News Coverage on Climate Change, 1987-2012 
 
Content Coding Climate News for Attribute Diversity and Causal Uncertainty 
Newspaper articles were coded for climate change policy and science content, the 
results of which were used to construct attribute diversity and causal uncertainty. Content 
coding was conducted using a two-step machine-human hybrid approach to analyzing 
political texts. First, an automated topic model, known as latent Dirichlet allocation 
(LDA) was used on the newspaper articles to uncover the attributes of climate news. 
Then after robustness checks,83  the clusters of words from the topic model – known as 
                                                 
83
 Robustness is defined as the stability and validity of topic terms for small changes in the number of 
topics estimated (Blei 2012; Grimmer and Stewart 2012; Grimmer and King 2010). I settled on a model 
that estimated 75 sets of topic terms for climate coverage attributes. After removing “junk” categories, and 
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“topic terms” – were each assigned a substantive climate attribute topic using an 
extensive codebook that was developed for this project (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
This codebook is based on a meta-analysis of the literature on climate change news 
coverage,84 cross-referenced with a sample of Government Accountability Reports on 
climate change,85 and converted into a modified version of the Policy Agendas Project 
codebook86 specifically for climate change attributes.  
As a reminder from the detailed discussion of attribute diversity in news coverage 
in Chapter 4 (section two), there are 32 unique issue attributes found in climate news 
from 1987 through 2012. Table 5.4 provides descriptions of attributes nestled under nine 
distinct umbrella dimensions: climate science, economics, energy, environment, 
international, extreme weather, and other (national security, social welfare, and 
technology R&D).87 The attributes of climate coverage range from the relationship 
between carbon dioxide and global warming, temperature trends, competitiveness of US 
industries, “green jobs”, alternative and renewable energy, coal, nuclear power, coastal 
erosion, greenhouse gas pollution, water conservation, climate summits and treaties, 
drought conditions, hurricanes, deaths from heat/cold waves, disease epidemics, and 
geoengineering. 
                                                                                                                                                 
topics that identified locales, political actors, and entertainment without policy content, 49 topic terms 
remained.    
84
 See for example Ungar (1992, 1995); McComas and Shanahan (1999); Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, 
2007); Liu et al (2008, 2013); Antilla (2005); Trumbo (1996); Zehr (2000; 2009); Mazur and Lee (1993). 
Section two of Chapter 4 includes an extensive discussion of attribute diversity in climate news coverage. 
85
 Several of the reports were prepared as witness testimony in hearings. The following reports were used: 
RCED-90-58, GAO/RCED-99-235R, GAO/RCED-00-166R, GAO-07-863, GAO-08-605, GAO-09-534T, 
GAO-11-317, GAO-11-876T, GAO-12-283, and GAO-13-242. These reports also informed the 




 National security, public health, and technology R&D are considered umbrella categories but are 
presented as “Other” for display purposes. 
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Table 5.4: Attributes in News Coverage by Major Climate Category 
An automated topic model approach was used to uncover the topics that 
structured the collection of newspaper articles. The topics that were generated were then 
assigned substantive codes for policy content by hand.  How do topic models content 
code text? Topic models group words that are semantically – that is, thematically – 
related. This produces the “topic terms” to which humans assign meaningful codes. One 
of the advantages of the topic model approach is that groups of words can share words. 
For example, “climate change” can be grouped with “greenhouse gas” in one topic and 
“sea level” in another. This is becoming a popular approach to analyzing political texts, 
such as how newspapers cover terrorist threats (Bonilla and Grimmer 2013), attribute 
uncertainty in congressional hearings during the 2008 financial crisis (Shaffer et al 2015), 
issue definitions of spent nuclear fuel in witness testimonies (Nowlin 2015), how climate 
policy and science is discussed in conservative think tank reports (Boussalis and Coan 
2015), and how the Senate agenda is set through press releases (Grimmer 2010) and floor 
speeches (Quinn et al 2010).       
Category Description of Attributes
Climate Science
Carbon dioxide and global warming, climate science scandals, computer modeling 
and simulation, sea-level rises, human contribution, natural variation, scientific 
reports, temperature trends
Economics Competitiveness of US industries, costs/benefits, employment (e.g., "green jobs"), 
climate program costs
Energy Alternatives and renewables, coal, conservation and efficiency, gas and oil, nuclear 
power
Environment Coastal erosion, endangered species, greenhouse gas emissions and pollution, 
water conservation
International Climate summits, European Union, international treaties, newly industrialized 
countries (China, India, and Brazil)
Extreme Weather Drought conditions, heat/cold waves, hurricanes
Other National security, public health, technology R&D
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The specific topic model used is known as latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) 
(Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; Blei 2012). This approach assumes that K topics structure a 
corpus of documents,88 but not all K topics are in an individual document Di. For 
example, the meta-analysis of media studies and Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reports on climate change policy shows that there are roughly 32 unique attributes 
in climate news coverage (Wolfe Forthcoming). We expect to find all of these attributes 
within the entire collection of nearly 5,000 newspaper articles, but we do not expect a 
single newspaper article to contain all 32 attributes. The LDA topic model estimates K 
topics for the corpus and assigns a proportion “score” to each Ki topics for each 
document Di in the corpus. Put another way, this approach assigns each document – here 
a newspaper article – a proportion “score” for each of the topics that define the entire 
collection of 4,675 news stories.  
After machine-generating the topics with LDA, I assigned each topic a 
substantive policy content code that aligns with known climate attributes from the 
codebook developed for this project. (See Table A.2 in Appendix A). Table 5.5 provides 
examples of the relationship between the topic terms, attribute name, and major climate 
dimensions. The right column displays the first five words for a sample of topic terms 
generated by LDA.89 The middle column is the topic – attribute – name assigned to it, 
and the left column is the major climate dimension. The topic names for this dissertation 
                                                 
88
 The number of topics and the topic structure depends on the research question of the investigator (Blei 
2012).  
89
 To check for topic code validity and reliability of manual coding, I followed standard practices in the 
communications field (Nueundorf 2002) and the burgeoning applied topic models literature (Grimmer and 
Stewart 2012; Hopkins and King 2010; Quinn et al 2010; Bonilla and Grimmer 2013). I read the top 15 
newspaper articles from each set of topic terms as determined by the proportion assigned by the LDA 
estimates, which amounts to a 20% sample of the entire newspaper corpus. First, I confirmed that there was 
a vein of similarity flowing through the sample articles reflecting the set of topic terms. In all cases, the 
average similarity score was approximately 90%, with a range of 70-100%. A topic (attribute) name was 
then assigned to the topic terms. A 10% random sample of the entire corpus was re-coded for attribute 
code, which resulted in a global intra-coder reliability score of approximately 85%.     
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are consistent with Boussalis and Coan’s (2015) study of think tank reports using LDA. 
They are also align with the literature that content codes climate news coverage (Boykoff 
and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Liu et at 2008, 2013; Zehr 2000, 2009; McComas and 
Shanahan 1999; Trumbo 1996). 
Table 5.5: Topic Terms Assigned to Topic Attributes for the Dimensions of Climate 
Change 
Table 5.6 shows the distribution of climate attributes in news coverage from 
1987-2012. If one of the 32 attributes was from one of the top three topics terms and 
assigned an LDA proportion score of 0.10 or greater, it received a policy content code for 
climate change. This threshold is in line with climate studies that employ traditional 
Dimension  Topic (Attribute) Name Topic Terms
Temperature trends warm temperatur  model degre global
Sea-level rise ice arctic sea melt glacier
Science scandals climat scienc scientist research scientif 
Carbon dioxide/global warming atmospher carbon effect dioxid earth 
Human contribution year human ago planet age
Employment ("green jobs") work technolog like one new
Climate program costs program million plan fund project
Oil and gas oil gas energi drill natur 
Alternative fuels ethanol crop use product corn 
Renewable energy energi electr power percent wind 
Endangered species speci bear said fish anim 
Coastal erosion sea rise level water  island 
Greenhouse gas pollution carbon dioxid emiss greenhous gas 
International treaties kyoto treati countri emiss unit 
Industrializing nations countri china unit world india 
Developing countries countri world develop africa nation 
Natural disasters chang climat weather hurrican drought
Cold waves like winter one snow peopl 
National Security secur war militari unit nation 
Public Health health diseas peopl problem death 









human content coding procedures for the presence/absence of a certain category (see for 
example Liu et al 2008, 2013, 2015; Park et al 2015). What this does is it produces a 
measure for capturing the diversity of attributes within single news stories and within any 
given time frame under investigation, by aggregating based on attributes found within 
single newspaper articles.  
Table 5.6: Attributes of Climate Change News Coverage, 1987-2012 
Continues next page 
Attribute Count Percentage
Climate Science 2169 25%
Carbon dioxide and global warming 256 3%
Climate science scandals 282 3%
Computer modeling and simulation 246 3%
Glacier and sea ice melt 185 2%
Human contribution to global warming 258 3%
Natural climate variation 179 2%
Scientific reports 276 3%
Temperature trends 487 6%
Economics 796 9%
Competitiveness of US industries 110 1%
Economic benefit/threat 132 2%
Employment ("green jobs") 144 2%
Climate program costs 410 5%
Energy 1910 22%
Alternatives and renewables 693 8%
Coal 245 3%
Conservation and efficiency 527 6%
Gas and oil 328 4%
Nuclear power 117 1%
Environment 998 12%
Coastal erosion 164 2%
Endangered species 328 4%
GHG pollution 403 5%
Water conservation 103 1%
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Table 5.6 continued 
The total number of attributes in news stories is 8,610. This amounts to an 
average of 1.8 climate attributes per newspaper article. The climate science umbrella 
dimension is the most prominent in news coverage with 25%. The second most dominant 
dimension is energy with 22%. International follows with 18%, environment with 12%, 
economics with 9%, weather with 7%, national security and technology with 3% each, 
and public health last with 1%. These results are consistent with other studies on climate 
news coverage (Liu et al 2008, 2013; Zehr 2000; 2009; Boykoff 2004, 2007; Painter and 
Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 2015; Boussalis and Coan 2015). Several unique attributes 
receive a good amount of coverage in climate news: alternative and renewable energy 
(8%); conservation and efficiency (7%), temperature trends (7%), international treaties 
(5%); climate program costs (5%); and greenhouse gas air pollution (5%). For a detailed 
discussion of attributes in climate news coverage, please refer back to Chapter 4, section 
two. 
International 1572 18%
Climate summits 381 4%
Developing nations 154 2%
European Union 257 3%
International treaties 470 5%
Newly industrialized countries 310 4%
Weather & Natural Disaster 562 7%
Drought conditions 135 2%
Heat/cold waves 210 2%
Natural disasters 217 3%
Other 603 7%
National Security 246 3%
Public Health 98 1%




Calculating Attribute Diversity 
Attribute diversity is an indicator of problem uncertainty, as it captures the 
ambiguity in the concentration and variety of climate attributes found in news coverage. 
Strong signals of attribute diversity in the news should amplify problem uncertainty in 
the muddled space, prioritizing attention to the climate problem. Measuring attribute 
diversity was a three-step process. First, newspaper articles were content coded for 
climate change attributes (a discussion of content coding follows this section). Second, 
each attribute was assigned a proportion by aggregating news coverage by month. For 
example, if in one month “energy efficiency and conservation” appeared in the news in 5 
of 30 total attributes, it would be assigned the value “.16”. Third, attribute diversity was 
calculated using the entropy measure. 
The entropy measure was used to calculate the diversity of attributes in climate 
change news coverage. Entropy – specifically Shannon’s H (Shannon and Weaver 1949) 
– is one of the most commonly-used measures of diversity in multiple fields, including 
ecology, communications, sociology, information theory, and the policy process 
(McDonald and Dimmick 2003; Boydstun et al 2014). Recently, Boydstun (2013) used 
entropy to gauge how the “diversity of discussion” in news coverage of public policy 
structures subsequent media attention to that policy topic. It has been used elsewhere in 
studies of jurisdictional competition among congressional committees (Baumgartner et al 
2000; Sheingate 2006), policy agenda volatility (Talbert and Potoski 2002), newspaper 
competition and agenda diversity (Chaffee and Wilson 1977; Lasorsa 1991), and 











)) ∗ ln() 
 
The formula for Shannon’s H entropy is above, where  represents an attribute, 
() is the proportion of news coverage devoted to that attribute, and ln() is the 
natural log of that proportion. The entropy score is calculated as an inverse sum of a 
proportion times its log, over all n attributes. As you can see, it captures the number 
(variety) of attributes in climate coverage and their relative distribution (concentration). 
Entropy increases as the distribution of coverage becomes more evenly spread among the 
attributes. For the theory of media signaling, this means that higher entropy scores are 
associated with strong signals of problem uncertainty. As calculated with entropy, the 
average attribute diversity score for the monthly series is 1.26, with a standard deviation 
of 0.35, with a range of 0.36-1.76.    
Table 5.7 shows an example of the variety and concentration of attributes in 
climate coverage for low and high entropy scores. The low score of 0.36 is given in a 
period where news coverage has just three dimensions – climate science, economics, and 
international – with one dimension garnering the bulk of media attention (climate 
science). In this case, the signal of problem uncertainty is relatively weak, as it is clear 
that climate change is being defined mostly along the science dimension. That is, the 
attributes that make up the climate problem are not very diverse. Turn to the high entropy 
score (1.71) and attribute diversity is high, which is a strong signal of problem 
uncertainty. In this case, climate change is defined along eight dimensions, with several 
receiving a significant amount of coverage (climate science, energy, economics, 
environment, international and extreme weather).   
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Table 5.7: Low and High Entropy Scores for Attribute Diversity 
A time series for attribute diversity in climate coverage from 1987 to 2012 is 
displayed in Figure 5.3. As you can see, attribute diversity gradually trends upwards over 
time. There is a good deal of variance from the beginning of the series until early 2005, 
where it levels off in a steadier manner. After 2005, attribute diversity varies around new 
highs. This means that signals of problem uncertainty were relatively strong during this 
period – and stayed strong. This precedes the uptick in government prioritization of the 
climate problem via hearings and opening statements starting in 2007. Besides this 
period, another example is an increase in prioritization activity following a rise in 
attribute diversity in 1988. The converse relationship is also on display. For example, in 
1991 and in 2001, attribute diversity decreased, and so too did prioritization of the 





Figure 5.3: The Attribute Diversity of Climate News Coverage, 1987-2012 
 
Calculating Causal Uncertainty 
Causal uncertainty is reporting on the uncertainty in the causal relationships that 
link human behavior with global warming, global warming with climate change, and 
climate change with its impacts, such as sea-level rise. Coverage of causal uncertainty are 
media signals that lead to intensifying disputes over problem severity.  Clarity in causal 
stories – connecting an activity with an unwanted outcome that warrants government 
intervention – has been shown to be a precursor to government problem prioritization, 
especially in the realm of environmental policy (Stone 1988, 1989; Rochefort and Cobb 
1994; Cobb and Elder 1972; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Scheberle 2005).  News 
reporting on the uncertainties of climate science has been cited as one of the main culprits 
in causing policy stagnation on climate change in the US (Brunner 1991; Boykoff and 
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Boykoff 2004, 2007; Antilla 2005; Zehr 2000; Painter and Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 
2015). Even so, none have systematically linked it to how it structures prioritization of 
the climate problem. This dissertation does just that – it examines the relationship 
between reporting on climate science and prioritization via congressional hearings and 
MOC opening statements.  
Climate science as a dimension in news coverage is used to measure causal 
uncertainty.90 Recall Figure 4.4 from Chapter 4 that diagrams how climate science news 
coverage creates causal uncertainty. Causal uncertainty in climate news converges around 
three forms of uncertainty found in reporting on climate science: (1) human contributions 
to global warming; (2) the causes, consequences, and slope of temperature trends; and (3) 
climate change impacts (Painter and Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 2015). These three 
categories are based on collaborative work between climate scientists and media scholars 
(see Rahmstorf 2004 for an explanation of the genesis). The pathways to uncertainty 
created as a consequence of reporting on the causal connections made in climate science 
studies (arrows in the diagram in Figure 4.4) is both real – reflecting cautious scientific 
language and internal debates – and overemphasized and manufactured – reflecting 
politically-motivated actions to cast doubt on the climate problem (McCright and Dunlap 
2003, 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010).  
An op-ed by Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) in the Washington Post published in 2013 
is a good example of causal uncertainty in climate news: 
                                                 
90
 Results were validated by coding the full-text of all climate science articles – as derived from the topic 
models and hand-coded for policy content – with three well-known sentiment dictionaries that are used to 
measure uncertainty in texts. The correlations ranged from 0.82-0.97 with the dictionary result from 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), Lexicoder (Young and Soroka 2011) and the WordStat Sentiment 
Dictionary (2013). In addition, I created my own dictionary using the literature on uncertainty in climate 
news coverage (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Antilla 2005; Zehr 2000; and Painter and Ashe 2012); 
the correlation coefficient with ‘climate science’ articles was 0.91. 
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Contrary to the claims of those who want to strictly regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions and increase the cost of energy for all Americans, there is a great 
amount of uncertainty associated with climate science. These uncertainties 
undermine our ability to accurately determine how carbon dioxide has affected 
the climate in the past. They also limit our understanding of how anthropogenic 
emissions will affect future warming trends. Further confusing the policy debate, 
the models that scientists have come to rely on to make climate predictions have 
greatly overestimated warming.91 
Causal uncertainty is measured as the proportion of news coverage devoted to the 
climate science dimension per month.92 This was derived by dividing the number of 
climate science mentions by the sum of all dimensions over the period of time. A 
‘mention’ of a dimension is considered to be true if it is derived from one of the top three 
topic terms from the LDA model and is assigned a proportion score of 0.10 or greater. 
This is the same procedure used in originally coding all articles across all policy content 
codes. Table 5.8 below displays the attributes of climate science that create causal 
uncertainty. They are carbon dioxide and global warming; climate science scandals; 
computer modeling and simulation; sea-level rises; human contribution; natural variation; 
scientific reports, and temperature trends. As you may recall, the other dimensions 
besides climate science are economics, energy, environment, international, extreme 
weather and “other” (national security, public health, and technology R&D).  
Table 5.8: The Attributes of Climate Science in News Coverage 
 
                                                 
91







Carbon dioxide and global warming, climate science scandals, computer 
modeling and simulation, sea-level rises, human contribution, natural 
variation, scientific reports, temperature trends
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For the years 1987 through 2012, there were 2,105 total mentions of climate science, with 
a mean of 6.8, standard deviation of 6.8, with a range of 0-49 mentions per month. This is 
an average of 0.44 mentions of climate science per article. As a percentage of news 
coverage, climate science averaged 28% per month, with a standard deviation of 21% and 
a range of 0-100%. 
Figure 5.X shows a time series of causal uncertainty in news coverage of climate 
change as a proportion of total coverage from 1987-2012. We can see that the proportion 
of causal uncertainty varies quite about until around 2007, except for a notable surge in 
late 2009 and early 2010, which was tied to two science scandals – errors in IPCC reports 
and Climategate. The long-term trend is a decrease in causal uncertainty in coverage, 
which is a result of the growing consensus in the scientific and policy communities. 
Although to be sure, there is much more consensus in the former than the latter. Or, 
rather, opposing skeptical voices in policy communities are loud enough to keep it a 
fixture of debate. Notice how it creeps back up again at the very end of the series, which 




Figure 5.4: Causal Uncertainty in News Coverage of Climate Change, 1987-2012 
Control Variables 
In addition to the three key independent variables on news coverage, several 
control variables were collected to account for effects related to objective climate 
conditions, events, party, chamber, divided government, public opinion, and the 
economy. The Climate Extremes Index (CEI) controls for objective climate conditions 
(Karl et al 1996; Liu et al 2011). The CEI is a single, seasonally-adjusted annual indicator 
that combines data on US temperature trends, precipitation, and tropical storms 
(hurricanes and cyclones).93 The CEI for the 1987-2012 data series averages 24.5, with a 
standard deviation of 7.7 and ranges from 14.3-49.4. Higher values indicate more 
extreme climate conditions. Following Liu et al (2011), international focusing events are 
                                                 
93
 Data collected from NOAA www.ncdc.gov. For a detailed definition of the CEI, see 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremes/cei/definition 
 142 
used as a control – 12 events in total coincide with 19% of congressional hearings. This 
accounts for major climate summits and IPCC reports (see Table A.3 in Appendix A for a 
list of these major climate events). Republican chamber majority (27% of all hearings), 
chamber (54% are House hearings), and divided government (61% of all hearings) are 
political and institutional controls. Stimson’s Public Mood was used to control for public 
opinion.94 Public mood averaged 60.3, with a standard deviation of 3.0 and a range of 
48.9-65.39. Higher scores are associated with a more liberal American public. Finally, 
changes in gross domestic product (GDP) controls for macroeconomic effects.95 Changes 
in GDP averaged 3.9, with a standard deviation of 3.1 and ranged from -4.5-10.4. 
Findings: Prioritizing the Climate Problem  
As a reminder, two indicators of prioritization are used to assess how news 
coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – effects problem 
prioritization: congressional hearings and MOC opening statements. This section 
discusses results for congressional hearings first, MOC statements second. Negative 
binomial regression was used to model the relationship between prioritization and news 
coverage, and for disproportionate information-processing and party influence. The 
dependent variables are event counts. Since event counts are not continuous (i.e. 
1,2,3,4…k), negative binomial regression rather than linear regression was used to 
produce more accurate and efficient estimates (King 1989) and to account for 
overdispersion found in most social processes (Cameron and Trevedi 1986; Long 1997), 
meaning that the assumption of independence across events is often violated. A simpler 
Poisson model does not do this; and, not accounting for overdispersion could bias 






estimates of standard errors downwards, leading to overly-precise estimates of 
confidence in coefficients (Cameron and Trevidi 1986).   
The first model gauges how Congress prioritizes the climate problem using 
congressional hearings as the dependent variable (#1-1a). It also investigates 
disproportionate information-processing (#5) and party influence (#6). To refresh, 
according to the theory of media signaling previously presented, we should expect the 
following:  
1: The number of hearings will increase with attribute diversity and volume of 
news coverage because they are media signals that focus subsystem attention and 
mobilize competition over problem definition in light of problem uncertainty and 
importance. 
1a: The number of hearings will decrease with causal uncertainty because it 
heightens disputes over causal stories, making it less likely that the policy 
community will recognize the climate problem as one that warrants debate.  
5: Threshhold effects for climate news signals will vary by coverage type and 
stage in the problem definition process.   
6: Republicans should be less active in the problem definition process save for  
giving opening statements at hearings to highlight its uncertainties and/or steer 
debate towards “nonproblemicity.” 
Figure 5.5 shows the findings for the first negative binomial model, which 
estimates the number of congressional hearings as a function of attribute diversity, high 
levels of causal uncertainty,96 volume, climate extremes (CEI), international conferences, 
Republican Congress, divided government, public mood, GDP, time,97 and previous 
number of hearings. Data is a time series aggregated at the calendar quarter level, with an 
n of 100. All three media variables – attribute diversity, high climate science, and volume 
                                                 
96
 Threshold effects. High levels of climate science is a dichotomous variable where 1 is assigned if the 
value at time t is greater than the average of t-1 and t-2; 0 if at or below average. This accounts for 46% of 
the cases. 
97
 Number sequence 1-100 
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– are lagged k = 2, which amounts to a six-month lag, consistent with the literature on 
media effects (see McCombs 2008); and, previous hearings are lagged k = 1.98 (Full 
regression results are Table A.4 in Appendix A). Looking at the figure, the points on the 
plot represent coefficient estimates and the bands around the coefficients represent 95% 
confidence intervals. There is a solid vertical line at the x-axis zero tick mark. Points to 
the left of this line represent negative coefficient estimates; and, points to the right of the 
line represent positive coefficient estimates. Confidence bands that do not intersect the 











                                                 
98
 Results from a Ljung-Box Q-test – 0.54 (p = 0.46) – reveals no significant autocorrelation. 
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Figure 5.5: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Hearings per Calendar, 1987-2012 
The model using congressional hearings examines the effects of climate news 
coverage on problem prioritization at the institutional level. Overall, the results support 
the expectations that news coverage affects problem prioritization – the number of 
hearings held on climate change varies with media signals.  The coefficient estimates for 
attribute diversity and volume are both positive and statistically significant.99 That is, the 
number of hearings increases as attribute diversity and volume grow. These results 
                                                 
99
 It is hard to tell that volume is positive or statistically significant. The volume estimate is 0.003 with a z-
value of 2.52, so the coefficient and its confidence band are comparatively small. Recall that volume is a 
variable composed of whole numbers, some of which are relatively large (i.e., 200). The size of the 
parameter estimate reflects this and is taken into account when interpreting effects with predicted counts. 
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support the expectation that these characteristics of news coverage drive problem 
prioritization via holding hearings to debate the climate problem.  
The coefficient estimate for causal uncertainty is negative and statistically 
significant. This supports the expectation that the number of hearings is negatively 
associated with uncertainty in causal stories. The number of hearings decreases as a 
function of causal uncertainty in the news. Meaning, coverage of causal uncertainty 
constrains policy debates on the climate problem. Recall that causal uncertainty in this 
model is a threshold variable – it is a dichotomous measure that captures strong (i.e., 
above a two-quarter moving average) media signals of causal uncertainty. This supports 
the expectation that some media signals will be subject to disproportionate information-
processing. In this case, policy communities underreact to media signals of causal 
uncertainty until it “breaks through” the messy information environment that 
characterizes climate change’s muddled problem space with above average levels of 
coverage. That is, the number of hearings decreases when causal uncertainty in climate 
reporting is at above-average levels.  
Turning to the coefficient for Republican congress, it is negative and statistically 
significant. This provides support for the expectation that Republicans are less active in 
the climate problem definition process – prioritization being one aspect of it. This is 
consistent with the literature on concerted efforts by conservatives to oppose government 
action to attend to and alleviate the climate problem (McCright and Dunlap 2003; 
Oreskes and Conway 2010). Republican-majority congresses are less likely to hold 
hearings to examine the climate problem.  
In regards to the other control variables, international conferences, divided 
government, public mood and time are all positive and statistically significant. Congress 
holds more hearings on climate change to debate the potential policy impacts of 
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international conferences (Liu e al 2011; Painter and Ashe 2011). More hearings are 
likely to be held in times of divided government and when the American public is more 
liberal. In terms of time, the findings suggest that over the years the number of hearings 
increases. Previous hearings have no statistically significant impact on the number of 
hearings. This suggests that climate hearings may be more a function of politics and 
attention to problem indicators – such as media signals – and less of institutional inertia. 
This is counter to many other studies that have demonstrated policy attention inertia 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Wood and Peake 1998; Soroka 2002). The muddled 
problem space of climate change may account for this, whereas typical issues do not 
reside in a policy environment with such heightened levels of uncertainty. The climate 
extremes variable has no discernable impact on congressional hearings. This supports the 
notion that real-world conditions as problem indicators are filtered through political 
institutions, such as the media (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 
2015).  
It is difficult to interpret the effects of independent variables in negative binomial 
regression looking solely at the parameter estimates and their confidence intervals. Since 
this is the case, Figure 5.6 and 5.7 show predicted counts of hearings for attribute 
diversity, volume, and low-high levels of causal uncertainty. The first two are line graphs 
because they are continuous independent variables. The effect of causal uncertainty is 
displayed in what is called a ropeladder plot, on account of it being a dichotomous 
variable. Figure X shows the predicted number of hearings held on climate change for 






Figure 5.6: Predicted Number of Hearings for Increasing Values of Attribute Diversity 
and Volume of News Coverage 
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The solid black line represents the predicted number of hearings and the gray 
shading around it its 95% confidence bands. Keep in mind that the average number of 
hearings held per calendar quarter is 3.9. The first thing to notice in Figure X is that the 
number of hearings grows as both attribute diversity and volume of coverage increase. In 
the case of attribute diversity (top), the predicted number of hearings increases from 2.3 
to 7.4 as attribute diversity in the news moves from a low of 0.36 to its maximum score 
of 1.7 – an over two-fold increase in hearings.  Turning to volume (bottom), the predicted 
number of hearings more than double from 4.5 to 10.8 as volume of coverage moves 
from a low of 3 articles to its high of 266 articles.100 As the slope of the line indicates, 
attribute diversity and volume exhibit similar effects on mobilizing attention to climate 
change.  
Figure 5.7 displays the predicted number of hearings when causal uncertainty in 
the news is below average (left) and when it is above average (right). The points 
represent the number of hearings and the vertical band that runs through it its 95% 
confidence level. When climate news coverage shifts to other dimensions other than 
causal uncertainty in climate science, the predicted number of hearings is above average, 
at 5.2. When signals of causal uncertainty break through the muddled problem space with 





                                                 
100
 Recall that the unit of analysis for this model is calendar quarter, which summed the number of hearings 
per month. 
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Figure 5.7: Predicted Number of Hearings for Low and High Levels of Causal 
Uncertainty in News Coverage 
The model using congressional hearings examines the effects of climate news 
coverage on problem prioritization at the institutional level. The findings show support 
for news coverage driving institutional prioritization of the climate problem. We should 
expect climate news to impact how individuals prioritize it as well after it is on the 
government agenda, i.e. once a hearing has been scheduled. To investigate this, I tallied 
the number of opening statements made by Members of Congress (MOC) at the 
beginning of each hearing. When giving opening statements, MOCs are acting as policy 
brokers for subsystems competing to steer policy debates on climate change (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Kingdon 1995). Opening statements are a vehicle for casting an 
image over and making claims about a policy problem (Brown 2004). In addition to 
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testing for threshold effects (#5 above) and party influence (#6 above), we should expect 
the following: 
2: The number of opening statements will increase with all three aspects of news 
coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – because they will 
induce policy brokers to compete over defining climate change in light of problem 
uncertainty, heightened scrutiny of problem seriousness, and increases in 
importance. 
Figure 5.8 shows the findings for a negative binomial model that estimates the 
number of opening statements as a function of attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, high 
volume,101 climate extremes (CEI), international conferences, Republican majority, U.S. 
House, public mood, GDP, and time. The unit of analysis is the hearing. The date of the 
first session was used to create six-month lags for the three independent variables on 
climate news. (Full regression results are in Table A.5 in Appendix A). As before, the 
points represent coefficient estimates and the bands are 95% confidence intervals. Points 
that fall to the left of the solid vertical line at the zero tick mark represent negative 
coefficients; and, those on the right represent positive coefficients. Confidence bands that 
do not intersect zero are considered statistically significant. 
 
 
                                                 
101
 High volume is a dichotomous variable where 1 is assigned if the value at time t of hearing k is greater 
than the average of t-1 (k-1) and t-2 (k-2); 0 if at or below average. High volume occurs in 52% of the 
cases. 
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 Figure 5.8: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Opening, 1987-2012 
The overall results for attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and high volume 
support the expectations that news coverage will be positively associated with the number 
of opening statements made by Members of Congress. The coefficients for all three 
variables are positive and statistically significant. It also provides additional support for 
the expectation that problem prioritization is affected by climate news coverage. These 
findings suggest that climate news mobilizes policy brokers to make opening statements 
to influence how the climate change problem definition is characterized.  
Looking at the three variables individually, these results demonstrate support for 
the notion that increases in attribute diversity as a media signal amplifying problem 
uncertainty provides policy brokers an opportunity to compete over which attributes 
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define climate change. In regards to causal uncertainty, the positive relationship indicates 
that the media signal about uncertainty in climate change’s causal relationships 
moderates how policy brokers prioritize resources devoted to steering policy debates by 
making claims about the climate problem. Finally, the results for volume suggest that 
policy brokers will be moved to prioritize attention to publically weighing in on the 
debate in response to clear signals that the climate problem is highly salient. This 
provides further support for the notion that some media signals will be subject to the 
vagaries of disproportionate information-processing.  
Turning to the control variables, the estimate for Republican majority is neither in 
the expected direction nor is it statistically significant. We can see that international 
conferences and divided government are positively and statistically related to the number 
of MOC opening statements. The dynamics that underpin these results are at least 
partially related. The president plays a leadership role in climate policy by being the chief 
executive over the EPA and Department of Commerce, who make rules and regulations 
about greenhouse gas emissions. We should expect MOCs to compete with the president 
over climate policy, especially given its partisan nature. As for international conferences, 
this is again the purview of the president, whose climate treaties must be ratified by the 
Senate. International conferences are also catalysts for contentious policy debates over 
climate science (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Liu et al 2011), which mobilizes 
fierce competition among policy brokers.  
House-held hearings and GDP both have negative and statistically significant 
estimates. The explanation for the House estimates dovetails with international 
conferences: the differential is likely explained by the Senate’s obligations regarding 
treaties. The number of statements decrease as GDP grows, which suggests that policy 
brokers know that the argument that climate policy is too costly, a common thread in 
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climate debates, may have less punch with improving economic conditions. Time as a 
variable is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. This means that the 
number of witness statements made at hearings decreases over the years. The frequency 
of hearings toward the end of the 1987-2012 period may account for this. For example, 
the same policy broker that made a statement at a hearing in June 23, 2007 may not feel it 
advantages to them to make another at a hearing held on July 5th. 
The predicted number of statements are presented in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 to better 
interpret the effects of the three media variables – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, 
and high volume. Recall that line graphs are used to explore the impact of continuous 
variables and ropeladder plots are used for the dichotomous volume variable. Figure X 
shows the predicted number of statements during climate hearings for increasing values 















Figure 5.9: Predicted Number of Statements for Increasing Levels of Attribute Diversity 
and Causal Uncertainty in News Coverage 
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The solid black line represents the number of statements, and the gray shading its 
95% confidence interval. Keep in mind that the average number of statements is 4.4 per 
hearing. The first thing notice is that the number of predicted statements increases as both 
attribute diversity and causal uncertainty move from low to high values. Also notice that 
the steepness of the slope accelerates in the case of high levels of attribute diversity 
compared to causal uncertainty. In the graph on attribute diversity (top), the predicted 
number of statements increases nearly five-fold from 1.4 to 6.7 statements per hearing as 
attribute diversity grows from its lowest to its highest value, sending stronger and 
stronger signals of problem uncertainty. The overall effect of causal uncertainty in 
climate science reporting is substantial, but not as pronounced (bottom graph). The 
number of statements nearly doubles from 3 to 5.1 per hearing as the proportion of 
coverage devoted to climate science grows from its lowest to its highest value. This 
suggest policy brokers respond as news coverage of causal uncertainty grows, sending 
signals that intensify uncertainty in causal relationships and calling into question current 
notions of problem severity.       
Figure 5.10 displays the predicted number of statements when the volume of news 
coverage is below average (left) and above average (right). As before, the points 
represent the number of statements and the vertical lines their 95% confidence bands. 
When the volume of climate news shifts from below to above average values, the 
predicted number of hearings increases approximately 20% from 4.4 to 5.3. This 









Figure 5.10: Predicted Number of Hearings for Low and High Levels of News Volume 
Summary 
To test the theory of media signaling, this chapter examines how attribute 
diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume of news coverage influence how policy 
communities prioritize the climate problem. Prioritizing policy attention is a necessary 
precursor to coming up with its solutions (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Does news 
coverage influence problem prioritization, and if so, how? This chapter uses two 
indicators of prioritization – congressional hearings for policy communities as a group 
and the number of opening statements made at these hearings as a proxy for policy 
brokers prioritizing climate change.  
The results suggest that attribute diversity and volume moderate problem 
uncertainty and disputes over severity and are thus important factors in prioritizing the 
climate problem. The number of congressional hearings and opening statements increase 
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alongside growth in these media signals. Causal uncertainty in climate news lowers the 
priority of the problem among policy communities as a group, making it less likely to be 
up for debate on the policy agenda.  But once it is the subject of formal debates, causal 
uncertainty seems to prioritize the climate problem among policy brokers. This chapter 
also demonstrates support for disproportionate information-processing of signals coming 
from news coverage. These findings imply that only clear and strong signals of causal 
uncertainty influence problem prioritization by way of congressional hearings. Policy 
brokers seem only to respond when volume of news coverage is a clear and strong media 
signal as well. The results from this chapter provide strong support for the role of the 
media in problem expansion.  The next chapter looks at how climate news influences the 










Chapter 6: Limiting Climate Solutions 
Climate change is due to a combination of factors, including natural cycles and 
human activity. But scientists still disagree about how much each of these factors 
contributes to the overall climate change the Earth is experiencing. But 
understanding the causes of climate change is critical to developing a serious and 
effective solution. … President Obama and the Environmental Protection Agency 
recently released carbon pollution standards for new power plants that, even the 
EPA admits “will result in negligible CO2 emission changes.” … A better 
approach is to place a higher priority on fundamental research that will enable 
new energy technologies to become more cost-effective.102  
 
Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX), Chairman of the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology, engaged in a media blitz in 2013 to counter President 
Obama’s Climate Action Plan, which contained provisions for the first set of government 
standards on carbon pollution from power plants. The above excerpt from his op-ed in 
The Hill illustrates a common argument used in policy debates to limit the 
comprehensiveness of climate solutions. Opponents of large-scale solutions to reduce 
greenhouse gases – such as carbon caps as in the above or a carbon tax – highlight 
uncertainties in the science that establishes causal connections between human activities, 
greenhouse gases, and climate change impacts to steer debate towards more limited, 
incremental solutions. In this example, Smith advocates for funding cost-effective new 
energy technologies instead of carbon caps on power plants in light of scientific 
disagreements on the causes and consequences of climate change. As a strategic policy 
entrepreneur, Smith is also using this as an opportunity to advocate for climate solutions 
                                                 
102
 Italics added. Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) in The Hill, October 1, 2013. http://the hill.com/opinion/op-
ed/325971-extreme-weather-isnt-linked-to-climate-change. (Accessed November 2013). 
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that would benefit an important constituency in his home state – the Texas Clean Energy 
Project, a coal gasification power plant with cutting-edge carbon capture technologies.103   
The climate problem has been a fixture in policy debates since at least 1988, but 
the U.S. – and especially Congress – has been slow to respond by considering large-scale 
policy solutions, such as cap-and-trade or a carbon tax. In 2000, President Clinton said in 
his State of the Union address to Congress that “[i]f we fail to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases, deadly heat waves and droughts will become more frequent, coastal 
areas will flood, and economies disrupted.”104 It was not until 2007 that the House and 
Senate seriously considered several cap-and-trade and some carbon tax legislative 
proposals. A cap-and-trade bill passed the House in 2009, but its counterpart in the 
Senate stalled in floor debates and was eventually abandoned.  
In place of comprehensive solutions, Congress overwhelmingly debates and 
legislates incremental approaches to reducing greenhouse gases, such as conservation and 
efficiency or alternative and renewable energy initiatives. Why is this the case? What 
accounts for this slow momentum toward policy solutions on the climate problem? This 
chapter examines how news coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty and volume 
– structures debates on climate solutions, limiting government intervention to more 
cautious approaches to tackling the problem. This is the other half of the dual dynamics 
that are at play for how climate news structures policy debates. We saw in the previous 
chapter that news coverage influences how congressional committees and Members of 
Congress acting as policy brokers prioritize the climate problem. It is in this capacity that 
                                                 
103
 The DOE had invested $450M into the Texas Clean Energy Project as of 2014 
http://www.texascleanenergyproject.com/ (Accessed April 2016). 
104
 Retrieved from the Policy Agenda’s Project data series on State of the Union Speeches 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#state_of_the_union_speeches. (Accessed July 
2013). 
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media signals are responsible for problem expansion; it focuses attention and moderates 
our understanding of what defines the climate problem.  
But on the other side of the climate problem are the solutions attached to it. And it 
is here where media signals are responsible for solution containment. The nature in which 
climate change is covered in the news – the degree of attribute diversity and causal 
uncertainty – leads to amplifying already intense policy debates about problem 
uncertainty – which attributes define the climate problem - and questions of problem 
severity due to uncertainties surrounding why climate change is happening and what are 
its effects. In light of so much uncertainty, news coverage at once paralyzes debates about 
comprehensive solutions, and mobilizes policy debates instead toward incremental 
approaches to fixing the climate problem.  The remainder of this chapter is divided into 
two sections. The first section provides a review of media signaling in the muddled 
problem space that leads to solution containment. The second section presents the 
research design and findings from two models – (1) the number of large-scale and (2) 
incremental solutions in policy debates – that examine how news coverage structures 
policy debates on climate solutions away from large-scale approaches toward more 









LIMITING SOLUTIONS BY AMPLIFYING UNCERTAINTY IN THE MUDDLED PROBLEM 
SPACE 
Believe it or not, the main scientific and policy institutions responsible for climate 
change in the international arena do not even agree on what the phrase ‘climate 
change’ actually means.105 
Contrary to the claims of those who want to strictly regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions and increase the cost of energy for all Americans, there is a great 
amount of uncertainty associated with climate science. These uncertainties 
undermine our ability to accurately determine how carbon dioxide has affected 
the climate in the past. They also limit our understanding of how anthropogenic 
emissions will affect future warming trends. Further confusing the policy debate, 
the models that scientists have come to rely on to make climate predictions have 
greatly overestimated warming.106 
 
How a problem is defined determines its range of solutions and hence whether or 
not policy in that area changes a great deal – i.e. large-scale punctuations – or if it 
evolves in a more incremental fashion (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). This section provides an overview of how media signals interact 
with the muddled problem space to result in solution containment of the climate problem. 
By solution containment I mean limiting policy debates to incremental approaches to 
alleviating the unwanted impacts of climate change and discouraging discussions of 
comprehensive solutions that would lead to large-scale policy change. Table 6.1 provides 
descriptions of the media signals investigated in this dissertation – attribute diversity, 




                                                 
105
 Roger Pielke, Jr. in The Climate Fix (2010, p. 143) 
106
 Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) in a Washington Post op-ed, May 19, 2013. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lamar-smith-overheated-rhetoric-on-climate-change-hurts-the-
economy/2013/05/19/32cb6d94-bda4-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html. (Accessed April 2016). 
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Table 6.1: Three Media Signals of Climate Change 
The first quote at the beginning of this section is from Roger Pielke, Jr., Professor 
of Environmental Studies at the University of Colorado, who specializes in climate policy 
and politics. It illustrates the potential influence of attribute diversity in news coverage – 
it amplifies uncertainty about how climate change is defined or “what it even means.” 
This heightened problem uncertainty is a characteristic of complex policies in the 
muddled problem space. The problem known as “climate change” has multiple ill-defined 
attributes attached to it – broadly, the economy, national security, science, energy, etc. 
Policy communities compete over which attributes best define the climate problem to 
delineate the solutions attached to it. Attribute diversity is defined as ambiguity in the 
variety and concentration of the dimensions used to frame the climate problem in the 
news. Signals of attribute diversity from climate coverage amplify the existing problem 
uncertainty in the muddled space. Because comprehensive solutions require large shifts in 
resource allocation, government intervention, and regulatory changes, they are not likely 
when problem uncertainty is relatively high. Instead, if policy communities cannot agree 
on “what it even means,” politically feasible solutions to climate change will be smaller-
scale in nature – i.e. incremental.       
Media Signal Description
Attribute Diversity
Ambiguity in the variety and concentration of the dimensions 
found in climate change news coverage. This leads to amplifying 
problem uncertainty. 
Causal Uncertainty
Reporting on the uncertainty in the causal relationships that link 
human behavior with global warming, global warming with climate 
change, and climate change with its impacts. This leads to 
intensifying disputes over problem severity.
Volume
The amount of attention the media devotes to climate change. 
This increases the salience and importance of the climate 
problem. 
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The second quote at the beginning of this section is from an op-ed written by Rep. 
Lamar Smith (R-TX), Chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology, in 2013. It is at once both an example of causal uncertainty in news 
coverage and an illustration of how this type of media signal colors policy debates on 
climate solutions. Causal uncertainty in news coverage is reporting on the uncertainty in 
causal relationships that link human behavior with global warming, global warming with, 
climate change, and climate change with its impacts. This leads to intensifying disputes 
over problem severity, which are a fundamental characteristic of complex problems in the 
muddled space. 
 In the muddled space there is a great deal of contention over just how severe is 
the climate problem. This is largely a result of the uncertainty that underlies the 
complexity of causal connections that link human behavior with global warming and 
global warming with deleterious climate change effects. At its simplest, a problem 
definition is a cause-and-effect relationship that is also solvable and worth solving (Dery 
1994).  Rep. Smith emphasizes causal uncertainties in his Post op-ed, writing that “there 
is a great amount of uncertainty associated with climate science” and then goes on to list 
many points of uncertainty and how they “confuse” the policy debate. The theory of 
media signaling suggests that growing causal uncertainty in news coverage will decrease 
the likelihood of large-scale climate solutions such as cap-and-trade – for political 
reasons and for policy tool appropriateness. Instead, incremental approaches to solving 
the climate problem will be the preferred mode in policy debates in light of causal 
uncertainty. 
Volume as a media signal of importance is a little more straightforward than 
attribute diversity or causal uncertainty in news coverage. Volume is the amount of 
attention the media devotes to climate change. This is a media signal that increases the 
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salience – the importance – of the climate problem and should mobilize policy 
communities around comprehensive solutions to fix it. Media attention in the policy 
processes literature has a strong relationship with large-scale, punctuated policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; see Van Aelst and 
Walgrave 2006 for a review). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
How does news coverage produce solution containment, discouraging policy 
debate on large-scale solutions and instead encouraging incremental approaches to fixing 
the climate problem? The theory of media signaling suggests that three aspects of climate 
news – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – send signals to policy 
communities about problem uncertainty, problem severity, and just how important or 
salient is the problem. These signals heighten uncertainty and intensify policy disputes 
that already exist in the muddled problem space of climate change policy debates. The 
previous chapter demonstrated how these aspects of news coverage structure prioritizing 
the climate problem. This chapter looks at the other end of the climate problem – its 
solutions – to investigate the link between news coverage and the scope of climate 
solutions. 
Data: Large-Scale and Incremental Solutions in Climate Policy Debates 
The two dependent variables in this chapter used to examine how news coverage 
structures the generation of climate solutions in policy debates are the number of (1) 
large-scale solutions and (2) incremental solutions to climate change per hearing. What 
differentiates large-scale from incremental climate solutions, specifically those that 
reduce carbon emissions? Large-scale solutions require large shifts in resource allocation, 
government intervention, and bureaucratic rules and regulations (Davenport 2007b). 
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Legislating large-scale solutions requires devoting massive resources and political capital 
to coordination, bargaining, and tradeoffs. In the parlance of the policy processes 
literature, these are punctuated changes to climate policy. Incremental – or rather limited 
– solutions make no or little such demands. This type of solution is akin to making 
updates or adjustments to the status quo (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Wildavsky 1964; 
Truman 1951). As opposed to punctuated policy change, these solutions feed into 
stability and enforce equilibrium policymaking.    
Table 6.2 provides descriptions of the large-scale and incremental solutions to the 
climate problem. Cap-and-trade and its alternative, the carbon tax, are the two large-scale 
climate solutions (Cullenward 2010). Cap-and-trade is a market-based approach that sets 
total carbon allowances – the “cap.” Carbon credits are then traded by emitters on the free 
market. A carbon tax is a price set on each ton of carbon emitted, and emitters throughout 
the economy are charged, such as a tax applied to the purchase or use of fuels. It does not 
guarantee emission reductions as does cap-and-trade, rather its price signal is intended to 
incentivize “a market response” away from greenhouse gas intensive behaviors and forms 








                                                 
107
 World Bank’s Putting a Price on Carbon with a Tax publication  
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/background-note_carbon-tax.pdf 
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Table 6.2: Definitions for Large-Scale and Incremental Climate Solutions 
There are seven prominent incremental climate solutions to reducing greenhouse 
gases, particularly carbon dioxide, in climate policy debates (Schneider et al 2010; 
Dryzek, Norgaard and Schlosberg 2011). Table 6.2 provides descriptions of these as well. 
Conservation and efficiency reduce emissions by changing behavior (e.g. turning out 
lights) and through technologies developed for the purpose of providing the same or 
better service, but with less energy (e.g. energy efficient appliances, lightbulbs) (Chang, 
Rosenfeld, and McAuliffe 2010). Renewables and alternatives are no and low-carbon 
sources of electricity and fuel from existing and replaceable natural sources, such as 




Also known as "carbon trading," it is a market-based policy instrument that sets a limit on total allowed 
emissions. Carbon credits -- "the legal right to emit 1 ton of carbon dioxide per year" -- are created that 
equal the total amount of emissions. Credits are either sold or given to companies gratis, who are then 
allowed to trade them among each other.1
Carbon Tax A price (tax) is set on carbon -- such as $10 per ton -- and emitters throughout the economy are charged.1 
Incremental
Conservation and Efficiency
Conservation and energy efficiency reduce carbon emissions by changing behavior (e.g. turning out lights) 
and through technologies aimed at providing the same or better service using less energy (e.g. energy 
efficient kitchen appliances). It is one of the cheapest policy solutions for reducing carbon emissions.2  
Renewables and Alternatives
No and low-carbon sources of electricity and fuel from existing, ongoing, and replaceable natural sources 
(e.g. wind and solar; corn for ethanol).3  
Carbon Sequestration
Technologies to capture carbon from industrial and power plant emissions and store it in geological 
formations (sequestration). Cost-effective technologies for its wide-spread application are still being 
researched and developed.4 
Voluntary Reductions
Programs that assist and incentive voluntary reductions of greenhouse gases by the private sector (e.g. 
ENERGY STAR, The Green Power Partnership, Center for Corporate Climate Leadership).8
Carbon Offsets
A unit of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) is reduced for every unit of carbon emissions produced (e.g. 
planting trees or buying renewable energy credits).1, 5 
Mass Transit
Public transportation (i.e. buses, trains, subways) as an alternative mode of travel to reduce carbon 
emissions from burning gasoline in single-occupancy vehicles.6
Technology R&D
Engineering technologies developed as "intentional, large-scale manipulation of the environment" to 
counterbalance global warming, for example injecting aerosols into the atmosphere to act as "sun shades."7
1Cullenward (2010, pp. 204-205);  2Chang, Rosenfeld, and McAuliffe (2010);  3Kammen (2010);  4Hawkins (2010);  5World Resource Institute www.wri.org (accessed 
March 2016);  6https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/transportation.html (accessed March 2016);  7 Keith (2010);  
8https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/voluntaryprograms.html (accessed March 2016).
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that captures carbon emitted from high-volume sources, such as industry or power plants, 
and stores it underground (Hawkins 2010). Voluntary reductions are programs that assist 
and provide incentives for voluntarily reducing carbon emissions, such as the EPA’s 
ENERGY STAR.108   
Carbon offsets compensate for every unit of carbon emitted by reducing it 
elsewhere (Cullenward 2010; World Resources Institute109), for example, by planting 
trees or buying renewable energy credits. Mass transit is public transportation alternatives 
to single-occupancy, internal-combustion engine, gasoline-dependent vehicles.110 And, 
technology R&D is engineering technologies developed to manipulate the environment to 
reduce global warming. An example of this is known as “sun shade” technology, which is 
the injection into the atmosphere of aerosols that block solar radiation to reduce warming 
(Keith 2010). While not specifically aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions, it 
counters the need for reducing them and is often brought up as an alternative in tandem 
with the other incremental solutions (Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013; Schneider et al 
2010).  
Data on large-scale and incremental solutions were collected from 406 
congressional hearings on climate change held from 1987-2012. These hearings were 
collected from ProQuest with a keyword search on a standard set of terms for research on 
climate change.111 Non-relevant hearings were eliminated by reading ProQuest’s 
descriptions and the first few pages of each borderline hearing. Results were further 
verified by cross-referencing these hearings with the Policy Agendas Project’s series on 
                                                 
108
 https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/transportation.html (accessed March 2016) 
109
 www.wri.org (accessed March 2016) 
110
 https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/transportation.html (accessed March 2016) 
111
 These terms are “greenhouse gases”, “greenhouse effect”, “global warming”, and “climate change.” 
This set of terms is used in many media and policy studies of climate change. See for example Liu et al 
(2011, 2015), Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, 2007); Park et al (2010); Fisher et al (2013).  
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congressional hearings from policy content codes 705 (global warming and air pollution) 
and 1902 (international treaties and resource agreements).112  
As discussed in the previous chapter on problem prioritization, policy debates in 
hearings are an indicator of subsystem competition over defining policy problems and 
delineating their solutions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 1997; Worsham 1997; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Often in the policy processes literature we analytically 
separate problems from solutions, but in practice we know that individuals and 
deliberative bodies often engage with problems and solutions at the same time (Jones 
1994b; Newell and Simon 1972; Kingdon 1995; Cohen, March and Olsen 1972).  This is 
because problem definitions structure solutions sets; and, because sometimes policy 
entrepreneurs seek to apply their preferred solutions from one policy to another policy 
problem. We see this anecdotally with Wirth’s – the Senate’s “point man” on the Energy 
and Natural Resources Committee – statement that advocates of energy conservation 
must “ride the global warming [wave]” (Stanfield 1988).  
Content Coding Policy Debates in Hearings for Climate Solutions 
The full-text of opening statements and witness testimonies from these 406 
congressional hearings were content coded for large-scale and incremental solutions 
using a two-step machine-human hybrid approach to analyzing political texts. There were 
1,818 statements and 2,491 witness testimonies. The combination of opening statements 
and testimonies – referred to collectively as “statements” from here on out – totaled 4,309 
and averaged 10 per hearing, with a standard deviation of 6, and ranged from 1 to 36.  
                                                 
112
 www.polcyagendas.org. The Policy Agendas Project maintains a data series on congressional hearings 
that is coded for policy content using a consistent and reliable coding scheme that is backwards compatible, 
allowing for comparisons over time. The full coding system can be access here: 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook. For examples of peer-reviewed research using Policy 
Agendas data, see Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2015), Jones and Baumgartner (2005), Jones and 
Baumgartner (2009), Baumgartner et al (2011), Wolfe (2012).  
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The first step to content coding was estimating an automated topic model on the 
statements. After checks for robustness,113 the topic terms – clusters of words that best 
represent each topic – were coded for solution type based on the definitions in Table X.X 
above.  
Automated topic models group words that are semantically, i.e. thematically, 
related. This produces the “topic terms” to which humans assign substantively 
meaningful content codes. One of the advantages of this method is that these groups of 
words can share words, which better reflects real-world political texts. For example, 
“carbon” can be grouped with “efficiency” and “cap-and-trade.” Topic models applied to 
political texts have been used to analyze newspaper coverage of terrorist threats (Bonilla 
and Grimmer 2013), attribute uncertainty brought on by a financial crisis (Shaffer et al 
2015), the issue definitions that structure policy debates on spent nuclear fuel (Nowlin 
2015), the policy and scientific frames used in reports issued by conservative think tanks 
(Boussalis and Coan 2015), and agendas found in Senate press releases (Grimmer 2010) 
and floor speeches (Quinn et al 2010).  
As in the chapter on problem prioritization, latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) 
(Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; Blei 2012) is the specific topic model that was used to 
analyze hearing statements for climate solutions.  This approach assumes that K topics 
structure a collection of documents.114 Not all K topics are in each individual document 
Di – hearing statements here. For example, we know from the literature on climate 
solutions that there are two large-scale solutions and more or less seven types of 
incremental solutions (Schneider et al 2010; Dryzek, Norgaard and Schlosberg 2011). We 
                                                 
113
 Robustness is defined as the stability and validity of topic terms for small changes in the number of 
topics estimated (Blei 2012; Grimmer and Steward 2012; Grimmer and King 2010). The final model 
estimated 66 topics. After “junk” topics were removed, 57 remained. 
114
 The number of topics and the topic structure depends on the research question of the investigator (Blei 
2012). 
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expect to find all of these represented in the entire collection of statements from 1987-
2012. However, we do not expect a single statement made by a Member of Congress to 
contain all 11 types of solutions in any meaningful fashion. The topic model LDA 
estimates K topics for the entire collection of documents D and assigns a proportion to 
each Ki topics for each document Di. In other words, this approach assigns each statement 
a proportion “score” for each Ki topics that structure all documents D. For example, 
Wirth’s entire statement about energy conservation would be assigned a large proportion 
to the set of terms that best represent “conservation and efficiency” – say .60+ – and 
much smaller proportions to all of the remaining 10 solution categories. 
After estimating the topic model with LDA, each topic was coded for solutions 
found in Table 6.2.115  Table 6.3 displays the top five words (right) for the topic terms 
estimated by the LDA model for each type of climate solutions (left-hand column).116 
(Full topic model results can be found in Table B.1 in Appendix B). As you can see, three 
solution types – cap-and-trade, conservation and efficiency, and renewables and 
alternatives – are associated with more than one set of topic terms. This is expected, and 
illustrates one of the advantages of LDA’s flexibility, as these three solutions are the 
                                                 
115
 The codebook was created through a meta-analysis of the literature (see citations in Table X.X) and 
verified using a sample of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on climate change. These also 
informed the codebook developed for climate change news coverage. Several of the reports were prepared 
as witness testimony in hearings. The following reports were used: RCED-90-58, GAO/RCED-99-235R, 
GAO/RCED-00-166R, GAO-07-863, GAO-08-605, GAO-09-534T, GAO-11-317, GAO-11-876T, GAO-
12-283, and GAO-13-242. 
116
 As in the case of topic modeling news coverage in the prior chapter, I followed standard practices in the 
communications literature for reliability and validity (Nueundorf 2002), as well as those in the growing 
field of applied automated text analysis (Grimmer and Stewart 2012; Hopkins and King 2010; Quinn et al 
2010; Bonilla and Grimmer 2013). I read the top 15 statements from each set of topic terms as determined 
by the proportion assigned by LDA estimates, which amounts to a 20% sample of the corpus. First, 
statements and topic terms were read and compared to ensure a vein of similarity ran through them, 
reflecting the topic terms derived from LDA. For all sets of topic terms, the average similarity score was 
approximately 87% and ranged from 66-100%. Second, a solution type was assigned to the topic terms. 
Third, a 10% random sample of the entire corpus of statements was re-coded by hand for solution type. The 
intra-reliability score for this exercise was approximately 90%.   
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most prevalent in climate policy debates. Cap-and-trade is the most oft-considered large-
scale solution for reductions in carbon emissions, as it is a market-friendly approach 
successfully implemented in the past to control other greenhouse gases, such as sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) in acid rain measures.117 The incremental 
solutions associated with conservation, efficiency, renewables, and energy alternatives 
were in place as responses to oil shortages in the 1970s before global warming and 
climate change became a fixture of the policy agenda in the late 1980s (Kammen 2010; 
Hawkins 2010). They are some of the most popular, cheap, effective and wide-ranging 
solutions next to a carbon tax or cap-and-trade (Kammen 2010). 
Table 6.3. LDA Topic Terms for Climate Solutions  
Table 6.4 shows the distribution of climate solutions in hearing statements from 
1987-2012. If one of the 11 solution types was one of the top three topic terms and 
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 https://www3.epa.gov/captrade/programs.html (accessed April 2016). 
Solution Type Topic Terms
Large-Scale Solutions
emiss trade market carbon cap 
epa regul act air clean greenhous
Carbon Tax cost tax will price consum
Incremental Solutions
energi effici util save conserv 
fuel emiss percent aviat industri 
energi build busi small green 
fuel vehicl standard car economi 
fuel ethanol use energi biofuel 
energi electr power generat renew 
Carbon Sequestration carbon coal technolog captur plant
Voluntary Reductions emiss program greenhous voluntari
Carbon Offsets agricultur carbon soil land offset
Mass Transit transport transit need new invest





assigned an LDA proportion score of 0.10 or greater, it was coded for that solution type. 
This threshold is in line with climate studies that employ traditional human content-
coding for the presence/absence of a certain category (see for example, Liu et al 2008, 
2013, 2015; Park et al 2010). Hearing statements – both opening statements and witness 
testimonies combined – contained a total of 2,471 significant mentions of climate 
solutions from 1987-2012. Large-scale solutions account for 26% (640) of the total, with 
incremental solutions accounting for the remaining 74% (1,831).  
Table 6.4: Distribution of Climate Solutions, 1987-2012 
Cap-and-trade solutions make up the preponderance (75%) of policy debates on 
large-scale solutions to reducing greenhouse gases, and are 19% of the total number of 
climate solutions in hearing statements. In order of prominence, the incremental solutions 
are conservation and efficiency (25%); renewables and alternatives (15%); carbon 
sequestration (11%), voluntary reductions (8%); carbon offsets (8%); mass transit (4%); 
and tech R&D (3%). This lineup reflects the realities of climate policymaking in the US 
Congress – while large-scale policy solutions have been considered by both the House 
GHG Reduction Solutions Count Percentage
Large-Scale Solutions 640 26%
Cap-and-Trade 478 19%
Carbon Tax 162 7%
Incremental Solutions 1831 74%
Conservation and Efficiency 607 25%
Renewables and Alternatives 379 15%
Carbon Sequestration 282 11%
Voluntary Reductions 192 8%
Carbon Offsets 191 8%
Mass Transit 95 4%
Technology R&D 85 3%
2471
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and Senate, neither a carbon tax nor a cap-and-trade bill has been passed by both and sent 
to the White House. Incremental approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, on 
the other hand, dominate policy debates about climate solutions – and legislative 
outcomes. 
Table 6.5 provides excerpts from hearing statements for each of the large-scale 
and incremental climate solutions. The first is for cap-and-trade testimony given by 
Dallas Batraw, from Resources for the Future, a nonpartisan think tank, on the economic 
instruments (price collars and symmetric safety valves) in a cap-and-trade legislative 
proposal that sets a ceiling and a floor on the value of carbon credits traded on the 
market.118 The carbon tax excerpt is from testimony given by Frank E. Loy, 
Undersecretary of Global Affairs at the State Department, on the success of the US 
delegation in excluding from Kyoto Protocol commitments to carbon taxes.119 Under 
“conservation and efficiency” solutions, we have an opening statement made by Sen. 
John Chafee (R-RI) and testimony given by Rafe Pomerance of the World Resources 
Institute on conservation and efficiency provisions to reduce global warming that 
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 Addressing Price Volatility in Climate Change Legislation, House, 111th Cong. 2009. 
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 Climate Change: Status of the Kyoto Protocol After Three Years, Senate, 106th Cong. 2000. 
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The main point I want to communicate today is the opportunity for cost management through the introduction of a price collar or a
symmetric safety valve around the price and allowance trading program. The price collar would set a price ceiling and a price
floor for trading emission allowances.
Carbon Tax
We rejected both unrealistic and prohibitively expensive targets and mandatory policies and measures, such as carbon taxes ... we
made it clear from day one that the Kyoto Protocol is not yet a finished product and that by itself it is not a complete solution to
the problem of climate change. 
Conservation and Efficiency
One thing I'd like to point out is that the Federal Government is one of the largest consumers of energy in the Nation, and I just
think it behooves us to do everything we can to reduce the consumption of energy that the Federal Government uses and, as such,
I have submitted legislation directing the General Services Administration to establish energy consumption targets for all buildings
and thermal unit expenditures per square foot and then see if we can reduce it.
Much of the current energy policy controversy centers on the appropriate weight that should be assigned to energy production
options versus conservation and efficiency programs. While this is an important discussion and high- lights the nature of the
tradeoffs that characterize national energy policy, it does not get to the heart of the issue. A pollution pricing strategy for energy
resources can provide the basis for national environment and economic benefits and supply the policy underpinning for strong
conservation and renewable energy activities 
Renewables and Alternatives
Renewable energy is going to be one of the key pillars of a clean energy economy. We are not going to be able to avoid
catastrophic climate change without a dramatic increase in the amount of energy generated from renewable sources. Today only
2 1/2 percent of our electricity comes from all non-hydro renewables, but fortunately the United States has tremendous renewable
energy resources that we have only just begun to tap.
New genetically altered organisms have been developed to produce fuels from plants and grains. Automobile manufacturers are
selling cars and mini- vans capable of running on 85-percent ethanol.
Carbon Sequestration
[T]he existence of naturally-occurring CO2 reservoirs proves that CO2 can be sequestered for hundreds of thousands of years or
more. Depleted oil and gas reservoirs are especially promising for long-term sequestration, because they have seals that have
stood the test of time. They are also attractive because CO2 sequestration can be combined with enhanced oil recovery, a mature
technology that is applicable to 80 percent of oil reservoirs. The availability of a low-cost and abundant supply of CO2 could be a
boon to the domestic oil industry.
Voluntary Reductions
I am happy to talk about voluntary reporting of greenhouse gas emissions ... The Energy Policy Act of 1992 in section 1605(b)
established this data collection which allows individuals or companies at their option to report annually on the reductions in the
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, or any of the other greenhouse gases. 
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Continue Table 6.5 
Turning to the “renewables and alternatives” climate solutions on Table XX, the 
first excerpt is from an opening statement given by Rep. Henry Waxman, who stated that 
“[r]enewable energy is going to be one of the key pillars of a clean energy economy” at a 
hearing to examine its role in reducing greenhouse gases.121  The second except is from 
an opening statement made by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), Chairman of the Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, about using ethanol from corn to reduce 
greenhouse gases to allay the agricultural sector’s fears that they would come out on the 
losing side in Kyoto negotiations.122  On the topic of carbon sequestration, Dr. Sally 
Benson from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory provided testimony to explain 
this carbon capture technology, which was a feature of a W. Bush Administration 
initiative to address climate change.123  Jay Hakes from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) testified about their program to provide regulatory credits for any 
future carbon capping programs as an incentive to companies who voluntarily reduce 
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 Renewable Energy: Complementary Policies for Climate Legislation, House, 111th Cong. 2009. 
122
 Many Ways Renewable Fuels Could Aid in Decreasing Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increasing 
Energy Security, 105th Cong. 1997. 
123
 What Are the Administration Priorities for Climate Change Technology?, House, 108th Cong. 2003. 
Carbon Offsets
I have worked on land use and environmental policy for 20 years and offsets policy for the last 10 years. Offsets have received
much attention, both positive and negative, as a policy option to address greenhouse gases and climate change. In the next 5
minutes I will review offsets, why they are proposed, opportunities they present for farmers, challenges and potential solutions to
those challenges.
Mass Transit
[W]e burn 6,300 gallons of oil every second to fuel our transportation sector. So it is no wonder that we have to look at a more
responsible transportation policy. That sector is responsible for one quarter of the greenhouse gas emissions, according to the
EPA study for 2005.
Technology R&D
Geoengineering describes two distinct concepts. Carbon dioxide removal, CDR, is a set of tools for removing carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere, while solar radiation management, SRM, would reduce the earth's absorption of solar energy, cooling the planet
by adding sulfur aerosols to the upper atmosphere or by adding sea salt aerosols to whiten marine clouds. 
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their greenhouse gases.124 On carbon offsets, Brian Murray from the Nicholas Institute 
for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke provided testimony about offsetting 
greenhouse gas emissions via agriculture and forest management.125 Finally, the excerpt 
from the technology R&D category comes from testimony given by David Keith, 
Research Chair on Energy and the Environment at the University of Calgary, on cloud 
whitening, a geoengineering technology, which is injecting aerosols into marine clouds to 
reflect solar radiation and reduce global warming.126  
Figure 6.1 shows the number of large-scale (top) and incremental (bottom) 
solutions in policy debates on climate change from 1987 to 2012. In total, there are 308 
hearings that contained significant mentions of either type of climate solution. By type, 
there are 154 hearings that contain significant mentions of large-scale solutions, 
averaging 1.4 per hearing, with a standard deviation of 3.0 and a range of 0-17.  The 
House accounts for 57% of debate on large-scale solutions; and, Republican-majority 
chambers contain just 22%.  There are 280 hearings that contain significant mentions of 
incremental solutions, averaging 4.1 per hearing, with a standard deviation of 5.1 and a 
range of 0-23.  The House accounts for 52% of debate on incremental solutions; and, 
Republican majorities contain 24%. 
Comparing the two figures, incremental solutions are a staple of climate policy 
debates, whereas large-scale solutions are mentioned much more intermittently for most 
of the series. We can see small clusters of large-scale solutions (top) between 1988 and 
1989, 1991 and 1992, late 1997 and 1998, large spikes in 2001, 2005 and 2011, and a 
cluster of a high number of significant mentions from 2007 to early 2010. In 1988 and  
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 Credit for Early Action: Win-Win or Kyoto Through the Front Door, House, 106th Cong. 1999. 
125
 Hearing to Review the Costs and Benefits of Agriculture Offsets, House, 111th Cong. 2009. 
126
 Geoengineering: Parts I, II, and III, House, 111th Cong. 2010. 
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Figure 6.1: Number of Large-Scale and Incremental Solutions in Policy Debates on 






1989 Congress was debating provisions for what would become the Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1990. This established the Acid Rain Program, which put in place a cap-
and-trade solution to reduce the greenhouse gases SO2 and NOx.127 Policy debates leading 
up to this act also included consideration of carbon dioxide into this particular 
program.128 The cluster in 1991 and early 1992 is on account of policy debates about 
capping emissions leading up to and following the Rio Summit (CQ Almanac 1992 
1993). Another climate summit and the international treaty that came out of it – the 
Kyoto Protocol – explains the slight increase in policy debates regarding large-scales 
solutions in 1997 and 1998 (CQ Almanac 1997 1998a,b). 
In 2001, there is a substantial increase in large-scale solutions. In the background 
of W. Bush reversing his support of the Kyoto Protocol ahead of a climate summit 
(Adams 2001a), the newly-Democratic Senate debated extending the acid rain cap-and-
trade program to carbon emissions in Clean Air Act amendments oversight hearings. This 
debate was the nascent beginnings of what would become the McCain-Lieberman cap-
and-trade proposal, the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003.129 The 2005 increase coincides 
with W. Bush’s Clean Air Rule, which put new caps on SO2, NOx, ozone and soot.130 In 
Congress, the cap-and-trade Climate Stewardship Act was reintroduced and defeated as 
an amendment to legislation that became the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (CQ Almanac 
2005 2006). The cluster in 2007 to early 2010 reflects debates in the newly-Democratic 
majority House and Senate on a carbon tax and several cap-and-trade proposals (Palmer 
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 https://www3.epa.gov/captrade/programs.html (Accessed April 2016). 
128
 Global Environmental Protection Act of 1988, Senate, 100th C., 1988. 
129
 Clean Air Act Oversight Issues, Senate, 107th C., 1997. In June of 2001, Senate party control switched 
as a result of Jim Jeffords’ decision to caucus with the Democrats. He was Chairman of the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works. This committee renamed one of its subcommittees to Clean Air, Wetlands, 
and Climate Change, with Joe Lieberman as Chair. 
130
 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ceq/clean-air.html. (Accessed April 2016). 
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2007). In 2009, the House passed Congress’ first cap-and-trade legislation to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions, the American Clean Energy and Security Act (HR 2454) (CQ 
Almanac 2009 2010). Senate negotiations led by John Kerry, Joe Lieberman, and Lindsay 
Graham, could not muster a compromise and legislation died in committee following a 
Republican boycott of a markup session (CQ Almanac 2010 2011). Finally, we see an 
expansion of large-scale climate solutions in policy debates in 2011. This is a result of 
legislation passed by the newly Republican-majority House to ban the EPA from 
regulating any and all greenhouse gases, following the EPA’s proposed rules for limiting 
carbon dioxide emissions in 2010 (CQ Almanac 2011 2012). 
Turning to incremental solutions in Figure 6.1 (bottom graph), we can see 
reflected in this figure that they are a fixture of policy debates on climate solutions 
(Schneider et al 2010; Dryzek, Norgaard, and Schlosberg 2011). The highpoints are in 
years 1989, 1991, 2001, 2007, and 2008. In 1989 and 1991, Congress held several 
hearings to examine conservation and efficiency, renewables and alternative energy 
options to address the “greenhouse effect.”131 These policy debates were precursors to 
provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. In 2001, Congress considered several 
incremental options to reduce global warming, including alternative fuels, conservation, 
and fuel efficiency standards.132 These were part of policy debates that led up to passage 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. In 2007, biofuels and other incremental solutions such 
as renewables and efficiency were provided as “differing views” in light of cap-and-trade 
proposals.133 In 2008, policy debates in congressional hearings heightened in discussing 
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 National Energy Policy Act of 1989 (PURPA), Part 2, Senate, 101st Cong., 1989; National Energy 
Policy Act of 1989 (Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy), Part 1, Senate, 101st Cong., 1989; Global 
Warming and Other Environmental Consequences of Energy Strategies, Senate, 102nd Cong., 1991. 
132
 Climate Change Technology and Policy Options, Senate, 107th Cong., 2001. 
133
 The Gas is Greener: The Future of Biofuels, House, 110th Cong., 2007; America’s Climate Security Act 
of 2007, S 2191, Senate, 110th Cong, 2007. 
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conservation and fuel efficiency to reduce emissions from the transportation sector134 and 
energy efficiency in buildings.135 Incremental solutions were also considered as 
complementing and as alternatives to several cap-and-trade proposals in the House in 
2008.136 Heightened activity in 2008 is also a result of provisions in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 – the Stimulus package – which included 
several clean energy incremental solutions (Aldy 2011). 
Data: Collecting and Content Coding New Coverage 
This chapter examines how three independent variables derived from news 
coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty and volume – shapes policy debates on 
climate solutions. Data on news coverage is the same as that used in the previous chapter 
on problem prioritization. The full-text of 4,765 newspaper articles for 1987-2012 from 
the New York Times and the Washington Post were collected from a LexisNexis137 
keyword search limited to the headline and leading paragraph using the terms 
“greenhouse gases”, “greenhouse effect”, “climate change”, and “global warming.”138 
Irrelevant articles – those only mentioning climate change in passing – and duplicates 
were removed. These two news organizations – the Times and the Post – are widely used 
in the policy agendas literature and media studies of climate change (Boydstun 2013; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 1992; Liu et al 2011, 2013).  
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 Climate Change Impacts on the Transportation Sector, Senate, 110th Cong., 2008. 
135
 Climate Benefits of Improved Building Energy Efficiency, House, 110th Cong., 2008. 
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 This standard set of terms is used in media studies and congressional studies of climate change. See for 
example Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, 2007), Liu et al (2008; 2011; 2013; 2015), Park et al (2010). 
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Volume of News Coverage  
Volume of news coverage is the amount of attention the media devotes to climate 
change. As a media signal to policy communities, it moderates the salience and 
importance attached to the climate problem – which mobilizes attention to understanding 
and solving it. This indicator has a long history in being linked to agenda dynamics and 
policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Boydstun 
2013; McCombs 2008; for a review see Van Aelst and Walgrave 2006). Though to be 
sure, less is known about how it structures the dynamics of solution generation in policy 
debates. As a measure, volume is calculated as the number of newspaper articles per unit 
of time. At the monthly level, the volume of climate coverage averages 15.4, with a 
standard deviation of 17.8 and a range of 0-114 articles per month. 
Figure 6.2 shows the volume of news coverage from 1987-2012 aggregated to the 
quarterly level. As a reminder, Chapter X discusses the volume of climate coverage in 
detail. There are notable increase in the volume of coverage in 1988, 1992, 1997, and 
2000-2001. Starting in late 2004, volume steadily increases until it surges in 2007 and 
again in late 2009 through early 2010. These increases are triggered by events – most 
notably climate summits and releases of IPCC reports – and elite conflict over climate 
policy and scientific controversies. These peaks are consistent with other media studies of 
climate change in the news over time (see Ungar 1992, 1995; McComas and Shanahan 
1999; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Liu et al 2008; 2013).  
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Figure 6.2: The Volume of Climate Change News Coverage, 1987-2012 
Content Coding Climate News for Attribute Diversity and Causal Uncertainty 
The full-text of the 4,765 newspaper articles were coded for policy content using 
the two-step machine-human hybrid LDA topic modeling approach to measure attribute 
diversity and causal uncertainty.139 The results from the topic model were coded for 
substantive climate change policy content140 using a codebook that was based on a meta-




 Robustness is defined as the stability and validity of topic terms for small changes in the number of 
topics estimated (Blei 2012; Grimmer and Stewart 2012; Grimmer and King 2010). I settled on a model 
that estimated 75 sets of topic terms for climate coverage attributes. After removing “junk” categories, and 
topics that identified locales, political actors, and entertainment without policy content, 49 topic terms 
remained).  
140
 For code reliability and validity, I followed standard practices in communications (Nuendorf 2002) and 
recommendations from the applied topic modeling literature (Grimmer and Steward 2012; Hopkins and 
King 2010; Quin et al 2010; Bonilla and Grimmer 2013). The top 15 articles from each set of topic terms 
assigned by LDA were read to ensure that there was a vein of similarity that flowed through the articles that 
matched the set of topic terms derived from the estimates. This amounts to a 20% sample. For all cases, the 
similiarity score averaged 90%, with a range of 73-100%. A topic attribute from the codebook was then 
assigned to the set of topic terms. A 10% random sample of the entire newspaper corpus was recoded, 
resulting in an intra-coder reliability score of approximately 85%.  
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analysis of the literature on climate change news coverage141 and converted into a 
modified version of the Policy Agendas Project codebook142 specifically for climate 
change attributes. The codebook can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A. As a 
reminder from the detailed discussion of climate change attributes in the second section 
of Chapter 4, there are 32 unique attributes in climate new coverage nestled under nine 
distinct umbrella categories: climate science, economics, energy, environment, 
international, extreme weather, national security, public health, and technology R&D. 
Table 6.6 shows these categories and provides examples of the attributes that fall within 
them.143  
Table 6.6: Attributes in News Coverage by Major Climate Category 
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 Ungar (1992, 1995); McComas and Shanahan (1999); Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, 2007); Liu et al 




 National security, public health, and technology R&D are considered umbrella categories but are 
presented as “Other” for display purposed only. 
Category Description of Attributes
Climate Science
Carbon dioxide and global warming, climate science scandals, computer modeling 
and simulation, sea-level rises, human contribution, natural variation, scientific 
reports, temperature trends
Economics Competitiveness of US industries, costs/benefits, employment (e.g., "green jobs"), 
climate program costs
Energy Alternatives and renewables, coal, conservation and efficiency, gas and oil, nuclear 
power
Environment Coastal erosion, endangered species, greenhouse gas emissions and pollution, 
water conservation
International Climate summits, European Union, international treaties, newly industrialized 
countries (China, India, and Brazil)
Extreme Weather Drought conditions, heat/cold waves, hurricanes
Other National security, public health, technology R&D
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Table 6.7 provides examples of the LDA topic terms (right) that were assigned to 
the unique climate attributes (middle) for each dimension/category of climate change 
(left). Table A.2 in Appendix A shows all topic terms and code for climate news 
coverage. 
Table 6.7: Topic Terms and Attributes for Climate News  
 
Calculating Attribute Diversity 
Attribute diversity in news coverage moderates problem uncertainty in policy 
communities operating in the muddled space that characterizes climate change. Attribute 
diversity captures the ambiguity in the concentration and variety of climate attributes in 
Dimension  Topic (Attribute) Name Topic Terms
Temperature trends warm temperatur  model degre global
Sea-level rise ice arctic sea melt glacier
Science scandals climat scienc scientist research scientif 
Carbon dioxide/global warming atmospher carbon effect dioxid earth 
Human contribution year human ago planet age
Employment ("green jobs") work technolog like one new
Climate program costs program million plan fund project
Oil and gas oil gas energi drill natur 
Alternative fuels ethanol crop use product corn 
Renewable energy energi electr power percent wind 
Endangered species speci bear said fish anim 
Coastal erosion sea rise level water  island 
Greenhouse gas pollution carbon dioxid emiss greenhous gas 
International treaties kyoto treati countri emiss unit 
Industrializing nations countri china unit world india 
Developing countries countri world develop africa nation 
Natural disasters chang climat weather hurrican drought
Cold waves like winter one snow peopl 
National Security secur war militari unit nation 
Public Health health diseas peopl problem death 









the news. Strong media signals of attribute diversity should amplify problem uncertainty 
in policy communities, thereby encouraging policy debates of incremental rather than 
large-scale solutions. The proportions assigned to newspaper articles that were estimated 
by the LDA topic model and policy content coded for climate change attributes were used 
to calculate entropy,144 a measure of diversity used across multiple fields, including 
ecology, communications, sociology, information theory, and the policy process 
(McDonald and Dimmick 2003; Boydstun et al 2014). Boydstun (2013) used entropy to 
measure the “diversity of discussion” in news coverage of threats of terrorist attacks and 
the death penalty. It has been used elsewhere in studies of jurisdictional competition 
among congressional committees (Baumgartner et al 2000; Sheingate 2006), volatility in 
policy agendas (Talbert and Potoski 2002), competition and diversity in newspapers 
(Chaffee and Wilson 1977; Lasorsa 1991), and complexity in the policy information 
environment (Wolfe 2010).  
 Entropy is a great measure of attribute diversity because it captures the number 
(variety) of attributes in climate coverage as well as their relative distribution 
(concentration). Entropy increases as the distribution of coverage becomes more evenly 
spread among attributes; and decreases for the opposite reason. For the theory of media 
signaling this means that higher entropy means stronger signals that should in turn 
amplify problem uncertainty in policy communities engaged in climate policy debates. 
The average entropy score for the monthly series is 1.26, with a standard deviation of 
0.35 and a range of 0.36-1.76.  
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: − ∑ (( )) ∗ ln(), where xi represents an attribute, p(xi) the proportion 
of news coverage devoted to that attribute, and lnp(xi) the natural log of that proportion. The entropy score 
is calculated as the inverse sum of a proportion times its log, over all n attributes. 
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Figure 6.3 is a time series of attribute diversity in climate coverage from 1987 
through 2012. It trends upwards over time, with a large degree of variation in the 
beginning of the climate news coverage. The variation and trend level off starting around 
2005, where it varies more subtly around new highs. We can infer that media signals of 
attribute diversity were strong during this period – and stayed strong. This precedes the 
expansion of policy debates on climate solutions we saw in the time series of large-scale 
and incremental solutions. The variation in the beginning and middle of the series tracks 
with the expansion and contraction of incremental solutions in policy debates shown in 
the previous figure as well. 
 
Figure 6.3: Attribute Diversity in Climate News Coverage, 1987-2012 
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Calculating Causal Uncertainty  
Causal uncertainty in news coverage is reporting on the uncertainty in causal 
relationships that link human behavior with global warming, global warming with climate 
change, and climate change with its myriad impacts, such as sea-level rise. Climate 
science as a dimension of news coverage is used to measure causal uncertainty.145 Recall 
Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4 that explains how news coverage of climate science converges 
around three forms of uncertainty: (1) human contribution; (2) temperature trends; and 
(3) impacts (Painter and Ashe 2012; Schmid-Petri et al 2015). These categories were 
actually based on collaborative work between media scholars and climate scientists (see 
Rahmstorf 2004). The pathways to uncertainty via reporting on the causal connections in 
climate science studies is both real, reflecting scientific language and internal debates, 
and manufactured, reflecting political motivations to cast doubt on the climate problem. 
Rep. Lamar Smith’s (R-TX) op-ed in the Washington Post is a good example of causal 
uncertainty in climate news coverage:  
Contrary to the claims of those who want to strictly regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions and increase the cost of energy for all Americans, there is a great 
amount of uncertainty associated with climate science. These uncertainties 
undermine our ability to accurately determine how carbon dioxide has affected 
the climate in the past. They also limit our understanding of how anthropogenic 
emissions will affect future warming trends. Further confusing the policy debate, 
the models that scientists have come to rely on to make climate predictions have 
greatly overestimated warming.146 
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 This was verified by coding the full-text of all climate science articles – as derived from the topic 
models and hand-coded for policy content – with three well-known sentiment dictionaries that are used to 
measure uncertainty in texts. The correlations ranged from 0.82-0.97 with the dictionary result from 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), Lexicoder (Young and Soroka 2011) and the WordStat Sentiment 
Dictionary (2013). In addition, I created my own dictionary using the literature on uncertainty in climate 
news coverage (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004, 2007; Antilla 2005; Zehr 2000; and Painter and Ashe 2012); 
the correlation coefficient with ‘climate science’ articles was 0.91. 
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Causal uncertainty in news coverage is a media signal that can intensify disputes 
over problem severity in the policy community. Clarity in what scholars of the policy 
process call causal stories (Stone 1988, 1989) – connecting a human activity with 
unwanted outcomes that should be prevented or alleviated by government intervention – 
has been shown to be a crucial determinant leading to large changes in environmental 
policy (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Scheberle 2005).   
Table 6.8 shows the attributes under the “climate science” dimension that were 
used to measure causal uncertainty in news coverage. As you can see, these map onto 
diagram and to the three types of uncertainty found in the aforementioned literature. They 
are carbon dioxide and global warming; climate science scandals; computer modeling 
and predictions; sea-level rises; human contribution; natural variation; scientific reports; 
and temperature trends. 
Table 6.8: Attributes of Climate Science that Create Causal Uncertainty 
Causal uncertainty is calculated as the proportion of news coverage devoted to the 
climate science dimension per month. The final proportion score came about by dividing 
the number of significant climate science mentions by the sum of all mentions of 
dimensions for that month. As with the dependent variables for climate solutions as 
calculated with policy debates, a significant mention is considered to be true if at least 
one of a newspaper article’s top three attributes is assigned 0.10 or higher by the LDA 
topic modeling estimates. There were 2105 total mentions of ‘climate science’ in news 
coverage, with an average and standard deviation of 6.8 and a range of 0-49 mentions in a 
Dimension Attributes
Climate Science
Carbon dioxide and global warming, climate science scandals, computer 
modeling and simulation, sea-level rises, human contribution, natural 
variation, scientific reports, temperature trends
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month. The average proportion (as a percentage here for convenience) is 28% a month, 
with a standard deviation of 21% and a range of 0-100%. 
Figure 6.4 shows the proportion of causal uncertainty in climate news coverage 
from 1987 through 2012. We can see that causal uncertainty varies quite a good deal until 
around 2007, and then surges notably again in 2009 and early 2010. It was during this 
time that two science scandals dominated the news cycle on climate change – errors in an 
IPCC report and Climategate. Anecdotally, this is also when cap-and-trade legislation 
died in the Senate. 
Figure 6.4: Causal Uncertainty in Climate News, 1987-2012 
Control Variables 
In addition to attribute diversity, causal uncertainty and volume – the three media 
variables of interest – data on several other variables was collected to control for 
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objective conditions, events, party, chamber, divided government, public opinion, and the 
economy. For objective condition, the Climate Extremes Index (CEI) (Karl et al 1996; 
see Liu et al 2011) accounts for US temperature trends, precipitation, and tropical storms 
(hurricanes and cyclones) in one single indicator.147 Instances of climate summits and 
IPCC reports control for policy debates on solutions driven by events (Liu et al 2011).148 
Republican majority,149 chamber,150 and divided government151 are used as political and 
institutional controls. Stimon’s Public Mood measure accounts for the influence of public 
opinion.152 The gross domestic product (GDP) is used to control for the effects of a 
changing economy. Finally, the sum of opening statements and witness testimonies per 
hearing is a control variable in both models since solution data was generated from these 
texts.153  
Findings: Limiting Climate Solutions 
Large-scale and incremental solutions to the climate problem are used as 
dependent variables to examine how news coverage – attribute diversity, causal 
uncertainty and volume – paralyzes consideration of punctuated changes, steering debate 
instead toward smaller-scale policy change. This section discusses results for large-scale 
solutions first and incremental solutions second. Negative binomial regression is used to 
model the relationship between solutions and news coverage, and to investigate 
disproportionate information-processing and party influence. Because the dependent 
                                                 
147
 Data collected from NOAA www.nrdc.gov. For a detailed definition of the CEI, see 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremes/cei/definition. The CEI series for 1987-2012 averages 24.5, with a 
standard deviation of 7.7 and a range of 14.3-49.4. 
148
 12 events in total, expanding on Liu et al’s (2011) list, coincide with 19% of congressional hearings. 
149
 Republican majority chambers account for 27% of all hearings. 
150
 House hearings account for 54% of all hearings. 
151
 Divided government was present in 61% of all hearings. 
152
 Public mood averaged 60.3, with a standard deviation of 3.0 and a range of 48.9-65.39. 
153
 Total statements and testimonies averaged 10 per hearing, with a standard deviation of 6 and a range of 
1-36. 
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variables are event counts – the number of large-scale solutions mentioned in policy 
debates for the first model – they are not continuous, so negative binomial regression was 
used. This approach produces more accurate and efficient estimates than linear regression 
(King 1989) and to account for overdispersion found in most social processes (Cameron 
and Trevedi 1986; Long 1997). The simpler event count Poisson does not control for 
overdispersion. If Poisson is used despite overdispersion, this could bias estimates of 
standard errors downwards, leading to over-precision confidence of the coefficients 
(Cameron and Trevedi 1986). 
The first model presented gauges to what degree news coverage plays a 
prohibitive role regarding policy debates of large-scale climate solutions, such as cap-
and-trade or a carbon tax. The theory of media signaling presented in this dissertation 
expects the following: 
3: Large-scale solutions in policy debates will decrease with attribute diversity 
and causal uncertainty in climate news coverage because these media signals 
amplify problem uncertainty and highlight disputes over the seriousness of the 
problem, respectively. This reduces the political feasibility of comprehensive 
approaches to fixing the climate problem. 
3a: Large-scale solutions will increase with the volume of coverage because it 
signals growing importance of the climate problem, which encourages policy 
debates on fixing it. 
5: Threshhold effects for climate news signals will vary by coverage type and 
stage in the problem definition process.   
6: Republicans should be less active in the problem definition process save for  
giving opening statements at hearings to highlight its uncertainties and/or steer 
debate towards “nonproblemicity.” 
Figure 6.5 shows findings for the first negative binomial model, which estimates 
the number of large-scale solutions in policy debates as a function of attribute diversity, 
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high levels of causal uncertainty,154 volume, climate extremes (CEI), international 
conferences, Republican majority, U.S. House, public mood, GDP, time, and the sum of 
statements and testimonies.155 The unit of analysis is a congressional hearing. The date of 
the first session of each hearing was used to create six-month lags for the three 
independent variables on climate news coverage – attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, 
and volume. (Full regression results are in Table A.2 in Appendix A). The points on the 
figure represent coefficient estimates and the horizontal bands are 95% confidence 
intervals. Points that fall to the left of the solid vertical line at the zero tick mark represent 
negative coefficients and those to the right are positive. Confidence bands that do not 













                                                 
154
 Threshold effects. High levels of causal uncertainty is a dichotomous variable where 1 is assigned if the 
value at time t is greater than the average of t-1and t-2; and 0 if below. This accounts for 41% of all cases. 
155
 Three observations were dropped because they were outliers. 
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Figure 6.5: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Large-Scale Climate Solutions, 
1987-2012 
The overall results provide limited support for expectations on the influence of 
news coverage on the number of large-scale climate solutions in congressional policy 
debates. The coefficient for high causal uncertainty is negative and significant at the 0.05 
level. This implies that large-scale climate solutions are curtailed in policy debates when 
there are strong signals about causal uncertainty from news coverage. This also 
demonstrates support for the expectation that there are threshold effects for media signals 
because political institutions are disproportionate information processors. The coefficient 
for attribute diversity is in the expected direction – it too should dampen policy debates 
about large-scale solutions. However, the coefficient estimates are not statistically 
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significant. The estimates for volume are also in the expected direction – large-scale 
solutions should increase as media signals the importance of the climate problem. 
However it is also the case here that the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance.  
The coefficient for Republican majority is in the expected directions, but does not 
reach statistical significance either. There is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the House and large-scale policy solutions. At first this may seem 
counterintuitive because it was only this chamber, and not the Senate, that was able to 
pass cap-and-trade legislation. But the Senate was the forum of prolonged cap-and-trade 
debates that surpassed the House it terms of duration and degree of contention 
(Davenport 2010). The following are the remaining control variables that failed to reach 
statistical significance: climate extremes, international conferences, divided government 
and public mood.  
Changes in the economy as measured by GDP, time, and the variable that controls 
for total number of statements and testimonies – they are all positive and statistically 
significant. Large-scale solutions in policy debates increase as the economy improves, 
which on its face makes sense since cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals involve 
consideration of substantial shifts in the allocation of resources. And, large-scale 
solutions increase over time, which is expected in the evolution of the climate problem  – 
more time to understand it and rally support around comprehensive approaches to fixing 
it. 
We know turn to a discussion of how causal uncertainty in news coverage shapes 
large-scale solutions in climate debates. It is difficult to interpret the effects of 
coefficients and their statistical significance directly from the output of a negative 
binomial regression. Since this is the case, Figure 6.6 shows predicted counts of large-
scale solutions for when causal uncertainty in the news coverage is below average (left) 
 196 
and when it is above average (right). The points represent the number of large-scale 
solutions and the vertical lines the 95% confidence bands. Keep in mind that the average 
number of large-scale solutions for the series is 1.4. The predicted number of large-scale 
solutions decreases by 15% when causal uncertainty moves from below to above average 
levels in news coverage. This supports the notion that strong media signals of causal 
uncertainty can “break through the noise” of policy debates taking place in the muddled 
space that defines climate change, which heightens disputes over problem severity and 
moves policy communities away from comprehensive approaches to tacking the problem.  






The complement of this dynamic is that aspects of news coverage can move 
debates about policy solutions away from large-scale changes and towards incremental 
approaches to solving the climate problem. The second model investigates this by 
estimating the number of incremental solutions in policy debates as a function of attribute 
diversity, high levels of causal uncertainty, volume, climate extremes, international 
conferences, Republican majority, divided government, U.S. House, public mood, GDP, 
time, and the total number of statements and testimonies made at each hearing. As with 
the case of large-scale solutions, the date of the first session of each hearing is used to 
create a six month lag for the three media variables – attribute diversity, causal 
uncertainty and volume. Negative binomial regression is also employed as the more 
appropriate alternative to normal linear regression and to account for overdispersion. 
(Full regression results can be found in Table A.3 in Appendix A).  
Along with the expectations for threshold dynamics due to disproportionate 
information-processing in the model for large-scale solutions (#5), the theory of media 
signaling suggests the below expectations in regards to incremental solutions in climate 
policy debates: 
4: Incremental solutions will increase with attribute diversity and causal 
uncertainty in climate coverage because media signals that amplify problem 
uncertainty and disputes over severity will increase the political feasibility and 
policy tool appropriateness of smaller-scale solutions. 
4a: Incremental solutions will decrease with volume of news coverage because 
the signal of importance will shift debates to considering solutions far greater in 
scope and potential effectiveness. 
6a: Republican majorities will be associated with increases in incremental climate 
solutions because they are less-costly alternatives and provide the opportunity to 
attach existing solutions to new problems. 
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Figure 6.7 shows the results for the incremental solutions model. As a reminder, 
the points represent coefficients and the bands their 95% confidence intervals. Points to 
the left of the vertical line placed at the zero mark represent negative point estimates and 
those to the right – positive. Confidence bands that do not intersect the zero mark are 
considered statistically significant. All three media variables are statistically significant 
and are in the direction that corresponds with the above expectations.  
 
Figure 6.7: Negative Binomial Model: The Number of Incremental Solutions, 1987-2012 
The results for attribute diversity in news coverage provides support for the 
expectation that incremental solutions increase with media signals that amplify the 
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uncertainty associated with which set of attributes define the climate problem. Problem 
uncertainty in the policy community shifts consideration to incremental approaches as 
members compete to better define it and reduce this type of uncertainty. High levels of 
causal uncertainty are strong signals to policy communities that disputes over causal 
relationships – i.e. the veracity of causal stories that link carbon emissions to global 
warming and global warming to damaging climate change impacts – are giving credence 
to the argument that the relative modesty in the severity of the climate problem only 
warrants incremental solutions. Volume of climate news coverage has the opposite effect. 
Policy communities respond to increases in media signals of the importance of the 
climate problem by shifting debate away from incremental solutions toward more large-
scale approaches.156 
The estimates for international conferences and divided government are positive 
and statistically significant. The number of incremental solutions increases as 
international conferences near and when the two leading institutions for climate 
policymaking – Congress and the White House – are occupied by different political 
parties. The estimates for public mood and changes in the economy as measured by GDP 
are negative and statistically significant. This means that the number of incremental 
solutions decreases when the public turns more liberal and the economy improves, which 
suggests that policymakers may turn toward more comprehensive approaches to solving 
the climate problem as a result of liberalism and a good economy.157 Or, they may devote 
more resources to understanding the problem to reduce uncertainties surrounding it in 
light of these conditions.  
                                                 
156
 The coefficient estimate for volume in the large-scale solutions model was positive. However, it did not 
reach statistical significance. 
157
 The coefficient estimate for GDP is positive and statistically significant in the large-scale model, 
buttressing this argument. However, mood was negative and did not approach statistical significance.  
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We now turn to predicted counts of incremental solutions in policy debates to 
gauge the effects of attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume of climate news 
coverage. Figure 6.8 shows the predicted number of incremental solutions for increasing 
values of attribute diversity (top) and volume of news coverage (bottom). The solid black 
line represents the number of solutions and the gray shading is its 95% confidence 
interval. Keep in mind that the average number of incremental solutions in policy debates 
in congressional hearings is 4.1. Note the direction and the steepness of the slope.  
For attribute diversity (top), the number of incremental solutions increases 
alongside stronger media signals that amplify problem uncertainty – i.e. which set of 
attributes define the climate problem. The predicted number of incremental solutions 
increases by almost 150% as attribute diversity grows from its lowest to its highest levels. 
Increasing volume of news coverage has the opposite effect – incremental solutions 
decrease as climate coverage grows. Policy communities turn to other activities as the 
media signals about the importance of the climate problem become stronger. They could 
turn to comprehensive solutions, or they could be refocusing attention back to better 
defining the problem, as we saw in the last chapter. The predicted number of incremental 
solutions decrease by nearly 62% from when climate coverage is at its lowest levels to 











Figure 6.8: Predicted Number of Incremental Solutions for Increasing Values of Attribute 
Diversity and Volume of News Coverage 
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Turning to media signals that heighten disputes over problem severity, Figure 6.9 
displays the predicted number of incremental solutions for below average (left) and above 
average (right) levels of causal uncertainty in climate news coverage. Remember that 
since this is a dichotomous variable, these predicted effects are displayed using what is 
called a ropeladder plot. The points represent the predicted numbers and the vertical 
bands the 95% confidence intervals. When causal uncertainty shifts from below average 
to higher than average, incremental solutions increase by 12% from 5.6 to 6.3. This 
demonstrates that policy communities respond to large increases in climate news that 
emphasizes causal uncertainty. 






Chapter 5 showed support for the problem expansion capacity of news coverage. 
This chapter on solution containment examines how the three aspects of news coverage – 
attribute diversity, causal uncertainty, and volume – structure the scope of climate 
solutions considered in policy debates. Does news coverage encourage limited 
approaches to solving the climate problem, as implied by the logic of media signaling in 
the muddled space? Findings suggest that high levels of causal uncertainty in news 
coverage is a limiting factor for the generation of large-scale climate solutions, such as 
cap-and-trade measures. The results for both attribute diversity and volume’s influence 
on large-scale solutions are in the expected direction, but their estimates do not reach 
statistical significance.  
We also look at how media signals structure the generation of smaller-scale, less 
costly solutions to the climate problem, such as efficiency increases and enhancing green 
technologies. The results imply that attribute diversity and causal uncertainty in news 
coverage play an important role in increasing the likelihood that policy debates on 
climate solutions will converge around incremental approaches to fixing it. Volume of 
coverage has the opposite effect, as expected – signals that amplify the importance of the 
climate problem seem to steer policy debates away from incremental solutions and 
perhaps toward further deliberating the problem in order to fix it. Results from this 
chapter also support disproportionate information-processing of some media signals 
flowing from news coverage, in that signals of causal uncertainty seem to need to be clear 
and strong before policy communities respond to them. The media play a role in problem 
expansion and solution containment. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: PRIORITIZING THE CLIMATE PROBLEM 
Table A.1: Climate Change Topic Codebook 
Table Continues Next Page 
 
Macroeconomics
100 General state of the economy, multiple economic effects
103 Job loss and gains, un/employment (e.g., "green" jobs)
108 Industrial health, productivity, and outlook (e.g., coal industry and clean energy 
legislation)
Health
300 General and multiple health effects
331 Public health threats from climate shifts and natural disasters (e.g., heat waves), 
disease(s) from air pollution
Agriculture
400 Agricultural forecasting, production, costs due to climate shifts
Environment
700 General and multiple environmental effects, comparisons (e.g., ozone)
705 Greenhouse effect and global warming/climate change (general), combinations of 
adaptation and mitigation measures, consequences of climate change for "future of 
planet", proposals to reduce GHG emissions (e.g., EPA regulations, cap-and-trade, 
carbon tax)
709 Species protection and endangerment, forest management in light of climate shifts 
(e.g., responding to increasing wildfire threat)
710 Sea-Level rise, coastal erosion, coral reef protection
711 Water supply and conservation measures in response to climate shifts, drought 
Energy
801 Nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels
803 Gas and oil production, prices, supply
805 Coal power plants
806 Alternative and renewable energy
807 Energy efficiency and conservation, fuel efficiency
898 Energy technology investment, development programs
Transportation
1001 Mass transit and alternative transportation methods (e.g., bicycling) 
Social Welfare
1302 Low income families and climate change (e.g., energy prices)
National Security
1600 Conflict due to climate shifts and US military involvement 
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1701 Climate science (e.g., sources of GHG emissions, causes of climate change, debates 
over temperature records, climate variability, consequences of global warming, state of 
climate modeling and prediction, scientific reports)
1702 Climate technology R&D (e.g., geoengineering, earth systems satellites, crossover 
technology funding, funding programs for collecting climate data)
International




2035 President and administration 
2040 Business practices and corporate interests
Public Lands
2101 Recreation and hunting
Sub-national
2400 State, local, and regional programs, adaptation policies
Weather
2600 Weather and natural disasters (general)
2605 Natural disasters (events) (e.g., hurricanes, floods, tornadoes) 
2610 Cold waves, heat waves
2615 Drought conditions
2620 Weather forecasting, accuracy
2625 Weather-related disaster response, insurance
Other
9905 Campaigns and elections
9910 Arts and entertainment (e.g., An Inconvenient Truth)
9915 Travel and recreation, (e.g., ecotourism)
9920 Letters to the Editor
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Topic Terms Policy Topic Terms Policy
econom much might polici like 100 ice arctic sea melt glacier 1701
american state nation unit  econom 100 climat scienc scientist research scientif 1701
tax propos govern cost pay 100 warm climat global chang scienc 1701
program million plan fund project 100 studi scienc comput ocean model 1701
work technolog like one new 103 year human ago planet age 1701
health diseas peopl problem death 331 report climat panel chang scienc 1701
climat chang global warm take 705 energi fuel technolog coal effici 1702
climat chang global warm nation 705 compani busi said execut corpor 1702
said group environment year directo 705 global environment nation warm environ 1900
agenc regul epa air rule 705 china chines unit offici state 1902
emiss carbon trade system allow 705 kyoto treati countri emiss unit 1902
court law state feder regul 705 countri china unit world india 1902
emiss greenhous reduc percent reduct 705 climat countri nation negoti unit 1902
carbon dioxid emiss greenhous gas 705 european said europ unit union 1902
percent year said report increas 705 countri world develop africa nation 1905
speci bear said fish anim 709 bill senat hous legisl democrat 2011
forest tree land fire deforest 709 said hous committe group member 2011
sea rise level water island 710 presid administr hous obama white 2035
plant tree garden water soil 711 administr said bush offici hous 2035
nuclear plant power energi new 801 bush presid administr white plan 2035
oil gas energi drill natur 803 said clinton meet presid confer 2035
percent price cost increas gasolin 803 state california said new governor 2400
plant coal carbon power dioxid 805 counti maryland state virginia million 2400
energi electr power percent wind 806 citi york new mayor build 2400
ethanol crop use product corn 806 chang climat weather hurrican drought 2605
product wast water use environment 807 like winter one snow peopl 2610
build home hous use design 807 water said river region state 2615
car vehicl fuel standard truck 807 democrat republican campaign parti polit 9905
secur war militari unit nation 1600 gore polit truth nobel film 9910
warm temperatur model degre global 1701 offset project use travel get 9915
atmospher carbon effect dioxid earth 1701
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Table A.3: Events: International Climate Summits and IPCC Reports 
 






Toronto Conference and IPCC Creation 1988
IPCC First Assessment Report and Geneva Climate Conference 1990
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992
IPCC Second Report and Conference of Parties 1 (COP-1) 1995
COP-2 1996
COP-3 Kyoto and Kyoto Protocol 1997
IPCC Third Assessment and COP-7 Morroco 2001
IPCC Fourth Assessment and COP-13 Bali 2007
COP-15 Copenhagen 2009
COP-16 Cancun 2010
Note: Events from 1987-2001 from Liu et al (2011)
Variable Estimate SE
(Intercept) -10.53 2.53 ***
Attribute Diversity 1.93 0.75 *
High Causal Uncertainty -0.43 0.15 **
Volume 0.03 0.00 *
CEI -0.01 0.01
International Confs 0.64 0.15 ***
Rep. Congress -0.58 0.15 ***
Divided Govt 0.55 0.15 ***
Public Mood 0.09 0.02 ***
GDP 0.03 0.02
Time 0.01 0.00 **
Hearing Lag 0.01 0.01
Ljung-Box Q-test 0.54 (p=0.46)
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1
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Attribute Diversity 0.84 0.24 ***
Causal Uncertainty 0.54 0.15 ***
High Volume 0.20 0.05 ***
CEI 0.00 0.00
International Confs 0.28 0.07 ***
Rep. Majority
-0.12 0.08







Time 0.01 0.01 .
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1
 209 
APPENDIX B: LIMITING CLIMATE SOLUTIONS 
Table B.1: Topic Terms and Code for Hearing Dimensions and Climate Solutions  
Table Continues Next Page 
 
Topic Terms Policy Solution Type
year percent million per billion 100
cost emiss percent econom polici 100
industri compani product manufactur produc108
job american will coal economi 108
health pollut air diseas public 331
agricultur carbon soil land offset 400 I
environment issu polici nation environ 700
cost tax will price consum 705 L
import need work role issu 705
need polici believ congress support 705
effect time term potenti may 705
chang climat will issu address 705
problem think issu area way 705
climat chang adapt impact will 705
global warm will world action 705
emiss trade market carbon cap 705 L
emiss program greenhous reduc voluntari 705 I
epa regul act air clean greenhous 705 L
ice arctic sea polar alaska 709
forest land fire tree manag 709
ocean coral reef pacif water 710
chang rise sea level wildlif 710
carbon coal technolog captur plant 802 I
energi oil gas natur price 803
fuel ethanol use energi biofuel 806 I
energi electr power generat renew 806 I
energi effici util save conserv 807 I
energi build busi small green 807 I
fuel emiss percent aviat industri 807 I
fuel vehicl standard car economi 807 I
transport transit need new invest 1001 I
peopl communiti live work mani 1302
chang climat secur nation state 1600
ozon problem effect deplet also 1701
energi greenhous global emiss polici 1701
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carbon dioxid atmospher emiss fossil 1701
emiss greenhous climat gas chang 1701
temperatur year warm record last 1701
scienc scientist warm scientif climat 1701
report assess scienc ipcc studil 1701
climat chang model greenhous warmt 1701
chang global research program scienc 1701
technolog energi invest develop clean 1702 I
program feder research agenc plan 1702
data earth program nasa satellit 1702
technolog use system can today 1702
china countri develop india state 1902
climat countri nation action develop 1902
kyoto treati protocol countri will 1902
countri develop world intern project 1905
senat bill hear committe thank 2011
bill legisl committe congress will 2011
administr presid year budget committe 2035
state local california feder today 2400
water will drought california state 2615
climat inform model noaa weather 2620
climat chang risk insur event 2625
Note: L = large-scale solution; I = incremental solution
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Attribute Diversity -0.08 0.08
High Causal Uncertainty -0.17 0.08 *
Volume 0.04 0.04
CEI 0.01 0.01
International Conf. 0.11 0.13
Rep. Majority -0.18 0.15
Divided Gov. 0.04 0.10
U.S. House -0.26 0.08 **
Public Mood -0.02 0.02
GDP 0.08 0.02 ***
Time 0.10 0.01 ***
Wit & MOC Total 0.01 0.00 ***
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 
Variable Estimate SE
(Intercept) 1.96 0.88 *
Attribute Diversity 0.45 0.22 *
High Causal Uncertainty 0.12 0.05 *
Volume -0.10 0.02 ***
CEI -0.01 0.00
International Conf. 0.18 0.07 **
Rep. Majority 0.08 0.07
Divided Gov. 0.13 0.06 *
U.S. House -0.04 0.05
Public Mood -0.02 0.01 *
GDP -0.05 0.01 ***
Time 0.01 0.01
Wit & MOC Total 0.00 0.00 .
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 
 212 
References 
Adams, Rebecca. 2001a, March 17. "Bush's Decision Not to Curb Carbon Dioxide Casts 
Shadow on Emission Control Legislation." CQ Weekly, 6078. 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport107000000223554 
Adams, Rebecca. 2001b, June 16. "Senate Democrats Will Turn Up Heat On Bush to 
Deliver Proposals For Reducing Global Warming." CQ Weekly, 1447. 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport107000000267971. 
Adams, Rebecca. 2001c, July 28. "Democrats Ramp Up 'Green' Legislation In 
Displeasure Over Bush's Kyoto Stand." CQ Weekly, 183435. 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport107000000290950 
Adler, Jonathan H. 2016, February 9. “Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s 




AEI/Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity. 2015. “Opportunity, 
Responsibility, and Security: A Consensus Plan for Reducing Poverty and 
Restoring the American Dream.” Published by the American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research and the Brookings Insitution. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/12/aei-brookings-
poverty-report/full-report.pdf 
Aldy, Joseph E. 2011, December. “A Preliminary Review of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act’s Clean Energy Package.” Faculty Research Working Paper. 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jaldy/img/RWP11-048_Aldy.pdf 
Antilla, Liisa. 2005. “Climate of Scepticism: US Newspaper Coverage of the Science of 
Climate Change. Global Environmental Change 15: 338-352. 
Associated Press. 1997, December 26. “Yellowstone Park Emits Tons of Carbon 
Dioxide, Study Finds.” The New York Times, A27. 
Bartels, Larry M. 1988. Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2001. “Issue Niches And Policy 
Bandwagons: Patterns Of Interest Group Involvement In National Politics.” 
Journal of Politics, 63:1191–13 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2002. “Positive and Negative Feedback in 
Politics” in Policy Dynamics, edited by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 213 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2015. The Politics of Information: Problem 
Definition and the Course of Public Policy in America. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., Christian Breunig, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Bryan D. Jones, 
Peter B. Mortensen, Michiel Neytemans, and Stefaan Walgrave. 
2009. "Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective." American Journal of 
Political Science 53, 3, (July): 602-619. 
Bennett, W. Lance, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston. 2007. When the Press 
Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Bennett, W. Lance. 1996. “An Introduction to Journalism Norms and Representations of 
Politics.” Political Communication, 13(4): 373–384. 
Bennett, W. Lance. 2003. “A Semi-Independent Press: Government Control and 
Journalistic Autonomy in the Political Construction of News.” Political 
Communication, 20:359–362. 
Birkland, Thomas A. 1997. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing 
Events. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Birkland, Thomas A. 1998. “Focusing Events, Mobilization and Agenda Setting.” Journal 
of Public Policy 18(1): 53–74. 
Boushey, Graeme. 2010. Policy Diffusion Dynamics in America. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Boydstun, Amber. 2013. Making the News: Politics, the Media, and Agenda Setting. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Boykoff, Maxwell T., and Jules M. Boykoff. 2004. “Balance as Bias: Global Warming 
and the US Prestige Press.” Global Environmental Change 14: 125-136. 
Boykoff, Maxwell T., and Jules M. Boykoff. 2007. “Climate Change and Journalistic 
Norms: A Case-Study of US Mass-Media Coverage.” Geoforum 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum/2007.01.008 
Bracmort, Kelsi and Richard K. Lattanzio. 2013, November 26. “Geoengineering: 
Governance and Technology Policy.” Congressional Research Service 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41371.pdf 
Brahic, Catherine. 2006, November 10. “Carbon Emissions Rising Faster Than Ever.” 
New Scientist https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn10507-carbon-emissions-
rising-faster-than-ever/ 
Casti, John. 1997, November 30. “A LOOK AT. . . Complexities of Global Warming; 
What Scientists Don't Know -- And Why They Don't Know It.” Washington Post, 
H01. 
 214 
Chang, Kenneth. 2001, December 12. “Drastic Shifts In Climate Are Likely, Experts 
Warn.” New York Times, A19. 
Cobb, Roger W., and Charles R. Elder. 1972. Participation in American Politics: The 
Dynamics of Agenda- Building. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, Johan P. Olsen A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Mar., 
1972), pp. 1-25.[JSTORS] [particularly pp.1-3 & 9-13] 
Cook, John, Naomi Oreskes, Peter T Dora, William R L Anderegg, Bart Verheggen, 
EdW Maibach , J Stuart Carlton, Stephan Lewandowsky, Andrew G Skuce, Sarah 
A Green, Dana Nuccitelli, Peter Jacobs, Mark Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob 
Painting and Ken Rice. 2016. “Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of 
Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming.” Environmental 
Research Letters 11: doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002 
CQ Almanac 1990. 1991. “Global Warming Research Measure Enacted." Congressional 
Quarterly, 46th Ed., Washington, DC: 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal90-1112648. 
CQ Almanac 1992. 1993. "Congress Pressures Bush To Attend Rio Summit." 
Congressional Quarterly, 48th Ed., Washington, DC: 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal92-1107892. 
CQ Almanac 2005. 2006. “Energy Overhaul Includes Many Bush Priorities – But Not 
ANWAR. Congressional Quarterly, 61st Ed. Washington, DC: 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal05-766-20110-1042541. 
CQ Almanac 2009. 2010. “House Reaches Milestone with Cap-and-Trade Climate 
Change Bill.” Jan Austin (Ed). CQ-Roll Call Group, Washington, DC: 
htpp://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal09-1183-59541-2251356. 
CQ Almanac 2010. 2011. “Support for Oil-Drilling Bill Fades.” CQ Almanac, 66th Ed. 
Jan Austin (Ed), Washington, DC: http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal10-
1278-70366-2371913. 
CQ Almanac 2011. 2012. “House Efforts to Limit EPA Rules Come to a Halt in the 
Senate.” CQ Almanac, 67th Ed. Jane Austin (Ed). Washington, DC: 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal-1390-77517-2462204. 
CQ Weekly. 2007, February 5th. “House Panel Cranks Up Oversight Hearings on Global 
Warming.” 403: 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-000002443437. 
CQ Weekly. 2007, January 22. “Pelosi Wants to Create Global Warming Panel.” CQ 
Weekly http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-000002433726. 
 215 
Cullenward, Danny. 2010. “Carbon Taxes, Trading, and Offsets.” In Climate Change 
Science and Policy, Stephen Schneider, Armin Rosencranz, Michael Mastrandrea, 
and Kirstin Kuntz-Duriseti (Eds). Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Davenport, Coral. 2007a, June 18. “A Battle of House Titans, Reignited.” CQ Weekly: 
1828-29. http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-000002533304. 
Davenport, Coral. 2007b, September 3. “Facing the 50-Year Carbon Challenge.” CQ 
Weekly: 2520-
27.http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110000002576806. 
Davenport, Coral. 2007c, December 3. “All Eyes on the Uninvited at Climate Change 
Talks.” CQ Weekly http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-
000002634675. 
Davenport, Coral. 2009, July 6. “A Temperature Take on the Climate Bill.” CQ Weekly, 
Washington, DC: http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-
000003158433. 
Davenport, Coral. 2010a, January 25. “Climate Change Pledge Is No Easy Sell on Hill.” 
CQ Weekly http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-
000003283402. 
Davenport, Coral. 2010b, Feburary 5. “Selling a Climate Change Bill to Coal Country.” 
CQ Weekly: 385-86. http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-
000003293756. 
Dery, David. 1984. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis. Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas. 
Deutsch, Claudia H. 2007, August 29. “Trying to Connect the Dinner Plate to Climate 
Change.” The New York Times, C3. 
Downs, Anthony. 1972. “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle.” 
Public Interest 28: 38–50. 
Eilperin, Juliet. 2004, November 17. “14 Nations to Participate in Plan to Reduce 
Methane; Gas to Be Used as Energy Source in an Effort to Slow Global 
Warming.” The Washington Post, A2. 
Eilperin, Juliet. 2008, January 13. “Among Hottest Years On Record; Scientists Blame 
Trend On Greenhouse Gases.” Washington Post, A13. 
Eilperin, Juliet. 2009, January 27. “Long Droughts, Rising Seas Predicted Despite Future 
CO2 Curbs.” The Washington Post, A4. 
Eizenstat, Stuart E. 2006, November 4. “Seeing the Climate Policy for the Trees.” The 
New York Times, A19. 
Examining Climate Change and the Media, Senate, 109th Cong. 1, 2006 (Opening 
Statement of James Inhofe) 
 216 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Gamson, William A. and Andrew Modigliani. 1989. “Media Discourse and Public 
Opinion on Nuclear Power.” American Journal of Sociology 95: 1-37. 
Global Climate Change, Senate, 105th Cong.,1997. 
Global Climate Negotiations: Obligations of Developed and Developing Countries, 
House, 105th Cong., 1997. 
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Michelle Wolfe. 2009. “The Institutionalization of 
Environmental Attention in the United States and Denmark: Multiple- versus 
Single-Venue Systems.” Governance, 22(4): 625-646. 
Halpin, Darren. 2011. “Explaining Policy Bandwagons: Organized Interest Mobilization 
and Cascades of Attention.” Governance, 24(2): 205-230. 
Hansen, James, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis, and Valdar Oinas. 2000, 
August 29. “Global Warming in the Twenty-First Century: An Alternative 
Scenerio.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 97(18) 
10.1073/pnas.170278997 
Harvey, Chelsea. 2016, January 21. “How Climate Change Could Worsen the Spread of 




Herszenhorn, David M. 2009, March 11. “Senate Clears Spending After Fractious 
Debate.” The New York Times, A19. 
Hilgartner, Stephen, and Charles L. Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: 
A Public Arenas Model.” The American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53–78. 
Huslin, Anita. 2008, April 14. “Energy Boost; Solar and Wind Businesses Powered by 
Tax Breaks.” The Washington Post, A14. 
Jacobs, Andrew. 2009, December 23. “Chinese and British Officials Tangle in Testy 
Exchange Over Climate Agreement.” The New York Times, A10. 
Janofsky, Michael. 2006, June 27. “Justices Agree To Consider New Case On 
Emissions.” The New York Times, A14. 
John Cook, Dana Nuccitelli, Sarah A Green, Mark Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob 
Painting, Robert Way, Peter Jacobs,, and Andrew Skuce. 2013. Enviornmental 
Research Letters 8(2): doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/024024 
Jones, Bryan D. 1994a. “A Change of Mind or a Change of Focus? A Theory of Choice 
Reversals in Politics.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
JPART 4(2): 141-178. 
 217 
Jones, Bryan D. 1994b. Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: 
Attention, Choice, and Public Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and 
Governance. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How 
Government Prioritizes Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2012. “From There to Here: Punctuated 
Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government 
Information Processing.” Policy Studies Journal 40(1): 1-20. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Wolfe, Michelle. 2010. “Public Policy And The Mass Media: An 
Information Processing Approach”. In Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten & Katrin 
Voltmer (Eds.), Public Policy and The Media: The Interplay Of Mass 
Communication And Political Decision Making, (pp. 17–43). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Kingdon, John W. 1973. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. New York: Harper and Row 
Kingdon, John W. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Edition. Boston: 
Little, Brown. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Inofrmation and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Lamar, Smith. 2013, May 19. “Lamar Smith: Overheated Rhetoric on Climate Change 




Lamar, Smith. 2013, October 1. “Extreme Weather Isn’t Linked to Climate Change.” The 
Hill http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/325971-extreme-weather-isnt-linked-to-
climate-change 
Lawrence, Regina G. 2000. The Politics of Force. University of California Press. 
Lindblom, Charles E. 1960. “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’.” Public 
Administration Review 19: 79-88. 
Lippman, Walter. 1922. Public Opinion. New York, NY: Harcourt. 
Lowi, Theodore J. 1969. The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton. 
Lund, David C., Jean Lynch-Stieglitz, and William B. Curry. 2006, November 30. “Gulf 
Stream Density Structure and Transport During the Past Millennium.” Nature, 
444: 601-604 doi:10.1038/nature05277 
MacKuen, Michael, Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 2001. The Macro Polity. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 218 
Makhijani, Arjun. 1997, December 26. “Crying Wolf About Kyoto.” The Washington 
Post, A29. 
Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1988, July 5. “Gas and the Greenhouse Effect.” The 
Washington Post, A10. 
Matthews, Donald R., and James A. Stimson. 1975. Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-
Making in the U.S. House of Representatives. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons 
Inc. 
May, Peter J., Joshua Sapatichne, and Samuel Workman. 2009. “Widespread Policy 
Disruption: Terrorism, Public Risks, and Homeland Security.” Policy Studies 
Journal 347(2): 171-194. 
May, Peter, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. 2006. “Policy Coherence and 
Policy Domains.” Policy Studies Journal 34(3): 381-403. 
McCubbins, Mathew, and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political 
Science 28: 165-79. 
Michaels, Patrick J. 1997, June 22. “Holes in the Greenhouse Effect?” Washington Post, 
H01. 
Mufson, Steven, David A. Fahrenthold, and Paul Kane. 2009, June 27. “In Close Vote, 
House Passes Climate Bill; Measure Aims to Change Energy Use.” The 
Washington Post, A1. 
Mufson, Steven. 2006, October 18. “Talk of Raising Gas Tax Is Just That; Analysts Cite 
Advantages but Concede Its Political Improbability.” The Washington Post, A13. 
New York Times, The. 2001, June 12. “In President's Words: 'A Leadership Role on the 
Issue of Climate Change'.” The New York Times, A12. 
New York Times. 1988, July 3. “Don't Make a Villain of the Greenhouse Effect.” New 
York Times, A14. 
Newell, Allen, and Herbert A. Simon. 1972. Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. 2010. Merchants of Doubt. New York: 
Bloomsbury. 
Painter, James, and Teresa Ashe. 2012. “Cross-National Comparison of the Presence of 
Climate Scepticism in the Print Media in Six Countries, 2007-10. Environmental 
Research Letters 7: doi:10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/044005 
Palmer, Avery. 2007a, September 7. “Fall Agenda: Climate Change.” CQ Weekly: 2548. 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-0000002576922. 
Palmer, Avery. 2007b, December 10. “Greenhouse Gas Bill Advances in Senate.” CQ 
Weekly http://library.cqpres.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-0000002638892. 
 219 
Pianin, Eric. 2001, August 6. “Aide: Bush Warming Plan Likely; Card Is 'Optimistic' 
Kyoto Alternative Will Be Ready by Fall.” Washington Post, A16. 
Pralle, Sarah B. 2003. “Venue Shopping, Political Strategy and Policy Change: The 
Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy.” Journal of Public Policy, 23: 
233-260. 
Pralle, Sarah B. 2006. “The Mouse that Roared: Agenda Setting in Canadian Pesticide 
Politics.” Policy Studies Journal, 34(2): 171-194. 
Rabe, Barry. 2007. “Can Congress Govern the Climate?” Legislating for the Future 
Project, Research Brief – Number 1 
Rein, Lisa. 2015, December 16. “NOAA Chief Duels with Climate Skeptics.” The 
Washington Post, A19. 
Rensberger, Joyce. 1993, June 1. “‘Greenhouse Effect' Seems Benign So Far; Warming 
Most Evident At Night, in Winter.” The Washington Post, A19. 
Revkin, Andrew C. 2000, November 24. “Effort to Cut Warming Lacks Time And 
Unity.” New York Times, A21. 
Revkin, Andrew C. 2006, January 29. “Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence 
Him.” The New York Times, A1 
Revkin, Andrew C. 2009, March 29. “Among Climate Scientists, a Dispute Over 'Tipping 
Points'.” The New York Times, W3. 
Rochefort, David A., and Roger W. Cobb, eds. 1994. The Politics of Problem Definition. 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Rochefort, David A., and Roger W. Cobb. 1993. “Problem Definition, Agenda Access, 
and Policy Choice.” Policy Studies Journal 21(1): 56-71. 
Rosenthal, Elisabeth. 2008, December 13. “Amid a Hopeful Mood, U.N. Talks Set 
Countries on Path Toward a Global Climate Treaty.” The New York Times, A7. 
Rosenthal, Elisabeth. 2008, February 8. “Studies Call Biofuels a Greenhouse Threat.” 
The New York Times, A9. 
Rothman, Stanley, and S. Robert Lichter. 1982. “The Nuclear Energy Debate: Scientists, 
the Media, and the Public. Public Opinion 5: 47-52. 
Sabatier, Paul A. 1998. “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance 
for Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 5(1): 98-130. 
Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Samuelson, R. J. 1992, June 1. “The End is Not at Hand.” Newsweek, 43. 
Sawyer, Kathy, and Gary Lee. 1995, October 25. “Global Warming Forecast Is for 
Slower Rate Than Previously Feared.” Washington Post, A12. 
 220 
Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semi-sovereign People. New York: Holt. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton. 
Schmid-Petri, Hannah, Silke Adam, Ivo Schmucki, and Thomas Haussler. 2015. “A 
Changing Climate of Skepticism: The Factors Shaping Climate Change Coverage 
in the US Press.” Public Understanding of Science 1-16 DOI: 
10.1177/0963662515612276 
Schneider, Ann, and Helen Ingram. “Social Construction of Target Populations: 
Implications for Politics and Policy. The American Political Science Review 
87(2): 334-347. 
Selin, Henrik, and Stacy D. VanDeveer (Eds). 2007. Changing Climates in North 
American Politics: Institutions, Policymaking, and Multilevel Governance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Shabecoff, Philip. 1989, Jaunary 17. “Global Warming: Experts Ponder Bewildering 
Feedback Effects.” New York Times, C1. 
Shafran, JoBeth Surface. 2015. Whirlpools of Information: Information Processing in 
Policy Subsystems 1995-2010. PhD Dissertation: The University of Texas at 
Austin. 
Shaping the Message, Distorting the Science: Media Strategies to Influence Science 
Policy, House, 110th Cong. 3, 2007 (Opening Statement of Brad Miller). 
Shehata, Adam, and David Nicolas Hopmann. 2012. “Framing Climate Change.” 
Journalism Studies 13(2): 175-192. 
Sheppard, Kate. 2016, March 10. “Marco Rubio Spouts Every Type of Climate Denial.” 
The Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/marco-rubio-climate-
change_us_56e239f3e4b0860f99d8882b 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of 
Committee Power.” American Political Science Review 81: 85-104. 
Sigal, Leon V. 1973. Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of 
Newsmaking. Lexington, CA: DC Heath. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1983. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1997. Administrative Behavior. 4th ed. New York: Free Press. 
Simon, Herbert. 1947. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes 
in Administrative Organization. New York: The Macmillan Company. 
Sparrow, Bartholomew H. 1999. Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political 
Institution. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 221 
Specter, Michael. 1990, January 13. “Record Hot Readings in 1980s Boost Global-
Warming Theory.” Washington Post, A20. 
Steffen, Will. 2011. “A Truly Complex and Diabolical Problem.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Climate Change and Society, John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, 
and David Schlosberg (Eds). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 21-37. 
Stevens, William K. 1989, November 21. “Methane From Guts of Livestock Is New 
Focus in Global Warming.” The New York Times, C4. 
Stevens, William K. 1990, April 5. “New Peril Seen on Earth Warming.” New York 
Times, A18. 
Stevens, William K. 1991, November 11. “Urgent Steps Urged on Warming Threat.” 
New York Times, B12. 
Stevens, William K. 1995, August 15. “Ice Age Evidence Suggests a Mercurial Tropical 
Climate.” New York Times, C4. 
Stevens, William K. 1995, September 26. “In Rain and Temperature Data, New Signs of 
Global Warming.” New York Times, C4. 
Stevens, William K. 1995a, September 10. “Global Warming Experts Call Human Role 
Likely.” New York Times, A1. 
Stevens, William K. 1995b, September 18. “Scientists Say Earth's Warming Could Set 
Off Wide Disruptions.” New York Times, A1. 
Stevens, William K. 1997, September 9. “Warming Could Bring Some Cold Surprises.” 
New York Times, C2. 
Stone, Deborah A. 1988. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman. 
Stone, Deborah A. 1989. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.” Political 
Science Quarterly104: 281-300. 
Stott, Peter A., D. A. Stone, and M. R. Allen. 2004, December 2. “Human Contribution to 
the European Heatwave of 2003.” Nature, 432: 610-614  doi:10.1038/nature03089 
Suplee, Curt. 1997, November 28. “Team Challenges Theory Linking Climate Change, 
Evolutionary Surge.” Washington Post, A15. 
Thomas, F. Thomas. 2015. Contagious Agendas: The Spread of Issue Attention in the 
Policy Process. PhD Dissertation: The University of Texas at Austin. 
Truman, David. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf. 
Vastag, Bryan. 2011, February 16. “Science gets a boost in budget.” The Washington 
Post, A2. 
Wald, Matthew L. 2009, July 14. “Debate on Clean Energy Leads to a Regional Battle 
Over Jobs.” The New York Times, A13. 
 222 
Walgrave, Stefaan, and Peter Van Aelst. 2006. “The Contingency of the Mass Media’s 
Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory.” Journal of 
Communication 56: 88–109.  
Washington Post, The. 2008, February 27. “The Problem With Biofuels; More proof that 
there are no easy solutions to climate change.” The Washington Post, A14. 
Washington Post, The. 2008, March 9. “Eat Locally, Ease Climate Change Globally.” 
The Washington Post, B6. 
Washington Post. 1989, February 11. “I'm Not Being an Alarmist About the Greenhouse 
Effect.” Washington Post, A10. 
Weeks, Elaine L., Jacqueline M. Boles, Albeno P. Garbin, and John Blount. 1986. “The 
Transformation of Sexual Harassment from a Private Trouble to a Public Issue.” 
Sociological Inquiry 56: 432-55. 
Weiss, Rick. 1996, October 7. “The Sun Also Braises; Renewable Energy Advocates 
Offer Invention That Can Harness and Ease Global Warming.” The Washington 
Post, A15. 
Weisskopf, Michael. 1989, February 4. “1988 Set Warmth Record, British 
Meteorologists Report; Scientists Differ on Signs of Long-Term Global Trend.” 
The Washington Post, A20. 
Wildavsky, Aaron. 1964. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown. 
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for 
Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 39: 981-1000. 
Wolfe, Michelle, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. “A Failure to 
Communicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies.” Political 
Communication, 30(2), 175-192. 
Wolfe, Michelle. 2012. “Putting On The Brakes Or Pressing On The Gas? Media 
Attention And The Speed Of Policymaking.” Policy Studies Journal, 40, 109–
126.  
Workman, Samuel, Bryan D. Jones, and Ashley E. Jochim. 2009. “Information 
Processing and Policy Dynamics.” Policy Studies Journal, 37(1): 75-92. 
Workman, Samuel. 2015. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government: How 
Congress and Federal Agencies Process Information and Solve Problems. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zehr, Stephen C. 2000. “Public Representations of Scientific Uncertainty about Global 
Climate Change.” Public Understanding of Science 9: 85-103. 
 223 
Zehr, Stephen C. 2009. “An Environmentalist/Economic Hybrid Frame in US Press 
Coverage of Climate Change, 2000-2008.” In Climate Change and the Media, 
Tammy Boyce and Justin Lewis (Eds), 80-91. New York: Peter Lang. 
